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Abstract 
Risk averse farmers face a substantial challenge managing irrigation water when they 
face limited water availability. The two primary reasons for limited water availability in the High 
Plains Aquifer region of the United States are limited well capacity (i.e., the rate at which 
groundwater can be extracted) or a constraint imposed by a policy. In this dissertation, I study 
how risk averse farmers optimally manage limited water availability in the face of weather 
uncertainty and also the impact of limited water availability on farmer welfare.  
I use AquaCrop, a daily biophysical crop simulation model, to predict corn yield under 
alternative irrigation scenarios with historical weather. Since no simple functional form exists for 
the crop production function, I use discrete optimization and consider 234,256 potential 
irrigation strategies. I also account for risk preferences by using expected utility analysis to 
determine the optimal irrigation strategy. Using a daily biophysical model is important because 
water stress in a short period of the growing season can impact crop yield (even if average water 
availability throughout the growing season is sufficient) and well capacity is a constraint on daily 
water use.  The daily biophysical crop simulation model accounts for the dynamic response of 
crop production to water availability.  
First, I examine how optimal irrigation strategies change due to limited water availability. 
I find that it is never optimal for irrigators to apply less than a particular minimum instantaneous 
rate per irrigated acre. An optimal required instantaneous rate implies that a farmer with a low 
well capacity focuses on adjustment at the extensive margin. On the other hand, farmers who 
initially have a high well capacity should adjust at the intensive margin in response to well 
capacity declining. I also find that total water use increases as the degree of risk aversion 
increases. More risk averse farmers increase water use by increasing irrigation intensity to reduce 
  
the variance in corn yields. Another important finding is that a higher well capacity could 
actually promote less water use because the higher well capacity allows a greater instantaneous 
rate of application that allows the farmer to decrease irrigation intensity while still maintaining or 
increasing corn yield. This finding may imply an accelerated rate of groundwater extraction 
when the groundwater depletion reaches a particular threshold. 
Second, I analyze the welfare loss due to limited water availability. The relationship 
between welfare loss and well capacity due to a policy constraint differs by soil type.  I found the 
welfare loss from a water constraint policy does not always increase as well capacity increases. 
Farmers with very high well capacity may make small or no adjustment at the extensive margin 
due to a higher instantaneous rate and higher soil water holding capacity. However, that is not 
the case for a farmer with land that has lower soil water holding capacity as the increase in well 
capacity results in greater welfare loss. I also investigate the effect of risk averse behavior on the 
magnitude of welfare loss. I found that the welfare loss per unit of reduced water use is lower for 
the farmer with more risk aversion. Thus, economic models that ignore risk aversion misestimate 
the cost of reducing water use. 
Finally, I investigate the incentive for adopting drip irrigation and its effect on water use. 
I find that a decrease in well capacity increases the benefits of adopting drip irrigation but is not 
sufficient to overcome the high initial investment cost without government support. While 
subsidies of the magnitude offered by current U.S. programs are sufficient to induce drip 
irrigation adoption, I find that such subsidies have the unintended consequence of increasing 
total water use, particularly for small well capacities.   
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the variance in corn yields. Another important finding is that a higher well capacity could 
actually promote less water use because the higher well capacity allows a greater instantaneous 
rate of application that allows the farmer to decrease irrigation intensity while still maintaining or 
increasing corn yield. This finding may imply an accelerated rate of groundwater extraction 
when the groundwater depletion reaches a particular threshold. 
Second, I analyze the welfare loss due to limited water availability. The relationship 
between welfare loss and well capacity due to a policy constraint differs by soil type.  I found the 
welfare loss from a water constraint policy does not always increase as well capacity increases. 
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due to a higher instantaneous rate and higher soil water holding capacity. However, that is not 
the case for a farmer with land that has lower soil water holding capacity as the increase in well 
capacity results in greater welfare loss. I also investigate the effect of risk averse behavior on the 
magnitude of welfare loss. I found that the welfare loss per unit of reduced water use is lower for 
the farmer with more risk aversion. Thus, economic models that ignore risk aversion misestimate 
the cost of reducing water use. 
Finally, I investigate the incentive for adopting drip irrigation and its effect on water use. 
I find that a decrease in well capacity increases the benefits of adopting drip irrigation but is not 
sufficient to overcome the high initial investment cost without government support. While 
subsidies of the magnitude offered by current U.S. programs are sufficient to induce drip 
irrigation adoption, I find that such subsidies have the unintended consequence of increasing 
total water use, particularly for small well capacities.   
 
 
viii 
Table of Contents 
List of Figures ................................................................................................................................ xi 
List of Tables .............................................................................................................................. xvii 
Acknowledgements .................................................................................................................... xviii 
Dedication .................................................................................................................................... xix 
Chapter 1 - Introduction .................................................................................................................. 1 
1.1 Objectives and Main Findings .............................................................................................. 9 
1.2 Organization of the remaining chapters .............................................................................. 13 
Chapter 2 - Literature review ........................................................................................................ 14 
2.1 Crop-water production function and AquaCrop ................................................................. 14 
2.2 Irrigation schedule and Management Allowed Deficit (MAD) .......................................... 18 
2.3 Limited water availability ................................................................................................... 21 
2.4 Adjustment in extensive and intensive margin ................................................................... 24 
2.5 Adoption of more efficient and modern irrigation technology ........................................... 28 
2.6 Decision under risk and uncertainty ................................................................................... 29 
Chapter 3 - Research methodology ............................................................................................... 33 
3.1. Expected Utility ................................................................................................................. 34 
3.2. Producer decision-making model ...................................................................................... 38 
3.3 Adjustment on extensive and intensive margin .................................................................. 40 
3.4 Discrete simulation model .................................................................................................. 44 
3.4.1 AquaCrop model .......................................................................................................... 47 
3.4.2 Parameter of output and input price ............................................................................. 48 
3.5 Analysis of welfare loss affected by water constraint policy and lower well capacity ...... 50 
3.6 Estimating upper bound and corresponding absolute risk aversion coefficient (r) ............ 51 
3.7 Model validation ................................................................................................................. 54 
Chapter 4 - Optimal irrigation strategies with a limited well capacity or a water constraint policy
 ............................................................................................................................................... 56 
4.1. The impact of a decrease in well capacity on optimal irrigation strategy and water use .. 57 
4.1.1 Risk neutral farmers with Richfield soil ...................................................................... 57 
4.1.2 Comparison between results Richfield soil and Valent-Vona soil .............................. 66 
ix 
4.2. The impact of risk averse behavior on water use and welfare ........................................... 72 
4.2.1 Average and standard deviation of net return for risk neutral farmer affected by well 
capacity ................................................................................................................................. 72 
4.2.2. The effect of risk averse behavior on irrigation strategies and water for Richfield soil 
without water constraint policy ............................................................................................. 74 
4.2.3. The effect of risk averse behavior on irrigation strategies and water use for Valent-
Vona soil without water constraint policy ............................................................................ 78 
4.2.4. The comparison of the effect of risk averse behavior to average net return and 
distribution of net return between Richfield soil and Valent-Vona soil ............................... 82 
4.3. The effect of water constraint policy on irrigation strategy and water use ........................ 84 
4.3.1 The effect of water constraint policy on irrigation strategy and water use for risk 
neutral farmer with Richfield soil ......................................................................................... 84 
4.3.2 The effect of water constraint policy on irrigation strategy and water use for risk 
neutral farmer with Valent-Vona soil ................................................................................... 89 
4.3.3. The effect of risk averse behavior on irrigation strategy and water use for Richfield 
soil with government enforced water constraint policy ........................................................ 92 
4.3.4. The effect of risk averse behavior on irrigation strategy and water use for Valent-
Vona soil with a binding water constraint policy ................................................................. 97 
4.4. Economic implication ........................................................................................................ 99 
Chapter 5 - The welfare loss as a result of reductions in well capacity and water constraint policy
 ............................................................................................................................................. 101 
5.1. The effect of well capacity reduction on welfare loss for Richfield soil and Valent-Vona 
soil ........................................................................................................................................... 102 
5.2 Welfare loss of water constraint policy affected by the decrease in well capacity........... 108 
5.2.1 Welfare loss of water constraint policy affected by the decrease in well capacity for 
risk neutral farmer with Richfield soil ................................................................................ 108 
5.2.2 Welfare loss of water constraint policy affected by the decrease in well capacity for 
risk neutral farmer with Valent-Vona soil .......................................................................... 112 
5.3 Welfare loss from water constraint policy affected by risk premium ............................... 115 
5.3.1 Welfare loss from water constraint policy affected by risk premium regarding 
Richfield soil ....................................................................................................................... 116 
x 
5.3.2 Welfare loss from water constraint policy affected by risk premium of Valent-Vona 
soil ....................................................................................................................................... 118 
5.4 The effect of different quantity constraints on welfare loss ............................................. 121 
5.4.1 The effect of quantity constraint on welfare loss for Richfield soil........................... 121 
5.4.2 The effect of quantity constraint to welfare loss for Valent-Vona soil ...................... 124 
5.5 Economic implication ....................................................................................................... 127 
Chapter 6 - The incentive for adoption of more efficient irrigation technology and the effect of 
adoption on water use .......................................................................................................... 129 
6.1 The effect of the decrease in well capacity on adopting more efficient irrigation technology
 ................................................................................................................................................ 132 
6.2 The effect of water constraint policy and risk averse behavior on adopting more efficient 
irrigation technology for land with Richfield soil .................................................................. 136 
6.3. The effect of investment subsidy to adoption of drip irrigation ...................................... 139 
Chapter 7 - Summary and conclusion ......................................................................................... 147 
References ................................................................................................................................... 154 
  
xi 
List of Figures 
Figure 1.1 Change in saturated thickness for the High Plains Aquifer in Kansas .......................... 3 
Figure 1.2 The Pac-Man shape of center pivot irrigation system ................................................... 8 
Figure 2.1 Management Allowed Deficit (MAD)  ....................................................................... 20 
Figure 3.1 Maximum irrigated acreage size and instantaneous rate of application (mm/day) for 
different combinations of well capacity (GPM) for center pivot irrigation .......................... 42 
Figure 3.2 Crop growth stage........................................................................................................ 43 
Figure 3.3 Discrete simulation model ........................................................................................... 45 
Figure 4.1 Average total irrigation for Richfield soil ................................................................... 58 
Figure 4.2 Average irrigation acreage for Richfield soil .............................................................. 58 
Figure 4.3 Instantaneous rate of application and average irrigation intensity for Richfield soil .. 59 
Figure 4.4 Corn yield for Richfield soil ........................................................................................ 62 
Figure 4.5 Average total production for Richfield soil ................................................................. 62 
Figure 4.6 Expected net return Richfield soil ............................................................................... 63 
Figure 4.7 Average total irrigation comparison between Richfield soil and Valent-Vona soil .... 66 
Figure 4.8 Average irrigation acreage comparison between Richfield soil and Valent-Vona soil66 
Figure 4.9 Instantaneous rate and average irrigation intensity comparison between Richfield soil 
and Valent-Vona soil ............................................................................................................ 69 
Figure 4.10 Corn yield comparison between Richfield soil and Valent-Vona soil ...................... 70 
Figure 4.11 Average total production comparison between Richfield soil and Valent-Vona soil 70 
Figure 4.12 Expected net return comparison between Richfield soil and Valent-Vona soil ........ 71 
Figure 4.13 Average and standard deviation of net return Richfield soil and Valent-Vona soil .. 73 
Figure 4.14 Average total irrigation for Richfield soil affected by risk averse behavior ............. 75 
Figure 4.15 Instantaneous rate of application for  Richfield soil affecting by risk averse behavior
 ............................................................................................................................................... 75 
Figure 4.16 Average irrigation intensity for  Richfield soil affected by risk averse behavior ..... 78 
Figure 4.17 Irrigated acreage for  Richfield soil affected by risk averse behavior ....................... 78 
Figure 4.18 Average total irrigation for  Valent-Vona soil affected by risk averse behavior ...... 79 
Figure 4.19 Average irrigation intensity for  Valent-Vona soil  affected by risk averse behavior80 
Figure 4.20 Irrigated acreage for  Valent-Vona soil affected by risk averse behavior ................. 80 
xii 
Figure 4.21 Instantaneous rate of application for  Valent-Vona soil affecting by risk averse 
behavior ................................................................................................................................. 81 
Figure 4.22 Comparison of average and standard deviation net return for risk averse farmer with 
Richfield soil or Valent-Vona soil ........................................................................................ 83 
Figure 4.23 Expected net return for Risk neutral farmer with Richfield soil affected by quantity 
constraint with 5 year average time constraint ..................................................................... 85 
Figure 4.24 Average total water use for Risk neutral farmer with Richfield soil affected by 
quantity constraint with 5 year average time constraint ....................................................... 85 
Figure 4.25 Irrigation acreage for Risk neutral farmer with Richfield soil affected by quantity 
constraint with 5 year average time constraint ..................................................................... 87 
Figure 4.26 Average irrigation intensity for Risk neutral farmer with Richfield soil affected by 
quantity constraint with 5 year average time constraint ....................................................... 87 
Figure 4.27 Instantaneous rate of application for Risk neutral farmer with Valent-Vona soil 
affected by quantity constraint with 5 year average time constraint..................................... 88 
Figure 4.28 Expected net return for Risk neutral farmer with Valent-Vona soil affected by 
quantity constraint ................................................................................................................. 90 
Figure 4.29 Average total water use for Risk neutral farmer with Valent-Vona soil affected by 
quantity constraint ................................................................................................................. 90 
Figure 4.30 Irrigation acreage for Risk neutral farmer with Valent-Vona soil affected by quantity 
constraint ............................................................................................................................... 91 
Figure 4.31 Irrigation intensity use for Risk neutral farmer with Valent-Vona soil affected by 
quantity constraint ................................................................................................................. 91 
Figure 4.32 Instantaneous rate of application for risk neutral farmer with Valent-Vona soil 
affected by quantity constraint with 5 year average time constraint..................................... 92 
Figure 4.33 Expected net return for risk averse farmer with Richfield soil affected by water 
constraint ............................................................................................................................... 93 
Figure 4.34 Standard deviation of net return for risk averse farmer with Richfield soil affected by 
water constraint ..................................................................................................................... 93 
Figure 4.35 Average total irrigation for risk averse farmer with Richfield soil affected by water 
constraint ............................................................................................................................... 94 
xiii 
Figure 4.36 Irrigation acreage for Risk averse farmer with Richfield soil affected by water 
constraint ............................................................................................................................... 95 
Figure 4.37 Irrigation intensity of net return for Risk averse farmer with Richfield soil affected 
by water ................................................................................................................................. 95 
Figure 4.38 Irrigation acreage and average irrigation intensity for risk averse farmer with 
Richfield soil affected by quantity constraint ....................................................................... 96 
Figure 4.39 Expected net return for risk averse farmer with Valent-Vona soil affected by water 
constraint ............................................................................................................................... 97 
Figure 4.40 Irrigated acreage for risk averse farmer with Valent-Vona soil affected by water 
constraint ............................................................................................................................... 97 
Figure 4.41 Average total irrigation for risk averse farmer with Valent-Vona soil affected by 
water constraint ..................................................................................................................... 98 
Figure 4.42 Irrigation acreage for Risk averse farmer with Valent-Vona soil affected by water 
constraint ............................................................................................................................... 99 
Figure 4.43 Irrigation intensity of net return for Risk averse farmer with Valent-Vona soil 
affected by water ................................................................................................................... 99 
Figure 4.44 Implication of groundwater depletion over time ..................................................... 100 
Figure 5.1 Certainty equivalent per acre without water constraint policy for Richfield soil ...... 103 
Figure 5.2 Certainty equivalent per acre without water constraint policy for Valent-Vona soil 103 
Figure 5.3 Welfare loss water constraint policy affected by well capacity declining to Richfield 
soil ....................................................................................................................................... 109 
Figure 5.4 Water saving affected by well capacity declining to Richfield soil .......................... 111 
Figure 5.5 Cost of water saving affected by well capacity declining to Richfield soil .............. 111 
Figure 5.6 Welfare loss from water constraint policy affected by well capacity declining for 
Valent-Vona soil ................................................................................................................. 113 
Figure 5.7 Water saving affected by well capacity declining for land with Valent-Vona soil ... 115 
Figure 5.8 Cost of water saving affected by well capacity declining for land with Valent-Vona 
soil ....................................................................................................................................... 115 
Figure 5.9 Welfare loss of water constraint policy affected by risk premium for land with 
Richfield soil ....................................................................................................................... 117 
Figure 5.10 Water saving affected by risk premium for land with Richfield soil ...................... 118 
xiv 
Figure 5.11 Cost of water saving affected by risk premium for land with Richfield soil .......... 118 
Figure 5.12 Welfare loss of water constraint policy affected by risk averse behavior for land with 
Valent-Vona soil ................................................................................................................. 119 
Figure 5.13 Water saving affected by risk averse behavior for land with Valent-Vona soil ...... 120 
Figure 5.14 Cost of water saving affected by risk averse behavior for land with Valent-Vona soil
 ............................................................................................................................................. 120 
Figure 5.15 Welfare loss affected by quantity constraint for risk neutral farmer with Richfield 
soil ....................................................................................................................................... 121 
Figure 5.16 Welfare loss affected by quantity constraint for risk averse farmer with Richfield soil
 ............................................................................................................................................. 121 
Figure 5.17 Water saving affected by quantity constraint for risk neutral farmer with Richfield 
soil ....................................................................................................................................... 123 
Figure 5.18 Water saving affected by quantity constraint for risk averse farmer with Richfield 
soil ....................................................................................................................................... 123 
Figure 5.19 Cost of water saving affected by quantity constraint for risk neutral farmer with 
Richfield soil ....................................................................................................................... 124 
Figure 5.20 Cost of water saving affected by quantity constraint for risk averse farmer with 
Richfield soil ....................................................................................................................... 124 
Figure 5.21 Welfare loss affected by quantity constraint for risk neutral farmer with Valent-Vona 
soil ....................................................................................................................................... 125 
Figure 5.22 Welfare loss affected by quantity constraint for risk averse farmer with Valent-Vona 
soil ....................................................................................................................................... 125 
Figure 5.23 Water saving affected by quantity constraint for risk neutral farmer with Valent-
Vona soil ............................................................................................................................. 126 
Figure 5.24 Water saving affected by quantity constraint for risk averse farmer with Valent-Vona 
soil ....................................................................................................................................... 126 
Figure 5.25 Cost of water saving affected by quantity constraint for risk neutral farmer with 
Valent-Vona soil ................................................................................................................. 127 
Figure 5.26 Cost of water saving affected by quantity constraint for risk averse farmer with 
Valent-Vona soil ................................................................................................................. 127 
xv 
Figure 6.1 Certainty equivalent comparison between Drip and Center pivot irrigation without 
water constraint policy for risk neutral farmer with Richfield............................................ 132 
Figure 6.2 Crop Production and corn yield comparison between Drip and Center pivot irrigation 
without water constraint policy for risk neutral farmer with Richfield soil........................ 133 
Figure 6.3 Irrigated acreage comparison between Drip and Center pivot irrigation without water 
constraint policy for risk neutral farmer with Richfield soil ............................................... 134 
Figure 6.4 Total irrigation comparison between Drip and Center pivot irrigation without water 
constraint policy for risk neutral farmer with Richfield soil ............................................... 134 
Figure 6.5  Irrigation intensity and instantaneous rate comparison between Drip and Center pivot 
irrigation without water constraint policy for risk neutral farmer with Richfield soil ........ 135 
Figure 6.6 Certainty equivalent comparison between Drip and Center pivot irrigation affected by 
quantity constraint for risk neutral farmer with Richfield soil and 600 GPM .................... 137 
Figure 6.7 Certainty equivalent comparison between Drip and Center pivot irrigation affected by 
quantity constraint for risk averse farmer with Richfield soil and 600 GPM ..................... 137 
Figure 6.8 Certainty equivalent comparison between Drip and Center pivot irrigation affected by 
quantity constraint for risk-averse farmer with Richfield soil and 400, 900, 1100 GPM well 
capacity ............................................................................................................................... 138 
Figure 6.9  Total irrigation, irrigation acreage, irrigation intensity and instantaneous rate 
comparison between Drip and Center pivot irrigation affected by quantity constraint for risk 
averse farmer with Richfield soil and 600 GPM ................................................................ 139 
Figure 6.10 Certainty equivalent comparison between Center pivot irrigation and Drip irrigation 
with investment subsidy and acreage constraint for risk neutral farmer with Richfield soil
 ............................................................................................................................................. 141 
Figure 6.11 Total irrigation water use comparison between Center pivot irrigation and Drip 
irrigation with investment subsidy and acreage constraint but without water constraint for 
risk neutral farmer with Richfield soil ................................................................................ 143 
Figure 6.12 Irrigated acreage and irrigation intensity comparison between Center pivot irrigation 
and Drip irrigation with investment subsidy and acreage constraint but without water 
constraint for risk neutral farmer with Richfield soil .......................................................... 144 
xvi 
Figure 6.13 Certainty equivalent comparison between Center pivot irrigation and Drip irrigation 
with investment subsidy, acreage constraint and water constraint for risk neutral farmer with 
Richfield soil ....................................................................................................................... 145 
Figure 6.14 total irrigation water use comparison between Center pivot irrigation and Drip 
irrigation with investment subsidy, acreage constraint, quantity constraint, and no quantity 
constraint for risk neutral farmer with Richfield soil .......................................................... 146 
Figure 6.15 Irrigated acreage and irrigation intensity comparison between Center pivot irrigation 
and Drip irrigation with investment subsidy, acreage constraint and quantity constraint for 
risk neutral farmer with Richfield soil ................................................................................ 146 
 
  
xvii 
List of Tables 
Table 3-1 Soil characteristic for Richfield Silt Loam and Valent-Vona Loamy Fine Sands ....... 48 
Table 3-2 The parameters of input cost of production .................................................................. 49 
Table 3-3 Risk aversion coefficient (r) value for Richfield soil and Valent-Vona soil ................ 54 
Table 4-1 Instantaneous rate and MAD for Richfield soil and Valent-Vona soil ........................ 68 
Table 4-2 Instantaneous rate and MAD for Richfield soil affected by risk averse behavior ........ 77 
Table 4-3 Instantaneous rate and MAD for Valent-Vona soil affected by risk averse behavior .. 82 
Table 5-1 Certainty equivalent affected by well capacity and risk premium ............................. 106 
 
  
xviii 
Acknowledgements 
Al-hamdu lillah rabbil ‘alamin, all praise to the Almighty Allah SWT, who has given me 
strength and composure to finish my study.  
 I am thankful to Dr. Nathan P Hendricks for guidance and mentoring me as I progress to 
finish my study. He is an excellent professor, but an even better mentor. His patience, flexibility 
and encouragement are always an inspiration for me. The open-door policy that he has for 
students is one of the reasons that I can pass all of the obstacles during my dissertation work. I 
would like to thank my supervisory committee members, Dr. Jeffrey M. Peterson, Dr. Jason 
Bergtold and Dr. Ignacio M. Ciampitti to help me through my study and their advice on my 
dissertation. 
 I wish to thank Dr. Allen M Featherstone and Dr. Sean Fox who have been excellent 
professors and really taken good care of me and all the other students during our study. I would 
also like to thank all the staff, Judy, Amy, Deana, and Mary for their readiness to help me in 
whatever I needed. I cannot survive and finish my study without the help of all my friends. 
Thanks also to all students in our department who have always given a warm friendship and 
help. 
 I would like to thank my parents, Sumono and Sukadah, who always support and pray for 
my success not only in life but also here after. May Almighty Allah always give his blessing to 
them. I cannot finish my study without the endless support and encouragement of my beloved 
Wife, Rohazatulsima Binti Ahmad. I will always remember her sacrifice deep down in my heart. 
The success of completing my studies is not only for me but it is for both of us. May Almighty 
Allah always bless and protect her. 
 
xix 
Dedication 
To my beloved Father and Mother for their unconditional love and support. To my beloved wife, 
Rohazatulsima Binti Ahmad for her patience, sacrifice and love.  
 
  
1 
Chapter 1 - Introduction 
Risk averse farmers face a substantial challenge in managing irrigation water when they 
face limited water availability. The two primary reasons for limited water availability in the High 
Plains Aquifer region of the United States are limited well capacity (i.e., the rate at which 
groundwater can be extracted) or policy constraint. Understanding optimal management of a 
limited amount of water requires an understanding of how risk aversion impacts behavior due to 
weather uncertainty. For example, a limited amount of water may still produce excellent crop 
yields with average rainfall, but in drought years producers suffer extreme losses, and this 
uncertainty results in a different management strategy under risk aversion. In this dissertation, I 
study how risk averse farmers optimally manage limited water availability in the face of weather 
uncertainty and the impact of limited water availability on farmer welfare.  
Kansas has above average weather unpredictability (Silver and Fischer-baum 2014), so 
its  weather volatility challenges a risk averse farmer to find an optimal irrigation strategy. This 
uncertainty is also likely to increase in the future due to climate change (Lobell et al. 2008; 
Lobell, Schlenker and Costa-Roberts 2011).  
A farmer may apply groundwater irrigation to mitigate the risk in production associated 
with weather variability  (Jain et al. 2015; Wood et al. 2014).  However, due to the limited water 
availability, groundwater irrigation needs to be managed efficiently to gain maximum profit or 
risk-adjusted profit and conserve groundwater. Unfortunately, groundwater irrigation adjusted 
for limited water availability will not diminish risk completely as some uncertainty will remain 
(English 1990). Ultimately, the farmer will choose irrigation strategies that give optimum 
profitability relative to their risk behavior and risk preference. 
2 
Farmers in the high plains have historically pumped water from the aquifer at a rate that 
has resulted in severe aquifer depletion (Buchanan et al. 2001; Opie 2000), which in turn  
reduces the saturated thickness and subsequently  decreases well capacity. The Ogallala Aquifer 
(or High Plains Aquifer), one of the main groundwater sources in Kansas, has depleted in some 
areas by 60% (see Figure 1.1).  The extent of depletion differs across the aquifer region because 
of several factors such as historical pumping rate, natural discharge, physical aquifer properties, 
and natural and human-induced recharge rates (USGS 2016).  
Nonetheless, the decrease in well capacity may become a major factor limiting irrigation 
water use since well capacity limits the instantaneous rate of irrigation water application and 
limits the soil moisture range that a farmer can effectively manage for a given water constraint 
(Foster, Brozović and Butler 2014; Upendram, Wibowo and Peterson 2015). Consequently, an 
important question is how do the welfare impacts of the decline in well capacity account for a 
farmer’s optimal adjustments to irrigation strategy? 
To address this question, water constraint policies have been enacted to reduce the rate of 
saturated thickness affecting depletion and thereby extend the use of the aquifer for irrigation. 
However, lower water constraint will limit water irrigation even though the farmer has high well 
capacity (Foster et al. 2014; Peterson and Ding 2005). An important factor of water constraint 
policy is not only the quantity of quota but also the time range of the constraint. A longer time 
constraint may give the farmer more ability to adjust an irrigation strategy to minimize the risk in 
crop production from weather uncertainty. 
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Figure 1.1 Change in saturated thickness for the High Plains Aquifer in Kansas 
 
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                 Source: Buchanan et al. (2001) 
The Walnut Creek IGUCA (Intensive Groundwater Use Control Area) and the Sheridan 6 
Local Enhanced Management Area (Sheridan 6 LEMA) are two examples of water constraint 
policies in Kansas that allow time range flexibility in irrigation water allocation over a particular 
period. Both policies enable the farmer to extend the irrigation limit to a five-year account with 
limited restriction on the amount pumped in a given year. Such flexibility in water constraint 
policy will give the farmer a more efficient tool to adapt to weather variability. Moreover, 
afarmer may bring an “unused quota” of irrigation from a previous year to the next year to 
address unfavorable precipitation. Additionally, flexibility in water constraint policy may help 
the farmer to meet the crop water demand with more efficiency but still reduce average total 
irrigation. The extent of the impact of the change in quantity and flexibility of water constraint 
on the welfare and on water use is critical for determining future policies.  
4 
The most common irrigation strategies that a farmer can implement in response to 
weather variability and limited water availability are to change the irrigated acreage (extensive 
margin of adjustment), to change the water intensity per acre (intensive margin of adjustment), 
and/or to change irrigation technology (English 1990; Pfeiffer and Lin 2014; Peterson and Ding 
2005; Wang and Nair 2013; Wolff and Stein 1999). Accordingly, a farmer with particular water 
availability, well capacity, and water policy constraint, may adjust irrigated acreage to prevent 
crop yield loss during drought. First, the adjustment in irrigated acreage would give the farmer 
more flexibility in choosing the optimum water intensity per acre for a particular weather 
condition. Regarding low well capacity, Foster et al. (2014) found that the farmer is likely to 
focus strategy on changing irrigated acreage in response to weather uncertainty. Next, in the case 
of low well capacity and low soil quality, the farmer may more likely maximize profit by 
adopting more efficient irrigation technology (Caswell and Zilberman 1986). 
The optimal adjustment in the intensive margin can best be thought of as the optimal 
irrigation schedule. One method to achieve it is to set different soil moisture levels for different 
crop growth stages. Consequently, a water optimization analysis may use a daily biophysical 
crop simulation model to predict the crop yield instead of using an economic water production 
function. A crop simulation model gives an advantage to the robustness of yield estimation by 
accounting for the effect of dynamic response of a crop to water, which is not accounted for by 
the economic water production function (Moore 1961). Hexem and Heady (1978) mentioned that 
an economic water production function may suffer from multicollinearity, and so they do not 
consider the effect of irrigation timing on crop yield. However earlier, Moore (1961) stated that 
estimating water production function may have  little meaning if we do not consider the final soil 
moisture level for each irrigation cycle.  
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My study will use AquaCrop, a daily biophysical crop simulation model, for crop yield 
prediction based on soil moisture and Management Allowed Depletion (MAD) as farmer input 
choices. The seasonal irrigation water use is dependent on MAD settings for each crop growth 
stage and specified weather conditions. Crop water productivity is different for each growth 
stage, so using MAD for the irrigation schedule is better than using total seasonal water use to 
illustrate a farmer’s demand for water. 
The effectiveness of an irrigation schedule depends on the range of soil moisture that a 
farmer can manage. Thus, a farmer may set a higher soil moisture level in a critical crop growth 
stage to obtain both higher yield and better water use efficiency (Panda, Behera and Kashyap 
2004). The effectiveness of an irrigation schedule is also affected by soil characteristics (Panda 
et al. 2004). Considering different soil characteristics may prompt a more effective irrigation 
schedule. Another important factor in the intensive margin of adjustment is well capacity. A 
farmer with a low well capacity will have a narrow soil moisture range with which to efficiently 
attain optimal yield (Foster et al. 2014). Thus, a farm with low well capacity is exposed to higher 
production risk.  
Adopting modern and more efficient irrigation technology could also address weather 
variability and groundwater depletion (Wolff and Stein 1999; Negri and Hanchar 1989). 
Ultimately, modern irrigation technology is expected to increase irrigation efficiency, which may 
lower the variation in crop yield affected by weather variability. However, the impact of more 
modern irrigation technology on water use is ambiguous (Huffaker and Whittlesey 2003; 
Peterson and Ding 2005). A farmer will likely increase irrigation water use when upgrading the 
irrigation technology if the marginal productivity of water is low (Caswell and Zilberman 1986). 
Modern irrigation technology also may induce the farmer to use more water by planting a more 
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water intensive crop or to increase the irrigated acreage (Pfeiffer and Lin 2014). Pfeiffer and Lin 
(2014) also found that adopting modern irrigation technology has encouraged the farmer to 
increase water use by decreasing the probability of leaving the field unirrigated. All the same, 
modern and more efficient irrigation technology does not always offer higher profitability than 
existing less efficient irrigation technology (Peterson and Ding 2005) and thus may be an 
inefficient use of public funds. 
Most studies analyze the adoption of more efficient irrigation technology based on its 
relationship to factors such as water price, labor cost, agronomic and physical characteristics, 
farm size, and weather characteristics (Caswell and Zilberman 1985; Frisvold and Bai 2016; 
Green et al. 1996; Negri and Brooks 1996). However, the high investment in more efficient 
irrigation technology could generate a sufficient barrier to its adoption even for farms with 
limited water availability. The research on the effect of limited water availability to adoption of 
more efficient irrigation technology is still somewhat limited. O’Brien et al. (1998) examine the 
economic comparison between center pivot and drip irrigation assuming full irrigation. 
Additionally, Peterson and Ding (2005) analyze the consequences of converting to irrigation 
technology including the limitation in well capacity (e.g. 300 and 500 GPM) and assuming fixed 
irrigated acreage. 
Modern irrigation technology does have a higher irrigation efficiency, but it also requires 
a higher investment. Thus, newer technology does not always provide greater profitability, 
although in general, investment in irrigation technology has caused the average farm to produce 
larger crop yield and to plant larger irrigated acreage. However, for the region with more limited 
water availability, this option may not be economically feasible, instead generating too high off-
farm cost. Thus, the impact of higher irrigation efficiency from modern technology may not 
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offset the high investment cost in the case of too low water availability. Moreover, perhaps 
modern irrigation technologies are more appealing in a region with limited water availability. 
The important question is to what extent of limited water availability will the farmer invest in 
more efficient irrigation technology? 
The total production and marginal productivity of water on crop yield may be affected by 
soil texture and soil water holding capacity. Zhao et al. (2007) stated that soil properties have 
significant impact on crop biomass productivity, which later will affect crop growth and crop 
production. Zhao et al. (2007) also mentioned that when the difference in soil property is greater 
between lands, the effect of irrigation on crop productivity will vary greatly. Thus, a farmer with 
different soil properties may have different optimal irrigation strategies, for both intensive and 
extensive margins of adjustment, in response to limited water availability and weather 
uncertainty. However, a farmer with less preferred soil characteristic may have greater change in 
irrigation strategy in response to more limited water availability. Thus, a model that does not 
account for the spatial difference in soil characteristics may be a poor predictor of optimal 
irrigation strategy and water use. 
Some previous studies consider only the intensive margin of adjustment in their irrigation 
strategy choice to cope with scarce water and weather variability (Boggess et al. 1983; English 
1990; Heeren et al. 2011). For example, Peterson and Ding (2005) and Upendram et al. (2015) 
use the intensive margin of adjustment and irrigation technology but without an extensive margin 
of adjustment as possible strategies for the farmer.  An irrigation choice that uses both intensive 
and extensive margins of adjustment in response to limited water availability better represent the 
farmer’s choice (Baumhardt et al. 2009; Foster et al. 2014; O’Brien et al. 1998; O’Brien et al. 
2001; D. L. Martin, Gilley and Supalla 1989). Additionally, the “Pac-Man” shape of a corn farm 
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may prove that the farmer uses an extensive margin of adjustment as part of the irrigation 
strategy (see Figure 1.2).  Broadening the traditional approach, this research considers extensive 
and intensive margins of adjustment and irrigation technology choice as possible strategies for 
optimizing water use and crop yield. 
Figure 1.2 The Pac-Man shape of center pivot irrigation system 
 
     Source: Earthobservatory (2015)  
The degree of risk aversion has an impact on a farmer’s irrigation strategy with respect to 
weather variability (Bernardo 1988; Boggess et al. 1983; Foster et al. 2014; Peterson and Ding 
2005). This means deficit irrigation affected by weather variability may produce more variability 
in crop yield compared to full irrigation. However, deficit irrigation may allow the farmer to 
apply a limited amount of water over a larger area. Nevertheless, a risk averse farmer may prefer 
an irrigation strategy that offers lower profit variability.  Evidence shows that a risk averse 
attitude induces the farmer to decrease optimal irrigated acreage (Foster et al. 2014) to reduce the 
variability in crop yield by focusing available water on a smaller irrigated acreage.  
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 1.1 Objectives and Main Findings 
The primary objective of this study is to analyze the effect of a limited well capacity—
due to groundwater depletion—and a water constraint policy on a farmer’s optimal irrigation 
strategy (extensive adjustment, intensive adjustment, and irrigation technology). Thus, the study 
focuses on the following six specific objectives: 
I. Estimate how limited well capacities affect the optimal irrigation strategy and net return. 
II. Examine the effect of soil characteristics on the optimal irrigation strategy with  limited 
water availability. 
III. Analyze how different degrees of risk aversion affect the optimal strategy with limited water 
availability. 
IV. Analyze how the optimal strategy changes when government enforces a water constraint 
policy. 
V. Quantify the welfare loss from a limited well capacity or policy constraint.  
VI. Analyze how limited well capacities and policy contraints affect the incentives to adopt a 
more efficient irrigation technology. 
 
The main contribution of my study is the analysis of aquifer depletion impact on optimal 
irrigation strategy and welfare. To that end, this study addresses intensive margin of adjustment 
with non-uniform soil moisture level as one possible strategy that a farmer may choose. I believe 
this type of deficit irrigation has not been analyzed in previous studies (Foster et al. 2014; Foster, 
Brozović and Butler 2015a; Upendram et al. 2015). The variable of non-uniform soil moisture 
level in irrigation schedule affects crop-water productivity at each growth stage and is therefore 
important in analyzing water use and conservation strategies. My study will also contribute to the 
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literature by investigating the effect of different soil characteristics on intensive and extensive 
margins of adjustment, which, to my knowledge has not been analyzed in previous research 
(Foster et al. 2014; Upendram et al. 2015). The combination of different soil characteristics and 
optimal irrigation technology will generate a more specific understanding of irrigation efficiency. 
This study explains how the farmer with limited well capacity may choose a strategy based on 
irrigation efficiency and total water quota. Another contribution of this study is that I impose the 
water constraint on total water use with a 5-year average time constraint whereas previous 
literature has imposed the constraint on water use per irrigated acre on annual basis (Nair, Wang, 
et al. 2013; Peterson and Ding 2005; Upendram et al. 2015). My study will give insight into how 
groundwater depletion may affect the adoption rate of more efficient irrigation technology, 
which is still not fully understood with regard to limited water availability.  
There are four key findings in this dissertation. First, my study finds a counterintuitive 
result that water use does not increase monotonically with well capacity. Instead, my results 
show that water use is greatest with a well capacity of roughly 600-700 GPM and decreases with 
smaller and larger well capacities. This counterintuitive result occurs because the well capacity 
of 600-700 GPM has a smaller instantaneous rate of application, so farmers find it optimal to 
apply water more frequently to maintain higher soil moisture to avoid the risk of severely 
depleted soil moisture in a long dry period when the small instantaneous rate cannot maintain 
soil moisture. Including the effect of non-uniform soil moisture level in adjustment at the 
intensive margin in the analysis might cause the difference in findings between my study and 
previous studies (Foster et al. 2014). Accommodating the non-uniform soil moisture level also 
might cause a higher instantaneous rate to generate less average water use because of more 
efficiency in irrigation scheduling especially during unfavorable weather conditions. This 
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counterintuitive result also implies a faster rate of groundwater extraction when depletion in 
groundwater resources causes well capacity reduction at a particular level. The groundwater 
depletion pattern is consistent with data on actual depletion rates from the High Plains Aquifer 
that show a peak in groundwater demand rather than groundwater demand always declining over 
time (Steward and Allen 2016). Specifically, the well capacities that result in the greatest 
groundwater extraction differ by soil type and depend on capacity threshold.  
The well capacity threshold is the point at which a farmer changes from adjustment in the 
intensive margin to adjustment in the extensive margin. The adjustment in the extensive margin 
occurs at a constant return to scale production. The threshold also shows when the reduction in 
well capacity results in rapid decline of farmer welfare. The well capacity threshold differs by 
soil characteristic. Identifying the threshold accounting the spatial variability in soil is critical for 
policy maker monitoring the impact of groundwater depletion to welfare loss. 
The second important finding of this dissertation is that risk aversion induces farmers to 
significantly increase water use. For example, I find that optimal water use under plausible levels 
of risk aversion is roughly 30% larger than under risk neutrality with Richfield soils with a 600 
GPM well capacity. My study simulates the sensible range of risk averse behavior using the 
Babcock, Choi and Feinerman (1993) method, which is different from methods used in previous 
studies (Foster et al. 2014; Peterson and Ding 2005; Upendram et al. 2015). The impact of risk 
averse behavior on the change in water use differs by well capacity, and it is the highest at 
medium well capacity due to the small instantaneous rate typical of medium well capacities that 
reduces the ability to mitigate risk.  
The third key finding is that the impact of water policy constraints on farmer welfare 
differs substantially by well capacity and soil type. For example, the welfare loss of Valent-Vona 
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soil is 106% higher than for Richfield soil at 900 GPM wells, and the welfare loss of 500 GPM 
wells is 108% higher than for 600 GPM wells for land with Richfield soil. Surprisingly, the 
impact of a water constraint policy on welfare loss is smaller for large well capacities than for 
medium well capacities for soils with high soil water holding capacity.  For example, the welfare 
loss of 1200 GPM wells is 26% lower than for 900 GPM wells for land with Richfield soil.  The 
greater soil water holding capacity enables farmers with higher well capacities to focus on 
adjustment at the intensive margin instead of at the extensive margin in response to policy 
constraint, resulting in less welfare loss. Therefore, models that do not account for different soil 
types and well capacities when predicting the impact on farmer welfare of policy constraints are 
misleading.  
The final key finding is that current government subsidies for drip irrigation are large 
enough to induce adoption in locations with a policy constraint, and adoption is more likely to 
occur for medium well capacity. However, the adoption of drip irrigation under a policy 
constraint is likely to increase water use, especially in the case of smaller well capacity. A farmer 
who adopts drip irrigation might decrease water use from historical use but actually increase 
water use relative to what they would use with center pivot irrigation and constraint policy. Thus, 
the government subsidy might not reduce water use. My model allows farmer to make changes to 
irrigated acreage and deficit irrigation application, which is more specific and different than 
research based on previous study model assumptions (O’Brien et al. 1998; Peterson and Ding 
2005). In addition, the policy constraint considers a flexible time range application, the 5-year 
time constraint, which is motivated by LEMA and Walnut Greek IGUCA implementation.  
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 1.2 Organization of the remaining chapters 
Chapter two presents the literature review on the crop water production model, irrigation 
strategy, and farmer decision under risk and uncertainty, while Chapter three addresses the 
methods and research procedure. Chapter four addresses objectives one to four. The analysis on 
welfare loss as an impact of groundwater depletion and water constraint policy (objective five) is 
addressed in Chapter five, and Chapter six analyzes the impact of limited well capacity and 
government policy on adoption of modern irrigation technology (objective six). The final chapter 
presents the summary, conclusions, and potential future research.   
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Chapter 2 - Literature review 
Many studies have addressed how crop producers choose the optimal irrigation strategy 
under limited water availability and uncertainty. To address the most significant studies, the 
literature review will be divided into six sections: (1) water optimization analysis that previous 
studies used and the benefit of using daily biophysical crop simulation models in the analysis; (2) 
a review of the importance of using management allowed deficit (MAD) for the irrigation 
schedule as the input choice for optimization analysis; (3) limited water availability caused by 
groundwater depletion and water constraint policy  and studies that discuss the effect of limited 
water availability on optimal irrigation strategy; (4) review of irrigation strategy with respect to  
adjustment in extensive and intensive margins and discussion of  how farmers tradeoff between 
those two irrigation strategies in response to limited water availability; (5) factors that affect the 
adoption of more efficient irrigation technology, and  the effect of those factors on total water 
use; and (6) objectives that previous studies used for optimal irrigation management under risk 
and uncertainty. In addition, this final section will also review the use of the absolute risk 
aversion coefficient to represent the farmer’s risk preference. 
 
 2.1 Crop-water production function and AquaCrop 
Crop-water production function shows the relation between crop yields to water received 
by the crop.  This  function is used not only as a crop-yield predictor (Kallitsari, Georgiou and 
Babajimopoulos 2011; Martin, Watts and Gilley 1984; Moore, Gollehon and Negri 1989) but 
also as a tool to find optimal irrigation strategies for both unlimited water availability and also 
for limited water availability (Dinar and Knapp 1986; English 1990; D. Martin, Brocklin and 
Wilmes 1989; Peterson and Ding 2005; Wang and Nair 2013). The optimization analysis using 
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the crop-water production function is to evaluate water allocation by the economic value it 
generates (Harou et al. 2009).  The function is estimated by assuming  a particular production 
model, for example the Translog production model (Peterson and Ding 2005), or one of several 
models such as the quadratic and the power function (Cobb-Douglas) production model (Dinar 
and Knapp 1986; Wang and Nair 2013), Square root, Mitscherlich-Baule, Linear Von Liebig, 
and nonlinear Von Liebig (Llewelyn and Featherstone 1997). The most widely chosen input 
variable in crop-water production function is total water use, which can be determined based on 
crop growth stages (Peterson and Ding 2005) or annual/seasonal (Dinar and Knapp 1986; 
Llewelyn and Featherstone 1997).   
Using the crop-water production function in optimization analysis is not restricted only to 
using water as an input choice. Other inputs such as soil moisture level (Limaye et al. 2004; 
Paudel et al. 2005; Shani, Tsur and Zemel 2004; Shani et al. 2007), well capacity (O’Brien et al. 
2001), and irrigation capacity (Lamm, Stone and O’Brien 2007) are regularly used to find the 
most optimal water allocation, irrigation technology choices, or crop acreage allocation.  
However, using annual or seasonal water as an input choice for crop production in 
optimization analysis may cause problems. Moore (1961) stated that relating crop yield to total 
water applied during growing season may have little meaning when the final soil moisture 
condition for each irrigation cycle is not taken into account. Thus, researchers may misuse the 
crop-water production function for an irrigation experiment, which could cause the function to 
not represent the farmer’s demand for water (Moore 1961).  Moore (1961) also stressed the crop-
water production function for each irrigation cycle, which means estimating total crop yield must 
take into account the plant-soil-water relationship. Other setbacks of using the crop-water 
production function are that it does not consider the dynamic response of crop to water, and the 
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multicollinearity among the independent variables (Hexem and Heady 1978). The crop-water 
production function also does not account for the timing effect of water application on crop 
yield. 
Moreover, other studies did not use the crop-water production function; instead, they 
used a daily biophysical crop simulation model for water optimization analysis (Baumhardt et al. 
2009; Foster et al. 2014; Heeren et al. 2011; Nair, Wang, et al. 2013; Upendram et al. 2015). 
Specifically, those studies used soil moisture level, denoted as Management Allowed Depletion 
(MAD), as a farmer input choice. The daily biophysical crop simulation model predicts the crop 
yield based on the water retained in the soil for each irrigation cycle. Other advantages of the 
daily biophysical crop simulation model are it accounts for the dynamic response of crop to 
water and also for the effect of water stress on crop yield. Thus, it will better predict the effect of 
water application on crop yield. Also, an important factor of daily biophysical crop simulation 
model reliability is the robustness of yield estimation. The daily biophysical crop simulation 
model with MAD as an input choice may enable optimal water use for varied conditions, which 
is not the case with optimization analysis using the crop-water production function. 
Foster et al. (2014) mentioned that the reliability of integrated modelling that uses a daily 
biophysical crop simulation model to improve water management is dependent on the capability 
of the model to capture the structures and variables that determine the farmer’s decision. Thus, 
the integrated modelling for water management should have a link between agricultural 
production and the hydrological system. Foster et al. (2014) also stated that using soil moisture 
to examine farmer actual decision and demand of water is more realistic than the use of crop-
water production function.  
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In pursuit of water optimization practice, engineers have developed computer software 
that uses the daily biophysical crop simulation model. Given weather characteristics, soil 
characteristics, and irrigation water supply, the software can predict crop yield. My study will 
use the programming software AquaCrop developed by Food and Agricultural Organization 
(FAO) for estimating crop yield. 
The AquaCrop model incorporates the practical empirical production function for 
estimating crop yield response to water (Raes et al. 2009). Raes et al. (2009) mentioned that 
AquaCrop model offers better accuracy, simplicity, and robustness than other crop yield 
simulation models. Moreover, AquaCrop requires less parameter and input data to simulate the 
crop yield response to the water supply (Steduto et al. 2009). Araya, Kisekka and Holman (2016) 
mentioned that AquaCrop uses fewer inputs than other crop yield simulation models such as 
DSSAT and APSIM. Also, the normalization of biomass water productivity estimation made 
AquaCrop applicable in diverse locations and seasons (Steduto et al. 2009). Steduto et al. (2009) 
also mentioned that another distinguishing feature of AquaCrop is that it uses canopy grown 
cover (CC) instead of leaf area index (LAI) as the basis to differentiate between evaporation and 
transpiration.  
Steduto et al. (2009) stated that the main growth engine for AquaCrop to predict the crop 
yield is the water-driven growth model that calculates the transpiration in the 1
st
 stage and 
translates it into biomass in the 2
nd
 stage, using conservative crop specific parameters and 
climate parameters. The fundamental implication of such a water driven growth approach is that 
it improves the robustness and generality of the model (Steduto et al. 2009). In fact, Stricevic et 
al. (2011) found that AquaCrop can be used with a high degree of reliability in water 
management and estimation of yield with regard to climate change.  
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The AquaCrop model emphasizes the fundamental processes of crop growth productivity 
and crop water stress caused by water deficit.  Consequently, AquaCrop has been successfully 
applied to various crops in different geographical locations for economic assessment or yield 
estimation (Foster et al. 2014; Foster, Brozović and Butler 2015b; Zhang et al. 2013). Ultimately, 
the suitability and flexibility of AquaCrop for various crops and geographical locations has been 
a major motivation for my using the model in this study (A. Araya et al. 2016; Heng et al. 2009; 
Mebane et al. 2013; Stricevic et al. 2011).  
 
 2.2 Irrigation schedule and Management Allowed Deficit (MAD) 
The supply of water for irrigated farms essentially comes from rainfall and groundwater 
irrigation. The groundwater irrigation application is affected by many factors such as weather, 
crop, water availability, irrigation system, soil characteristics, climate settings and economics 
(Stegman 1983).  Additionally, applying groundwater irrigation can be managed by irrigation 
schedule, which determines the amount of water applied to the field at different times throughout 
the growing season (Broner 2005).  
The irrigation schedule emphasizes the timing criteria of irrigation water application, and 
the allowable root zone soil water depletion is the most popular method for the irrigation 
schedule (Stegman 1983). Such a schedule may preclude the farmer from experiencing crop 
yield loss due to over-irrigating or under-irrigating. Broner (2005) stated that over-irrigation 
would drain away of soil nutrition to below the root zone, waste energy, and labor, fail to use 
water effectively, reduce soil aeration and decrease crop yields. Meanwhile, under-irrigation 
could cause water-stress to the crop that would severely reduce crop productivity.   
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An appropriate irrigation schedule is imperative as each crop has different needs water 
and response to the quantity of water for each growth stages. For example, corn is more 
responsive to water during its development stage rather than its initial stage. In addition, corn is a 
water sensitive crop, so if water is not sufficiently delivered at the right time and in sufficient 
quantity; it will severely affect the corn yield as crop water stress occurs.  
Bras and Cordova (1981) stated that the decision for water irrigation is made at each crop 
growth stage by comparing its benefit with cost in terms of yield increasing.  For example, 
applying more water during growing season may not always give a positive result. Indeed, 
application of water for a given growth stage may depend on water demand and application in 
other growth stages.  Thus, holding water irrigation application constant for other crop growth 
stages but over-irrigating during the vegetative stage in the dry season would reduce crop yield 
(Peterson and Ding 2005). Therefore, water as an input that increases yield variability may not 
hold if it is not applied with suitable timing and in sufficient quantity. Thus, sufficient timing and 
quantity of irrigation water are imperative in maximizing net crop returns.  
The irrigation schedule criterion most widely used is based on setting the soil moisture 
content. The management of soil moisture will enable a crop to retain sufficient water and avoid 
crop water stress. Another advantage of maintaining soil moisture level is to avoid costly over-
water use and reduce the risk of nutrient leaching (Broner 2005). The irrigation schedule method 
can be used to predict optimal water use for water allocation analysis. Specifically, previous 
studies  (Foster et al. 2014; Foster et al. 2015b; Upendram et al. 2015; Heeren et al. 2011; 
Igbadun et al. 2008) have used an irrigation schedule based on soil moisture management, MAD, 
to find the optimal water allocation.  
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Irrigation keeps the soil moisture content suitable for crop growth by setting the 
management allowed deficit (MAD) to a specific level depending on soil and crop 
characteristics. MAD is the level of water content available in the soil that allows depletion until 
the next irrigation (Tariq and Usman 2009). In particular, MAD shows the available water that 
can be extracted from the soil until the permanent wilting point (see figure 2.1). Ultimately, the 
magnitude of crop yield losses due to water shortages is equivalent to the effect of soil moisture 
deficiency (Bras and Cordova 1981), which is why irrigation keeps the soil moisture above the 
given allowable depletion level. However, maintaining soil moisture at optimum MAD depends 
on water availability to avoid severe crop yield loss. 
Figure 2.1 Management Allowed Deficit (MAD)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Computer programming has brought the water balance method of the irrigation schedule 
to the front line of irrigation management  (Stegman 1983).  This is because computer software 
can more carefully adjust the daily biophysical crop simulation model to predict the growth of 
plants, the crop’s need for water, and crop yield. My study uses AquaCrop to schedule a 
hypothetical irrigation program based on setting the MAD level for each crop growth stage.  
AquaCrop estimates the soil water content by calculating for evapotranspiration (ET) (Steduto et 
al. 2009) to allow us to estimate the irrigation schedule for a given MAD using the weather 
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forecast. Using such crop predicting software as a tool for irrigation scheduling seems very 
reliable for use with an automated irrigation system. The automated irrigation system uses soil 
water measurement tools (tensiometer, psychrometer, gravimetric, etc.) as part of the irrigation 
schedule, which works similarly to an irrigation schedule like AquaCrop’s, and which 
approximates how farmers actually  manage irrigation.    
 
 2.3 Limited water availability 
Foster et al. (2014) mentioned that most research had underestimated the impact of 
limited water availability by not adequately accounting for the impact of dynamic trajectory of 
groundwater depletion on agricultural production decisions. Meanwhile, there is an escalating 
problem of limited water availability mainly due to groundwater depletion (Buchanan et al. 
2001). Failure to account for the effect of limited water availability will lead to inaccurate 
predictions for cropping strategies and underestimation of the effect of groundwater depletion on 
crop production. 
Two factors limit water availability: (i) well capacity and (ii) water constraint policy. 
Well capacity is the amount of water that can be pumped in a given period of time, thus limiting 
the instantaneous rate of water applied in each irrigation cycle. Understandably, well capacity 
and instantaneous rate determine the time lag for an irrigation cycle.  In the case of low well 
capacity and high instantaneous rate, that high rate creates a long time lag for the next irrigation 
cycle, which in turn may result in crop water stress and crop yield loss, as water depletion in the 
root zone may occur below the allowable depletion level before a farmer can trigger the next 
irrigation cycle. Next, water constraint policy addresses the limit of total water that can be 
extracted in a period of time either annually or assessed over a specified period of time. For 
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example, most irrigators in Kansas are constrained to 24 inches per authorized acre for one 
growing season (Peterson and Ding 2005). There are also other water constraint policies such 
Sheridan 6 LEMA and Walnut Creek IGUCA that exact more binding constraints. However, 
both policies offer flexibility to farmers for managing the total water extracted on a 5-year basis.    
  Given that well capacity is affected by saturated thickness and hydraulic conductivity 
(Hecox, P. A. Macfarlane and Wilson 2002), the saturated thickness in the high plains aquifer is 
decreasing as groundwater sources are depleted over time due to agricultural irrigation 
(Buchanan et al. 2001). In turn, the decrease in saturated thickness reduces the water table 
elevation and potential extractable water, which results in  lower well capacity (Hecox, P. A. 
Macfarlane, et al. 2002). The water that can be extracted from groundwater also depends on 
sediment type and distribution, which is called as hydraulic conductivity. An aquifer composed 
of clean sand and gravel, shown by lower hydraulic conductivity, will result in greater and more 
sustained well capacity (Hecox, P. A. Macfarlane, et al. 2002).  
 Well capacity may affect a farmer’s decision on farm and irrigation strategy in various 
ways. O’Brien et al. (2001) indicated that a farmer might prefer to use a center pivot sprinkler 
system as it offers more profit than a furrow surface system if the irrigation system capacity falls 
below moderate level. Similarly, Peterson and Ding (2005) found that a farmer may prefer 
sprinkler irrigation to furrow if the farmer has below moderate level well capacity. However, a 
farmer may prefer  a less efficient and less expensive irrigation system if there is high well 
capacity (Peterson and Ding 2005). Foster et al. (2014) found that a farmer with low well 
capacity who may be concerned about production risk will reduce water use by reducing 
irrigated acreage rather than irrigation intensity. Other studies emphasize the role of deficit 
irrigation (i.e., reducing irrigation intensity) to deal with limited water availability (Ali et al. 
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2007; English 1990; English and Raja 1996; Geerts and Raes 2009; Klocke et al. 2010). Previous 
studies use various optimization analysis methods in finding farmer decision on optimal 
irrigation strategy affected by limitation in well capacity. 
Peterson and Ding (2005) use continuous optimization to determine best irrigation 
strategies with limited well capacity. Other studies (Foster et al. 2014; Foster et al. 2015a; 
Upendram et al. 2015) find the effect of well capacity proportional to optimal irrigation 
strategies by applying discrete optimization, which generates numerous possible options of 
irrigation strategies by assuming uniform soil moisture level in all growth stages (Foster et al. 
2014; Foster et al. 2015a; Upendram et al. 2015). However, each of these studies uses a 
biophysical crop simulation model, which identifies different crop water response by growth 
stages. Thus, the assumption of uniform soil moisture level may lead to water over-use. The 
uniform soil moisture level for all growth stages assumes that the farmer assigned the same 
importance to each growth stages of crop development. However, the need for water for each 
growth stage is different. For instance, corn requires the most water during the reproductive 
(vegetative) growth stages. Therefore, a lot of water during the maturation stage will not 
significantly increase crop yield only the total water use. Alternatively, my study will use 
uniform and non-uniform soil moisture level for discrete optimization. A non-uniform soil 
moisture level, shown by a different MAD level for each growth stage, will allow the farmer to 
use different amounts of water for different growth stages. The non-uniform soil moisture level 
also emphasizes deficit irrigation by focusing more water on the most productive growth stage. 
Notably, deficit irrigation may generate greater profitability especially in the case of more 
limited water availability. 
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Water constraint policy will affect a farmer’s decision on irrigation management 
especially the farmer with high well capacity (Foster et al. 2014; Peterson and Ding 2005). 
Obviously, the water constraint policy is not a limiting factor for the farmer with low well 
capacity (Foster et al. 2014; Peterson and Ding 2005). Previous studies (Foster et al. 2014; T 
Foster, Brozović, et al. 2015a; Peterson and Ding 2005; Upendram et al. 2015) assume that the 
amount of water that can be extracted is governed by well capacity and annual water constraint. 
My study will apply a more flexible water constraint, one not only accounted for on an annual 
basis but also for specific period bases, such as a 5-year average time constraint. The period 
based water constraint policy will give a farmer more flexibility in managing irrigation strategies 
while adapting to weather uncertainty. Furthermore, the period based water constraint policy is 
motivated by the enforcement of Sheridan 6 LEMA and Walnut Creek IGUCA.    
 
 2.4 Adjustment in extensive and intensive margin 
A farmer can use any of numerous irrigation strategies to adapt to limited water 
availability. The most common adjustment is reduced demand for water irrigation through 
intensive margin, extensive margin, and crop switching (D. Martin et al. 1989). The irrigation 
strategy that a farmer will choose depends on the severity of the water availability limitation 
problem.  
The optimization of water irrigation through irrigated area adjustment is called 
adjustment at the extensive margin. For example, in the early stage of a growing season, a farmer 
may decide a portion of land will be irrigated or kept for rainfed cropping depending on water 
availability. This assumption is based on a farmer not having dependable information about 
future weather and therefore water demand. In this case, the portion of irrigated acreage and well 
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capacity will determine the maximum instantaneous rate of application for a given period of 
time. A standard engineering formula can be used to calculate the upper bound of irrigation 
application rate for water use optimization research (Foster et al. 2014; Peterson and Ding 2005).   
Adjustment in intensive margin is an irrigation strategy that optimizes water per acre of 
irrigated area. Reducing such irrigation water depends on water availability and precipitation. 
For example, one of the adjustment intensive margins is deficit irrigation, which will use less 
water but avoid crop stress at critical growth stages (Geerts and Raes 2009; Pereira, Oweis and 
Zairi 2002).  Deficit irrigation can be managed by using uniform intensive irrigation or non-
uniform intensive irrigation, and both techniques can be triggered using soil moisture level, or 
Management Allowed Deficit (MAD) (Vico and Porporato 2011b). Vico and Porporato (2011a) 
mentioned that deficit irrigation is expected to increase water productivity without causing a 
severe drop in crop yield. This is because such irrigation considers a minimum soil moisture 
level that needs to be maintained to avoid severe crop water stress. 
Uniform soil moisture applies the same MAD level for all crop growth stages while non-
uniform soil moisture applies a different MAD level for each crop growth stage. In fact, the non-
uniform soil moisture method is governed by most crops needing different water productivity for 
each growth stage. Consequently, limiting water supply in the drought-sensitive growth stage 
may maximize the water application and crop productivity and stabilize crop yield rather than 
maximize the yield (Geerts and Raes 2009)  
Ultimately, a trade-off between adjustment in extensive and intensive margin exists, 
according to English (1990). Thus, the marginal benefit of increasing irrigation acreage must 
equal the marginal benefit of increasing irrigation intensity (Wang and Nair 2013). Wang and 
Nair (2013) also stated that the maximum water resource rent is acquired when the return is 
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equal for intensive and extensive margins. In the case of low water supply, shown by lower well 
capacity, the crop producer will change irrigated acreage to maintain a particular irrigation 
intensity that maximizes the marginal benefit of water. Likely, the crop producer will concentrate 
water into a fraction of farmland that can generate a maximum marginal benefit of water. 
O’Brien et al. (2001) stated that in response to well capacity declining a crop producer 
typically reduces the irrigated acreage to the extent of being able to provide sufficient water for 
crop growth. A farmer may focus the strategy on adjustment in the extensive margin but still 
maintain adequate water for crop growth through adjustment in the intensive margin in response 
to the decrease in well capacity. Thus, limited water availability may yield optimal water 
allocation by reducing the irrigated acreage and focusing the available water on smaller irrigated 
acreages (D. Martin et al. 1989; Nair, Maas, et al. 2013).  Baumhardt et al. (2009) stated that a 
farmer might concentrate available water on a portion of a field with a complementary non-
irrigated area to maintain optimal water use efficiency. Moreover, evidence shows a farmer may 
optimize water for intensive irrigation by applying deficit irrigation when faced with limited 
water availability (Heeren et al. 2011; English 1990). Panda, Behera and Kashyap (2004) stated a 
minimum MAD level for irrigation schedules that a farmer should attain to avoid severe crop 
yield loss. Such a farmer may focus the available water for irrigation during the most productive 
(vegetative) growth stage (Heeren et al. 2011; Nair, Wang, et al. 2013). My study suggests that 
the non-uniform MAD is an intensive adjustment strategy to account for different crop water 
productivity at each growth stage. The non-uniform MAD may also work for a deficit irrigation 
strategy.  
Previous studies used varied irrigation strategy choices in the optimization analysis 
(Baumhardt et al. 2009; Foster et al. 2014; Heeren et al. 2011; Nair, Wang, et al. 2013; Peterson 
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and Ding 2005). For example, Foster et al. (2014) applied uniform soil moisture level for all crop 
growth stages and assumed non-irrigated acreage do not have any value. Foster et al. (2014) also 
assumed that intensive margin decisions can be characterized by constant soil moisture level for 
the whole growing season. However, previous studies found that the optimal level of soil 
moisture is different for each growth stage (Doorenbos and Kassam 1979; Payero et al. 2009). 
Meanwhile, Baumhardt et al. (2009)  offered an even simpler strategy by using only fixed net 
irrigation application in their irrigation schedule. However, fixed net water application may 
cause irrigation water to have low marginal productivity. Meanwhile, Heeren et al. (2011) 
include both uniform and non-uniform soil moisture level as intensive irrigation choices. Earlier, 
Peterson and Ding (2005) found the optimal water allocation for different irrigation technologies 
by assuming the farmer does not change the irrigated acreage. Alternatively, my study will have 
adjustment in the extensive margin, the intensive margin with uniform soil moisture level, and 
the intensive margin with non-uniform soil moisture level in the decision model. The adjustment 
in intensive margin with non-uniform soil moisture level may enable the farmer to prioritize the 
allocation of groundwater irrigation based on crop growth stage. Consequently, my findings for 
the optimal irrigated acreage and profit may be larger than what previous studies found 
(Baumhardt et al. 2009; Foster et al. 2014). Notably, my study does not consider crop switching 
as an alternative choice to deal with limited water availability. D. Martin et al. (1989) stated that 
crop allocation is a viable option to deal with limited water supply when the farmer is facing a 
multi-year allocation system. However, I am not analyzing multi-year optimal allocation; 
instead, I am basing my model on only a one-period decision.   
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 2.5 Adoption of more efficient and modern irrigation technology 
Converting to more efficient modern irrigation technology may improve irrigation water 
use, crop yield, and farm returns. This is because such technology has higher water efficiency 
and delivers more water to the crop root zone. Moreover, an irrigator benefits from a more 
efficient system through crop yield increasing. However, the higher investment cost in modern 
irrigation technology may offset the benefit of higher revenue from crop yield increasing and 
lower irrigation cost (Frisvold and Deva 2012). Thus, the high investment cost may hinder a 
farmer’s decision to adopt a modern irrigation technology. Caswell and Zilberman (1985) stated 
that the economic consideration of cost saving has a significant impact on new irrigation 
technology adoption. Therefore, the higher irrigation efficiency from modern irrigation 
technology does not always encourage the farmer to adopt it (Caswell and Zilberman 1985; 
Peterson and Ding 2005). 
In fact, irrigation technology choice is heavily dependent on elasticity of marginal 
productivity of water (EMP) (Caswell and Zilberman 1986). Given that modern irrigation 
technology can increase  irrigation efficiency directly, Caswell and Zilberman (1986) mentioned 
that a farmer would adopt the irrigation technology that offers the highest quasi-rent per acre. 
Thus, modern technology is more likely found on a farm with expensive water, low well 
capacity, and low soil quality (Caswell and Zilberman 1986; O’Brien et al. 2001).  
The effect of more efficient and modern irrigation technology adoption to water use is 
ambiguous (Caswell and Zilberman 1986; Peterson and Ding 2005). For instance, Caswell and 
Zilberman (1986) stated that such technology would result in higher water use per acre if water 
use of the previous technology had low EMP and resulted in lower water use per acre in high 
EMP cases. Moreover, in the case of low EMP, adopting more efficient irrigation technology 
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would increase land and water productivity greatly, resulting in farmers increasing water use per 
acre. In the case of high EMP cases, more efficient irrigation technology would have less impact 
on the increase in land and water productivity as the increase in irrigation efficiency may reduce 
the water use per acre (Caswell and Zilberman 1986). Ding and Peterson (2012) found that more 
efficient irrigation technology is more effective in reducing water use in areas with higher 
saturated thickness, for example in areas with high well capacity. 
My study examines how the change in well depth might affect a farmer’s decision to 
adopt more efficient technology. My study also examines how more efficient irrigation 
technology and groundwater depletion may affect water use. Previous studies included an annual 
water constraint that limits irrigation water use (Foster et al. 2014; Peterson and Ding 2005; 
Upendram et al. 2015). However, this study will examine the effect of both well capacity 
declining and flexibility in water constraint policy in relation to a farmer’s decision to adopt 
more efficient technology. The flexibility in water constraint refers to 5-year average total water 
use.  The main objective is to determine which would be the key factor in a farmer deciding to 
adopt a more efficient and modern irrigation technology that could modulate the problematic 
severity of the limit on water availability. 
 
 2.6 Decision under risk and uncertainty 
Boggess et al. (1983) mentioned many possible objectives as a means of representing 
farmer decision regarding optimal irrigation strategies given risk and uncertainty. He simulated 
optimal irrigation strategy with different objectives such as maximizing net return, maximizing 
average yield per unit water, and maximizing yield. Consequently, he found a different optimal 
irrigation strategy for a different objective. Other studies used maximizing average net return (D. 
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Martin et al. 1989; D. L. Martin et al. 1989; Nair, Maas, et al. 2013; O’Brien et al. 2001) or 
certainty equivalent (Bernardo 1988; Foster et al. 2014; Nair, Wang, et al. 2013; Upendram et al. 
2015) as the objective for irrigation planning.  
This study uses an expected utility maximizing model to determine a farmer’s optimal 
strategy for risk and uncertainty. The objective of the model is to maximize expected utility of a 
Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility of net return. This net return assumes the law of diminishing 
marginal utility (𝑢′(𝜋) > 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑢′′(𝜋) < 0). The expected utility analysis assumes that a farmer 
is not only concerned with expected net return but also the dispersion of net return around its 
expected value (Chavas 2004). In sum, the farmer’s risk preference is represented by his or her 
utility function, which the farmer uses to decide how to maximize the expected utility.  
Chavas (2004) stated that maximizing the expected utility is equivalent to maximizing the 
certainty equivalent. Thus, the certainty equivalent will be used to measure the robustness of the 
optimal risk efficient irrigation strategy. For a particular utility function, the certainty equivalent 
is the amount of payoff that a farmer would determine to be between that payoff and risky 
irrigation strategy. Comparing irrigation strategies for the certainty equivalent should yield the 
best optimal risk efficient irrigation strategy.  
The choice of utility function may affect the finding of the simulated optimal irrigation 
strategy. For instance, my study assumes that a farmer has constant absolute risk aversion 
(CARA) and that the negative exponential utility is used to represent the CARA utility function. 
The CARA utility function has the benefit of flexibility for different decision makers’ risk 
preference. Tsiang (1972) stated that the approximation using the CARA utility function is 
appropriate if the risky choice is relatively small compared to the decision maker’s total wealth. 
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Accordingly, our study will analyze a hypothetical 160 acres of land owned by the farmer, which 
is small compared to the average land parcel owned by a Kansas farmer. 
Study results vary concerning the effect of risk preference on farmer irrigation strategy 
and water use. Boggess et al. (1983) found that the risk-averse attitude induces a farmer to 
irrigate less frequently and use smaller amounts of water compared to the optimum irrigation 
strategy. Similarly, Peterson and Ding (2005) also found that a farmer with risk-averse behavior 
may choose to use less water when less is available. Furthermore, the farmer may reduce the 
water applied during preplant and vegetative growth stages as using more water may increase 
yield variability. However, another study found evidence that the risk-averse attitude may induce 
a farmer to apply more irrigation to reduce the incidence of low yield or high variability in net 
returns (Bernardo 1988).  
The absolute risk aversion coefficient (ARAC) is often used to represent farmer risk 
preference in published studies (Nair, Wang, et al. 2013; Williams et al. 2014). This ARAC 
value shows the effect of risk aversion on farmer irrigation and farm strategy.  Those studies 
assume the same range of ARAC for different well capacities. However, Babcock, Choi and 
Feinerman (1993) mentioned that the ARAC value does not convey enough information about 
whether the implied risk aversion is reasonable.   Specifically, different well capacities may have 
different mean and variance of net return so that same value of ARAC may represent different 
risk preference for different well capacity. Also, any particular value of ARAC is possibly 
reasonable for a farmer with a particular well capacity but not for another farmer with a different 
well capacity. Clearly, the choice of the ARAC value is important to define the range of sensible 
risk preference behavior that a given farmer may possess. Thus, the choice of a sensible upper 
bound ARAC value for a farmer based on well capacity is necessary.   
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Babcock et al. (1993) introduced a method using risk premium and probability premium 
to estimate “sensible” risk preference for a decision maker with the CARA utility function. The 
Babcock et al. (1993) method will show that farmers with the same risk premium and probability 
premium but different well capacity may have different ARAC. This study will compare the  
upper bound of ARAC from the Babcock et al. (1993) method to the upper bound of ARAC 
generated from Mccarl and Bessler (1989).  Mccarl and Bessler (1989) introduced three 
procedures for estimating the upper bound of ARAC in the case of unknown utility function. 
Comparing those methods will limit the maximum level of the absolute risk aversion coefficient 
(ARAC) that can be used in the analysis.  
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Chapter 3 - Research methodology 
This chapter focuses on models and procedures I used to predict the optimal irrigation 
strategy given limited water availability. The research procedures and the steps in the analysis 
are detailed along with the model assumptions. My study considers a risk averse farmer who 
seeks to maximize expected utility by choosing the optimal soil moisture trigger for irrigation 
(i.e., management allowed deficit), the instantaneous rate of irrigation, the acres to irrigate, and 
the irrigation technology. I do not consider alternative cropping patterns and restrict the analysis 
for irrigated acreage to corn. This is because corn planted areas account for 19.8% of total all 
planted acreage and 59.44% of total all irrigated acreage (NASS 2016a). To simplify the 
modeling, the non-irrigated acreage is assumed to generate income through leasing.   
The expected utility theory in this study is described in Section 3.1, which also describes 
the mean-variance analysis and stochastic efficiency with respect to function (SERF) to rank 
risky alternative strategy. Section 3.2 then explains the formulation of the producer decision-
making model. Section 3.3 discusses adjustment to both intensive and extensive margins that 
will be generated as possible irrigation strategy choices for the producer. Next, Section 3.4 
addresses meshing the producer decision-making model from Section 3.2 with discrete 
simulation optimization. Section 3.4 also describes the AquaCrop model, including weather and 
soil data,, used as the crop yield predictor in the discrete simulation model and therefore the 
production function in this study. I also discuss parameter assumptions to calculate net returns in 
Section 3.4. Section 3.5, then describes estimated welfare loss of limited water availability 
through either reduced well capacity or water constraint policy. Section 3.6 discusses how to 
estimate absolute risk coefficient using risk premium and probability premium. The final section 
3.7 discusses the model validation on crop yield and expected net returns.  
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 3.1. Expected Utility 
This study uses a utility maximizing model to find the optimal irrigation strategy. This is 
because uncertainty in agriculture profitability is mainly because of random weather change and 
volatility in crop prices. My study examines the optimal irrigation strategy for a particular year 
given uncertain weather and simplifies the model by assuming price certainty. Granted, price 
uncertainty is likely to be a more important consideration for decisions made across growing 
seasons (e.g., irrigation technology and capital purchases) rather than for a single growing season 
(e.g., irrigation intensity and chemical purchases) ; however, farm output is a random variable 
when the agricultural inputs are chosen. Thus random agriculture output can be represented by a 
stochastic production function (Chavas 2004) shown as: 
(3.1)                                                                             y = f(x, μ)  
 
where  𝑦 is output, 𝑥 is input, and 𝜇 is a random variable representing the uncertainty in 
production. 
Next, the farmer’s subjective probability distribution of the uncertainty (𝜇) would be 
generated from information gathered before growing season begins. My study assumes that 
farmer has uniform probability for all conditions and that he would use his subjective probability 
to decide inputs and predict output. Thus, the farmer will choose inputs to maximize the 
expected utility of wealth (Chavas 2004) shown  as: 
(3.2)    𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑥𝐸𝑈(𝜋, 𝑟) = 𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑥{𝐸𝑈([𝑝𝑓(𝑥, 𝜇) − ∑ 𝑐𝑖𝑥𝑖]
𝑁
𝑖=1 , 𝑟)}  
 
where 𝑝 is output price, 𝑟 is absolute risk aversion coefficient, 𝑐𝑖 is the price of input i, and 𝜋 is 
wealth. Chavas (2004) states that maximizing the expected utility is equivalent to maximizing 
the certainty equivalent. Alternatively, the farmer’s  decision on input can be shown (Chavas 
2004) as: 
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(3.3)    𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑥 𝐶𝐸 = 𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑥{𝐸[𝑝𝑓(𝑥, 𝜇)] − ∑ 𝑐𝑖𝑥𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1 − 𝑅(𝑥, . )} 
 
where 𝑅(𝑥, . ) is the risk premium. The risk premium (R) is the minimum amount of money that 
would make the producer feels indifferent about a risky asset versus a risk-free asset. The risk 
premium (R) also can be interpreted as the producer’s willingness to insure against risk and can 
be regarded as the implicit cost of private risk bearing. The necessary first order condition for 
maximizing the certainty equivalent (Chavas 2004) is: 
 
(3.4)                                
𝜕𝐸[𝑝𝑦(𝑥,𝜇)]
𝜕𝑥𝑖
= 𝑐𝑖 +
𝜕𝑅(𝑥,.)
𝜕𝑥𝑖
  
 
The necessary first order condition of maximizing certainty equivalent in Equation 3.4 shows 
that the expected marginal value product of input (
𝜕𝐸[𝑝𝑦(𝑥,𝜇)]
𝜕𝑥𝑖
) is equal to input cost (𝑐𝑖) and 
marginal risk premium at optimal input chosen(
𝜕𝑅(𝑥,.)
𝜕𝑥𝑖
) (Chavas 2004).  From maximizing 
expected utility of wealth and maximizing certainty equivalent, the marginal risk premium can 
be also defined (Chavas 2004) as: 
(3.5)     
𝜕𝑅(𝑥,.)
𝜕𝑥𝑖
= −𝐶𝑜𝑣{𝑈′[
𝑝𝜕𝑓(𝑥,𝜇)
𝜕𝑥𝑖
}/𝐸𝑈′ 
 
 
Equation 3.5 shows that the marginal risk premium (
𝜕𝑅(𝑥,.)
𝜕𝑥𝑖
) represents the effect of input on the 
implicit cost of private risk bearing  (Chavas 2004). The covariance term (−𝐶𝑜𝑣{𝑈′[
𝑝𝜕𝑓(𝑥,𝜇)
𝜕𝑥𝑖
}/
𝐸𝑈′)  in the right hand side of Equation 3.5 measures the marginal effect of input i on the 
implicit cost of private risk bearing  (Chavas 2004). The covariance term also shows how input 
may reduce or increase the implicit cost of risk, providing an incentive for the farmer to reduce 
or increase input use.  The sign of marginal risk premium (
𝜕𝑅(𝑥,.)
𝜕𝑥𝑖
) indicates whether input 𝑥𝑖 is 
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risk increasing (
𝜕𝑅(𝑥,.)
𝜕𝑥𝑖
> 0)  of risk reducing(
𝜕𝑅(𝑥,.)
𝜕𝑥𝑖
< 0).  A farmer who is risk averse will use 
more input if the input reduces the implicit cost of private risk bearing (
𝜕𝑅(𝑥,.)
𝜕𝑥𝑖
< 0) and less 
input if the input increases the implicit cost of private risk bearing(
𝜕𝑅(𝑥,.)
𝜕𝑥𝑖
< 0) (Chavas 2004). 
Based on this assumption, I expect that risk-averse behavior will induce the farmer to increase 
water use because water is an input that reduces the implicit cost of private risk bearing. 
Also, I assume that the farmer has CARA risk behavior, which implies that the absolute 
risk aversion coefficient (r) is independent of initial wealth(𝜋). CARA also implies that initial 
wealth (𝜋)  does not influence individual willingness to insure against risk (Chavas 2004). Thus 
the expected utility corresponding to negative exponential utility for a given risk absolute 
coefficient (r) is shown as: 
(3.6)                                                   𝐸𝑈(𝑟) = ∑ (
1
𝑇
) [1 − 𝑒−𝑟∗𝜋𝑡]  
𝑇
𝑖=1
 
 
where T is all possible conditions that may occur. The probability of (
1
𝑇
) shows that we assume 
the farmer has uniform probability for all conditions. Chavas (2004) stated that under the CARA 
assumption and normality in wealth(𝜋𝑡), maximizing expected utility [EU(.)] is globally valid 
with a maximizing certainty equivalent as shown below:  
 
(3.7)                                      max 𝐸𝑈(𝜋, 𝑟) = max 𝐶𝐸 = max 𝐸(𝜋) − 𝑅 
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑅 = −0.5
𝑈′′
𝑈′
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜋) 
𝑟 = −
𝑈′′
𝑈′
 
 
Equation 3.7 represent the estimated expected utility or certainty equivalent using Mean-
Variance analysis. The decision-maker who has risk averse (r>0) behavior always has the 
expected income higher than the certainty equivalent; meanwhile, the risk-loving decision maker 
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(r<0) always has the certainty equivalent higher than the expected income. Naturally, an 
alternative decision strategy with its distribution will be preferred if it offers a higher certainty 
equivalent or higher expected utility compared to another strategy for the set range of the 
absolute risk aversion coefficient (r). Accordingly, the Mean-Variance analysis will rank the 
most preferred irrigation strategy in Chapters 4 and 6. 
Another method of estimating the certainty equivalent and expected utility is the 
Stochastic Efficiency Respect to Function (SERF) model. The SERF method ranks risky 
alternative strategy for welfare loss analysis in Chapter 5. Notably, the mean-variance analysis 
has a very restricted condition such that the certainty equivalent and risk premium estimation is 
only globally valid under normality assumption (Chavas 2004) whereas the SERF method 
relaxes the assumption of distribution (Hardaker et al. 2004). Therefore, Chapter 5 focuses on 
welfare loss analysis estimating loss using a utility-weighted risk premium between risky 
alternatives proposed by Hardaker et al. (2004) and Mjelde and Cochran (1988). 
 The SERF method identifies efficient utility sets by ordering alternative sets according to 
the certainty equivalent (CE) over a range of risk aversion coefficients (r) (Hardaker et al. 2004). 
The certainty equivalent (CE) in my study corresponds to negative exponential utility (𝑈(𝑥) =
1 − 𝑒−𝑟∗𝜋), and a given risk averse coefficient (r) is calculated as an inverse function of expected 
utility as follows: 
(3.8)     𝐶𝐸(𝑟) = ln(1 − 𝐸𝑈(𝑟))
−1/𝑟
 
 
The CE is determined by expected utility and the degree of risk aversion.  
This study identifies the irrigation strategy with the highest expected utility or highest 
certainty equivalent for several different values of the absolute risk aversion coefficient (r). 
Accordingly, the study used the method proposed by Mccarl and Bessler (1989) to determine the 
38 
upper bound of absolute risk aversion coefficient (r) and then calculated the corresponding 
ARAC for particular risk averse behavior by using the method proposed by Babcock, Choi and 
Feinerman (1993). My study assumes that the lower bound for the absolute risk aversion 
coefficient (r) is 0 as a farmer is expected to have risk neutral or risk averse behavior but not risk 
loving behavior. The method of calculating the absolute risk aversion coefficient and upper 
bound of absolute risk aversion coefficient are discussed in Section 3.6.  
 
 3.2. Producer decision-making model 
The producer decision-making model can be formulated as follows: 
(3.9)                             Max{𝑚𝑑,𝑙, 𝛿,𝛼} 
1
𝑇
∑ 𝑈(𝑟, 𝝅𝒕)
𝑇
𝑡=1
      
(3.10)                                 𝑠. 𝑡.    𝑤𝑡 = 𝑔(𝒎𝒅, 𝑙, 𝜽𝑡) ≤ 𝑞  𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑡 = 1, … ,30  
(3.11)      𝑙 ∗ 𝛿 ≤ 𝜑 ∗ 𝛾 
where 
(3.12)          𝜋𝑡 = 𝛿𝑝𝑓(𝒎𝒅, 𝑙, 𝛼, 𝜏, 𝜽𝒕 ) − 𝛿𝑐(𝑤𝑡, 𝛼) − 𝑑(𝛼) − 𝛿𝑛 ∗ 𝑓(. ) − 𝛿 ∗ 𝑔 + (𝐴 − 𝛿)𝑘 
 
Obviously, the producer faces risk in crop production due to weather uncertainty, which 
is shown by 30 years of possible weather conditions where years are denoted by t=1,…,30. 
Equation 3.9 shows that the producer’s objective is to find the irrigation strategy that maximizes 
expected utility as a function of net return (𝝅𝒕) and risk-aversion coefficient (𝑟). The producer’s 
strategy concerning irrigation has four components consisting of MAD at each growth stage 
(𝒎𝒅), instantaneous rate(𝑙), irrigated acreage (𝛿), and irrigation technology (𝛼).   The field 
irrigated acreage (𝛿) is referred to later as adjustment in extensive margin. In addition, MAD at 
each growth stage (𝒎𝒅) and instantaneous rate(𝑙) refer to adjustment in intensive margin. The 
simulation of net returns will be based on 30 years historical data (1986-2015), t=1,…,30. The 
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probability of (
1
𝑇
) shows that I assume the farmer has uniform probability for all historical time 
periods. 
Equation 3.10 shows the total irrigation water(𝑤𝑡); irrigation intensity that can be applied 
during a growing season is limited by water constraint policy (𝑞) imposed by the government. 
The total irrigation water (𝒘𝒕) depends on MAD from each growth stage (𝑚𝑑), instantaneous 
rate (𝑙), and weather conditions (𝜽𝑡). My study assumes four crop growth stages for corn, 
denoted by d = 1,…,4.   
Equation 3.11 expresses the irrigation constraint due to limitation in well capacity, which 
later is referred to as well capacity constraint. Equation 3.11 shows the total irrigation each day 
cannot exceed as the maximum water extraction per day. Total irrigation per day on the left-hand 
side is the instantaneous rate (𝑙)  times the irrigated acreage (𝛿). The instantaneous rate is the 
total maximum amount of water that can be applied per irrigated acre per day. On the right-hand 
side, the maximum water extraction per day is the well capacity (𝜑) times the maximum 
duration of extraction per day (𝛾).  Equation 3.11 implies that a farmer with a particular well 
capacity may need to decrease irrigated acreage to increase the instantaneous rate. In addition, 
Equations 3.10 and 3.11 show that the total irrigation water (𝒘𝒕) also depends on irrigated 
acreage as the instantaneous rate determined by irrigated acreage. 
The first few terms in the net return (𝝅𝒕) calculation in Equation 3.12 estimate the net 
returns from irrigation. The irrigated acreage is shown by 𝛿, and the total area is shown by 𝐴. 
The crop production is denoted by 𝑓(. ), which, for irrigated acreage depends on MAD from each 
growth stage (𝒎𝒅), instantaneous rate (𝑙), irrigation technology (𝛼), soil characteristics (𝜏), and 
weather conditions(𝜽𝒕). The water productivity and irrigation efficiency in irrigated acreage are 
mainly determined by irrigation technology (𝛼) and soil characteristics (𝜏). The cost of 
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production in Equation 3.12 comprises irrigation water cost (𝑐(𝑤𝑡, 𝛼)), fixed cost of irrigation 
technology (d(𝛼)), non-irrigation variable cost (𝛿𝑛 ∗ 𝑓(. )), and non-irrigation production cost 
based on acreage (𝛿 ∗ 𝑔). The non-irrigation variable cost (𝛿𝑛 ∗ 𝑓(. )) for irrigated acreage (𝛿) 
depends on the crop production(𝑓(. )). The non-irrigation production cost based on acreage 
(𝛿 ∗ 𝑔) is determined by irrigated acreage (𝛿) and fixed input cost per acreage of planting(𝑔). 
The fixed input cost per acreage of planting (𝑔) comprises seed, insecticide/fungicide, herbicide, 
machinery, crop consulting, non-machinery labor, irrigation labor, interest on non-land cost, and 
other miscellaneous cost. The irrigation cost (𝑐(𝑤𝑡, 𝛼)) corresponds to energy price and total 
water applied to the field (𝒘𝒕) for each growing season. The irrigation cost is assumed to be 
independent of land quality. Non-irrigation variable cost (𝛿𝑛 ∗ 𝑓(. ))  includes fertilizer and 
machinery harvest charge (extra charge and hauling). The revenue from non-irrigated acreage is 
shown in the last term and is generated from land leasing, where the rental rate of non-irrigated 
acreage is denoted by 𝑘.  
  
 3.3 Adjustment on extensive and intensive margin 
Adjustment at the extensive margin is how a farmer allocates total area to irrigated and 
non-irrigated acreage. Also, any adjustment occurs prior to planting before growing season 
weather is known. The 160-acre hypothetical field is divided into a maximum irrigation area of a 
125-acre crop circle (could be less than a 125-acre irrigate crop circle) and a minimum non-
irrigated acreage of a35-acre plot (could be more than a 35-acre non-irrigated plot) for center 
pivot irrigation. Drip irrigation maximum area is the 160-acre hypothetical field. 
The allocation of irrigated acreage is constrained by the instantaneous rate and well 
capacity. The relationship between maximum irrigated acreage and instantaneous rate for each 
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well capacity is shown in Figure 3.1 for center pivot irrigation.  The relation between well 
capacity, instantaneous rate, and maximum irrigated acreage is estimated using a standard 
engineering formula shown as follows: 
(3.13)      𝛿 =
𝜑∗𝛾
𝑙
 
where 𝛿 is irrigated acreage, 𝜑 is well capacity, 𝛾 is a maximum duration of extracting water per 
day, and 𝑙 is the instantaneous rate of application per acre. My study assumes that maximum 
duration of extracting water per day (𝛾) is 24 hours. My model allows the farmer to choose any 
combination of instantaneous rate and irrigated acreage illustrated by the lines in Figure 3.1 as 
long as the combination is less than or equal to the assumed well capacity. 
There are two components of adjustment at the intensive margin: the instantaneous rate 
and management allowed deficit (MAD). The instantaneous rate and MAD will generate 
irrigation scheduling. The instantaneous rate is the maximum rate of instantaneous application of 
water that can be applied in one day (mm/day), which in my research is between 1-16 mm at 1 
mm increment
1
.  
The instantaneous rate corresponds to well capacity and irrigated acreage such that low 
well capacity may have a large irrigated acreage but a small instantaneous rate, or a small 
irrigated acreage may have a large instantaneous rate. The relationships among instantaneous 
rates, well capacity, and irrigated acreage are shown in Equation 3.13. This study considers a 
wide range of well capacities from 100-1500 GPM (gallons per minute) in 100 GPM increment. 
The well capacity limits the maximum instantaneous rate of water application and affects the 
ability to maintain the desired MAD level on irrigated acreage (Foster et al. 2014; Peterson and 
Ding 2005; Upendram et al. 2015).  
                                                 
1
 1 mm increment in the instantaneous rate is the smallest possible instantaneous rate changing in AquaCrop 
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Figure 3.1 Maximum irrigated acreage size and instantaneous rate of application (mm/day) 
for different combinations of well capacity (GPM) for center pivot irrigation
2
  
 
 
The AquaCrop software simulates daily irrigation amounts based on the instantaneous 
rate to maintain the soil moisture level by setting MAD for each growth stage (i.e., irrigation 
scheduling).  MAD is the maximum amount of total available water (TAW) that is allowed to be 
depleted from the soil before triggering irrigation. For example, a MAD of 75% means that 
farmers will allow a maximum of 75% of TAW to be removed from the soil before triggering the 
irrigation application. Therefore, larger MAD values imply less frequent irrigation. 
I allow for various MAD levels for the four different growth stages as illustrated in 
Figure 3.2: initial stage (emergence); canopy development (max canopy); mid-season stage 
(senescence); and late-season stage (maturity). The irrigation scheduling combination is 
                                                 
2
 The same graph pattern also found for drip irrigation with maximum irrigated acreage of 160 acres 
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generated with a range of MAD levels of 0%-100% in 10% increments. Moreover, the ranges of 
MAD levels apply to all four growth stages. Therefore, the total number of possible irrigation 
schedules for each instantaneous rate is 14641 (11*11*11*11). Furthermore, the total adjustment 
in intensive margin for each well capacity is the combination of MAD and instantaneous rates, 
which offers 234,256 (14641*16) strategies for a single irrigation technology. The instantaneous 
rate and MAD at growth stage determine the irrigation intensity, where irrigation intensity is 
defined as the total amount of irrigation water applied per growing season (acre-inches/year). 
Notably, irrigation intensity varies by the weather of a given year; thus, an irrigation schedule 
calls for greater intensity in dry years than in wet years. I assume that a farmer sets the irrigation 
schedule prior to planting when weather is unknown, but the water applied depends on the actual 
weather in the growing season. This is an important distinction from previous studies that 
assume the choice of irrigation intensity is fixed so that farmers are restricted to applying the 
same amount of water in dry and wet years (Llewelyn and Featherstone 1997; O’Brien et al. 
2001; Peterson and Ding 2005).  
Figure 3.2 Crop growth stage 
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 3.4 Discrete simulation model 
My study uses discrete optimization with a historical simulation to find the optimal 
irrigation strategy under risk aversion. Previous studies have estimated optimal water use by 
using continuous optimization using an annual/seasonal crop water production model (Dinar and 
Knapp 1986; Llewelyn and Featherstone 1997; Peterson and Ding 2005). In contrast, my study 
uses discrete optimization because I use a daily biophysical crop simulation model so that 
continuous optimization is not feasible. The daily biophysical crop simulation model used in this 
study is AquaCrop.  
The annual/seasonal crop water production model does not consider various water 
application timing and dynamic response of the crop to water (Hexem and Heady 1978). 
However, daily biophysical crop water production model can capture the dynamic response of 
the crop to water. All the same, discrete simulation may not result in the optimal solution. To 
find a solution near the optimum, this study applies a fine grid of potential irrigation strategies—
234,256 strategies at the intensive margin alone denoted by a in Figure 3.3.  
Figure 3.3 illustrates the discrete simulation approach. The simulation starts with input 
data for AquaCrop comprising adjustment at the intensive margin (MAD and instantaneous rate), 
soil characteristics, irrigation technology, and 30 years of weather data. The daily water uses 
from intensive irrigation along with soil, irrigation technology and weather data are used to 
calculate the crop yield and water use per acre using AquaCrop.  The crop yield simulation is 
executed for each combination of MAD and instantaneous rate for 30 years of weather data to 
generate 7,027,680 observations of crop yield and water use per acre data denoted by b in Figure 
3.3. 
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Figure 3.3 Discrete simulation model 
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Adjustment at the intensive with extensive margin generates a combination of 27,642,208 
total irrigation strategy combinations from which the producer can choose the optimal irrigation 
strategy. In addition, the simulation of all irrigation strategy along with 30 years of weather data 
generates 829,266,240 observations of crop production and total water use, which are denoted by 
c  in Figure 3.3.  
The net return is calculated for each strategy for each year of historical weather using 
total crop production, crop price, non-irrigated revenue, irrigation cost, fixed investment cost, 
and other input cost. The total irrigation cost is estimated based on total irrigation water use and 
the price of energy. The parameters of crop price and input cost for net return estimation are 
presented in detail later in Section 3.4.2.  The optimal strategy is selected by choosing the 
highest certainty equivalent; as mentioned in Section 3.1, maximizing expected utility is equal to 
maximizing certainty equivalent. The certainty equivalent is calculated for each irrigation 
strategy as a function of the net returns across the 30 years of historical weather data for a given 
risk premium. The optimal irrigation strategy comprises MAD and instantaneous rate (intensive 
margin) and irrigated acreage (extensive margin). I conducted the simulation in Figure 3.3 
separately for center pivot and drip irrigation technologies and can compare the certainty 
equivalent from the optimal strategies to determine the preferred irrigation technology. 
I impose the well capacity and water constraint policies by considering only irrigation 
strategies that satisfy the relevant constraint. For example, for the well capacity, I only consider 
combinations of irrigated acreage and instantaneous rates that are feasible. The well capacity 
ranges from 100 to 1500 GPM in 100 GPM increments to reflect the range of well capacities in 
Kansas. For the policy constraint, I considered only irrigation strategies where the total water use 
over a given period of time (e.g., each growing season or a 5-year period) is less than or equal to 
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the assumed policy constraint. For example, with a 5-year policy constraint, I exclude any 
irrigation strategy where total water use in any sequential 5-year period with the historical 
weather data exceeds the 5-year allocation. Finally, the water constraint policy ranges from 9 to 
15 inches in 1-inch increments. 
 3.4.1 AquaCrop model 
This study uses the AquaCrop model to simulate corn yield under different irrigation 
schedules (e.g., MAD in each growth stage and instantaneous rate). AquaCrop is computer 
software that simulates crop yield and crop growth based on water received by the crop. The 
AquaCrop model can be used as an empirical production function for estimating crop yield 
response to water (Raes et al. 2009). I describe weather and soils data and crop growth 
parameters used in AquaCrop in this section. I parameterize the model to correspond with 
characteristics of Garden City, KS in Finney County. 
Five climate components are needed to simulate  an AquaCrop model: daily rainfall, 
daily maximum and minimum air temperatures, reference evapotranspiration, and mean annual 
carbon dioxide concentration in the bulk atmosphere (Raes et al. 2009). Therefore, I obtained 
thirty years of weather data from Garden City from the weather data library Kansas Mesonet. 
The weather dataset comprises daily rainfall, daily maximum and minimum air temperatures, 
relative humidity, and solar radiation for 1986-2015. The carbon dioxide information came from 
the default AquaCrop data for carbon dioxide concentration. Finally, the reference 
evapotranspiration (𝐸𝑇0) for the AquaCrop production estimation was calculated using the 
software 𝐸𝑇0 calculator (Raes 2012). Thus, the average rainfall during the growing season period 
for 30 years of data is 11.59 inches.   
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 Soil characteristics and crop growth parameters are necessary for the AquaCrop 
production model. Therefore, this study uses two types of soil, namely Richfield Silt Loam and 
Valent-Vona Loamy Fine Sands, because of their large difference in soil water holding capacity 
and because they comprise a large portion of Finney County. Using the SPAW model and 
reference number for the soil texture, I calculated the average available water capacity for 
Richfield Silt Loam is 1.91 in/ft and Valent-Vona Loamy Fine Sands is 0.946 in/ft.  According to 
USDA (1965) Richfield Silt Loam comprises 28.7% of the total area and is the most dominant 
soil type in Finney County. In addition, according to Web Soil Survey from NRCS (2016) 
Valent-Vona Loamy Fine Sands also comprises large proportion of soil in Finney County.  
Based on the soil survey data, we assumed the soil texture properties, using reference 
parameters, as shown in Table 3.1 below. The soil texture property was used to calculate the soil 
hydraulic conductivity for AquaCrop using the SPAW model (Saxton and Willey 2005).  
Table 3-1 Soil characteristic for Richfield Silt Loam and Valent-Vona Loamy Fine Sands 
Soil Type Depth (inches) % of Sand % of Silt % of Clay 
Richfield Silt 
Loam 
0-6 29 53 18 
6-17 9 52 39 
17-25 18 49 33 
25-79 22 52 26 
Valent-Vona 
Loamy Fine 
Sands 
0-8 78 16 6 
8-22 67 20 13 
22-60 64 27 9 
  
 3.4.2 Parameter of output and input price   
Parameters for the cost of production came from KSU farm management guides 
developed by Kansas State Research and Extension (O’Brien and Ibendahl 2015) . The cost of 
production is based on a Southwest Kansas corn farm given 2015 conditions.  Therefore, the 
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corn price is assumed at $4.25 per bushel and the pumping cost is assumed at $5.26/inch 
(O’Brien and Ibendahl 2015) while the non-irrigated cash rental rate is $24.90 per acre (Taylor 
2015). The parameters of the production cost are shown in Table 3.2. Importantly, I exclude the 
irrigated cash rent from the cost of production, so the estimated net returns represent the returns 
to land. 
Table 3-2 The parameters of input cost of production 
Input Cost ($) 
Irrigation water pumping cost 5.26/in 
Seed, 1,000/acre* 3.96/1,000 
Fertilizer 0.69/bushel 
Herbicide 
 Burndown 12.94/ac 
Preemergence 33.73/ac 
Postemergence 8.67/ac 
Insecticide / Fungicide 
 Fungicide 25.36/ac 
Insecticide 11.47/ac 
Machinery 91.97/ac 
Harvest 
     Base charge 29.78/ac 
    Extra charge for yields exceeding 0.25/bu 
    Hauling 0.2/bu 
Non-machinery labor 18/ac 
Irrigation labor 7.5/ac 
Crop consulting 6.5/ac 
Miscellaneous cost 10/ac 
Interest on capital 0.065 
               Source: (O’Brien and Ibendahl 2015) 
 
The cost of irrigation investment came from Lamm, O’Brien and Rogers (2015).  I 
assume the investment cost of center-pivot irrigation based on irrigation system installation for 
125 acres and investment cost of drip irrigation installation on 160 acres. The investment cost is 
assumed to be fixed based on maximum irrigated acreage and the same for all well capacity 
levels. I assume the investment cost for drip irrigation is proportional to the maximum irrigated 
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acreage. This assumption is based on O’Brien et al. (1998) who estimate an almost linear 
relationship between irrigation technology investment and irrigation acreage for drip irrigation 
systems. Finally, Lamm et al. (2015) mentioned that drip irrigation investment cost is 
proportional to irrigated acreage, but this is not the case with center pivot irrigation. 
 
 3.5 Analysis of welfare loss affected by water constraint policy and lower well 
capacity 
The estimation of welfare loss due to a water policy constraint, presented in chapter 5, is 
estimated as the amount of wealth compensation needed for the farmer to be indifferent to the 
constraint with compensation and no policy constraint. In particular, I seek to estimate the 
welfare lost (C) because of water policy constraint as follows: 
(3.14)      𝐸𝑈(𝜋1, 𝑊1) = 𝐸𝑈(𝜋2 + 𝐶, 𝑊2) 
where 𝑊1 is irrigation water application without water constraint policy, 𝑊2 is irrigation water 
application with water constraint policy, 𝜋1 is net return gain without water constraint policy, 
and 𝜋2 is net return gain with water constraint policy.  
As suggested by Mjelde and Cochran (1988),  the risk premium can determine the 
confidence of decision-makers choosing among risky alternatives. The utility-weighted risk 
premium at a given risk aversion level (r) can be calculated by subtracting the most preferred 
condition with the less preferred condition  (Hardaker et al. 2004). In this study, I assume that the 
welfare loss (C) in applying water constraint policy is equal to the risk premium of two different 
risky conditions. Thus, the welfare loss is simply the difference between the certainty equivalent 
without a constraint and with a constraint: 
(3.15)    𝐶 = 𝐶𝐸(𝑟, 𝜋1) − 𝐶𝐸(𝑟, 𝜋2) 
51 
The estimation of welfare loss due to the decrease in well capacity will follow a similar 
procedure except where 𝜋1 is the net return for higher well capacity and 𝜋2 is the net return for 
lower well capacity.  
 
 3.6 Estimating upper bound and corresponding absolute risk aversion 
coefficient (r) 
Using mean-variance analysis and stochastic efficiency with respect to a function (SERF) 
for expected utility maximization requires information about the risk aversion coefficient (r) to 
rank alternatives of risky strategies. In terms of the utility function of the decision maker, the risk 
aversion coefficient is represented as −
𝑈′′
𝑈′
 . While it is impossible to directly observe the utility 
function, several studies use empirical methods to elicit the risk aversion coefficient (r) for 
farmers in the USA (Brink and Mccarl 1978; Chavas and Holt 1996; Love and Buccola 1991; 
Saha, Shumway and Talpaz 1994; Atanu 1997). Those studies found different ranges of risk 
aversion coefficient (r). Indeed, varied estimates regarding risk aversion coefficients is not 
surprising as those studies most likely used different samples of farmers. Mccarl and Bessler 
(1989) mentioned that research procedure on ranking the alternative for risk strategies, which 
uses risk aversion coefficients (r) from other studies, is questionable since every study uses 
different utility assumptions and wealth levels.  
Mccarl and Bessler (1989) introduced a procedure for estimating the upper bound of the 
risk aversion coefficient (r) given unknown utility function based on three ways of estimating the 
upper bound risk aversion coefficient (r). The first method is assuming non-negative certainty 
equivalent and risk premium to be no greater than expected wealth(𝑟 =
2∗𝐸(𝜋)
𝜎𝜋
2 ). The other two 
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methods used the confidence interval and assumption on MOTAD analysis to calculate the upper 
bound of the risk aversion coefficient (r). My study uses the first method of Mccarl and Bessler 
(1989) to calculate the upper bound of risk aversion coefficient (r). The lower bound is expected 
to be zero as we assume the farmer has a risk neutral and risk-averse preference.  
The risk aversion coefficient (r) is often used in risk and uncertainty models as a 
parameter to represent the degree of risk-averse behavior. However, the value of the risk 
aversion coefficient (r) is difficult to interpret without further information (Babcock et al. 1993). 
The method proposed by Babcock et al. (1993) shows how to interpret the risk aversion 
coefficient (r) using risk premium and probability premium.   
This study will use the method proposed by Babcock et al. (1993)  to calculate the risk 
aversion coefficient (r) and later compare it to the upper bound of risk aversion coefficient (r) 
from the Mccarl and Bessler (1989) method to get a reasonable range for the risk aversion 
coefficient (r).  Babcock et al. (1993) calculate the risk aversion coefficient (r) value by using 
risk premium and probability premium for a particular gamble size. A gamble size is represented 
by the standard deviation of net return; in turn, the deviation shows the uncertainty for a 
particular strategy that a farmer will choose. The estimation of risk aversion coefficient (r) value 
using risk premium and probability premium (Babcock et al. 1993)  is shown below: 
(3.14)          𝑟 (𝜌, 𝜎) =
ln [
1+2𝜌
1−2𝜌
]
𝜎
 
 
such that : (3.15) 
𝜔(𝜌) =
ln [
1 + 4𝜌2
1 − 4𝜌2
]
ln [
1 + 2𝜌
1 − 2𝜌]
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where  𝜔 is the risk premium as percentage of gamble size, 𝜌 is the probability premium, and  
𝜎 is a gamble size shown by standard deviation of net return. 
The risk premium together with the probability premium is used to calculate a reasonable 
risk aversion coefficient (r) value for each well capacity. Different risk aversion coefficient (r) 
values generated for each well capacity are based on a different gamble size as represented by 
the standard deviation of net return.  The estimation of risk aversion coefficient (r) values for 
Richfield soil and Valent-Vona soil for each well capacity are shown in Table 3.3.  
The risk premium ranged from 10% to 80%. I found that the risk aversion coefficient (r) 
from a risk premium of 80% does not exceed the upper bound value in the  Mccarl and Bessler 
(1989) method.  Therefore, the risk premium of 80% represents the farmer with very strong risk 
averse behavior. Hudson, Coble and Lusk (2005) calculated the average risk premium for direct 
elicitation in yield context was about 10.5%.  Bontems and Thomas (2000) found that the value 
of information together with risk premium account for about 20% of profit per acre. Babcock and 
Shogren (1995) estimated that the production premium accounts for 21-79% of the willingness to 
pay to eliminate all production risk.  
Clearly, the risk aversion coefficient (r) value increases if the risk premium increases (see 
Table 3.3), meaning the farmer with more risk averse behavior is willing to spend a higher 
premium to eliminate the risk. For example, a risk premium of 10% indicates that a farmer is 
willing to spend a maximum of 10% of the total return to eliminate the risk. A higher risk 
premium indicates that a farmer is willing to spend a larger proportion of total net return to 
eliminate the risk; thus, a higher risk premium implies more risk averse behavior.  
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Table 3-3 Risk aversion coefficient (r) value for Richfield soil and Valent-Vona soil 
Well 
capacity 
(in 
GPM) 
Risk Premium 
 10% 15% 20% 80% 
RSL VVS RSL VVS RSL VVS RSL VVS 
100 0.0001497 0.0002498 0.0002265 0.0003779 0.0003056 0.0005100 0.0025723 0.0042926 
200 0.0000748 0.0001248 0.0001131 0.0001888 0.0001527 0.0002549 0.0012852 0.0021449 
300 0.0000499 0.0000832 0.0000754 0.0001259 0.0001018 0.0001699 0.0008568 0.0014297 
400 0.0000374 0.0000624 0.0000566 0.0000944 0.0000764 0.0001274 0.0006426 0.0010721 
500 0.0000299 0.0000499 0.0000453 0.0000755 0.0000611 0.0001019 0.0005141 0.0008577 
600 0.0000269 0.0000416 0.0000406 0.0000629 0.0000548 0.0000849 0.0004616 0.0007148 
700 0.0000271 0.0000384 0.0000410 0.0000581 0.0000553 0.0000784 0.0004658 0.0006600 
800 0.0000339 0.0000535 0.0000513 0.0000810 0.0000692 0.0001093 0.0005825 0.0009202 
900 0.0000408 0.0000610 0.0000618 0.0000923 0.0000834 0.0001246 0.0007016 0.0010484 
1000 0.0000455 0.0000595 0.0000688 0.0000900 0.0000929 0.0001214 0.0007815 0.0010218 
1100 0.0000473 0.0000573 0.0000716 0.0000867 0.0000966 0.0001170 0.0008133 0.0009843 
1200 0.0000486 0.0000577 0.0000735 0.0000872 0.0000992 0.0001177 0.0008347 0.0009908 
1300 0.0000505 0.0000573 0.0000764 0.0000868 0.0001031 0.0001171 0.0008676 0.0009854 
1400 0.0000513 0.0000617 0.0000777 0.0000933 0.0001048 0.0001260 0.0008822 0.0010603 
1500 0.0000517 0.0000600 0.0000783 0.0000908 0.0001056 0.0001225 0.0008892 0.0010312 
RSL=Richfield soil  ,    VVS=Valent-Vona soil 
 
A negative correlation exists between risk aversion coefficient (r) value and standard 
deviation of net return for a particular risk premium. The risk aversion coefficient (r) value for 
Richfield soil steadily increases with well capacity in the case of full-irrigated acreage (well 
capacity higher than 600 GPM). In particular, the ARAC values for a particular risk premium are 
found to be lower for Richfield soil than for Valent-Vona soil in all well capacity levels. This is 
because Richfield soil has a larger standard deviation of net returns than Valent-Vona soil.  
 
 3.7 Model validation 
I use crop growth parameters for AquaCrop that have been calibrated based on actual 
crop production data under limited irrigation conditions in Garden City (A Araya et al. 2016).   
55 
The crop statistical validation results show significant goodness of fit for AquaCrop on 
calibration datasets (A Araya et al. 2016). 
The estimation of crop yield using AquaCrop does depend on crop growth parameters. I 
am estimating regression analysis of corn yield using NASS (2016b) data from 1972-2010 for 
Finney Country, I  estimate in-sample analysis for the corn yield in 2010 is at 199 bushels per 
acre. The AquaCrop simulation shows the average corn yield from optimal irrigation scheduling 
is 189-192 bushels per acre for Richfield soil and 194-198 bushels per acre for Valent-Vona soil 
where the well capacity is between 600-800 GPM. The comparison in average corn yield 
validates my corn yield model and crop growth parameter for AquaCrop. 
Since, the estimated net returns from my model represent the net returns to the land; the 
results for a typical well capacity should correspond closely with those for irrigated cash rental 
rates. I estimate that the net return for a risk neutral farmer with Richfield soil is $111.16 /acre 
with the optimal irrigation strategy when the well capacity is 700 GPM. The estimated net return 
for a 600 GPM well is $103.48/acre. Taylor and Tsoodle (2015) estimated the cash rental rate for 
irrigated crop land for Finney County is $109 /acre. This comparison with cash rental rate data 
supports the validity of my model. 
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Chapter 4 - Optimal irrigation strategies with a limited well 
capacity or a water constraint policy 
Reducing well capacity reduces the amount of irrigation that can be applied in a 
particular period of time, which could reduce corn production by reducing irrigation per acreage 
or actual acreage. Moreover, the impact of well capacity reduction by decreasing corn production 
is significantly greater during periods of drought. Thus, the decline in well capacity arguably 
reduces expected net returns and increases the risk associated with corn production. Also, 
reduced well capacities will become an increasingly common concern as an aquifer is depleted 
following aquifer saturated thickness decreasing, which results in well capacity diminishing. In 
this chapter, I use the discrete simulation model described in the previous chapter to examine the 
optimal adjustment to irrigation strategy in response to a decrease in the well capacity and the 
resulting impact on total water use. I consider both risk averse and risk neutral behavior on the 
part of the farmer. I also examine the effect of different water constraint policies on optimal 
irrigation strategies and on total water use. 
The following analyses are organized into four separate sections. The first section 
analyzes the impact of the decrease in well capacity on the optimal adjustments along the 
intensive and extensive margins. I also explore potential expected net returns and water use. The 
second section examines how the optimal irrigation strategy differs for different degrees of risk 
aversion. The analyses in the first and second sections do not include water constraint policy, 
whereas in the third and fourth sections I do address water constraint policy. Specifically, the 
third section focuses on the impact of policy on net return and optimal irrigation strategy for the 
risk neutral farmer. The water constraint policy has two aspects:  time constraint and quantity 
constraint. In the third section, I vary the quantity constraint by increments of 1” from 9 to 15 
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inches, for a 5-year time constraint. Then, the fourth section examines how the optimal irrigation 
strategy differs for different degrees of risk aversion when the government imposes a 5-year time 
constraint and an 11 inch quantity constraint. The analysis of the effect of limited well capacity 
and water constraint policy is available for two types of soil: Richfield silt loam and Valent-
Vona loamy fine sand. In that analysis, I refer to the former as Richfield soil and the latter as 
Valent-Vona soil.  
 
 4.1. The impact of a decrease in well capacity on optimal irrigation strategy 
and water use  
This section addresses risk neutral farmers and compares the two types of prevalent soil. 
 4.1.1 Risk neutral farmers with Richfield soil 
The first section starts with the effect of a lower well capacity—perhaps caused by 
groundwater depletion—on the optimal irrigation strategy and water use for risk neutral farmers 
with Richfield soil. For each well capacity, I solve for the optimal irrigation strategy for a risk 
neutral farmer; then I examine how the optimal strategy, net returns, and standard deviation of 
net returns differ by well capacity. 
Total irrigation increases with well capacity up to 600 GPM, but total irrigation remains 
more or less stable when the well capacity is at or above 600 GPM (see Figure 4.1). Also, clearly 
the farmer with a well capacity of 600 GPM or higher will show some variation in total irrigation 
even while utilizing irrigation for all of the acreage area (see Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2). For well 
capacity below 600 GPM, any decrease in well capacity will lead to a faster decrease in total 
irrigation, which is predominantly driven by change in irrigated acreage.  
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Figure 4.1 Average total irrigation for 
Richfield soil 
Figure 4.2 Average irrigation acreage for 
Richfield soil 
  
 
A counterintuitive result is that higher well capacity may not always result in higher total 
water use. Figure 4.1 shows the total irrigation for 700 GPM is lower than for 600 GPM by 
11.3%. In addition, the highest total irrigation is when the well capacity is at 600 GPM. The 
lower total irrigation for700 GPM is due to a higher instantaneous rate (see Figure 4.3).  Such a 
rate may generate lower levels of irrigation intensity and total irrigation with the same irrigated 
acreage, corn yield, and total corn production compared to the rate for 600 GPM (see Figure 4.1, 
4.2 and 4.3). This finding differs from that of Foster, Brozović and Butler (2014) who 
determined that higher well capacity will result in higher total irrigation water use.  
I also observe when well capacity is above 600 GPM a farmer will not reduce irrigated 
acreage in response to a decline in well capacity (see Figure 4.2). Instead, when faced by a 
decrease in well capacity, this farmer may change only irrigation intensity and instantaneous rate 
(see Figure 4.3). These results imply a well capacity threshold of 600 GPM when a farmer 
changes from the intensive margin adjustment to an extensive margin adjustment as an effect of 
groundwater depletion due to reduced well capacity.  
Figure 4.3 shows that the instantaneous rate of application increases sharply when well 
capacity is above 600 GPM. The positive relationship between instantaneous rate of application 
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and well capacity is for full-irrigated acreage (see Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.3). A farmer with high 
well capacity optimizes water use and net return through adjustment in the intensive margin by 
choosing the higher instantaneous rate of application. With such a rate, the farmer may generate 
less frequent irrigation application by managing a higher Management Allowed Deficit (MAD) 
for the irrigation schedule.  In addition, the higher instantaneous rate will store a greater degree 
of water in the soil for each irrigation application making it less likely for corn to experience 
water stress.  
Figure 4.3 Instantaneous rate of application and average 
irrigation intensity for Richfield soil 
 
 
 
Furthermore, a minimum optimal instantaneous rate of application of 6 mm/day is 
required to deal with weather uncertainty and to obtain an optimum net return for the Richfield 
soil (see Figure 4.3). Instantaneous rate of application lower than 6 mm/day may not result in 
optimal net return but cause more frequent irrigation applications with lower Management 
Allowed Deficit (MAD) levels. In addition, less frequent irrigation but a higher instantaneous 
rate will result in lower irrigation intensity than will more frequent irrigation but lower 
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instantaneous rate. For example, Figure 4.3 shows that well capacity lower than 600 GPM has 
higher irrigation intensity but a lower instantaneous rate than well capacity higher than 700 
GPM. Thus, the lower instantaneous rate may result in higher irrigation cost.  
However, a very low instantaneous rate may result in an insufficient irrigation water 
supply that may induce corn water stress and severe corn yield loss especially during unfavorable 
weather condition because a low rate may be less able to maintain the given MAD. For a 
particular well capacity, the instantaneous rate can only be adjusted by changing the irrigated 
acreage. Clearly, an economic trade-off exists between instantaneous rate and irrigated acreage 
due to constraint in well capacity. The farmer will try to optimize these two to obtain the highest 
net return depending on weather conditions. This finding corroborates that of O’Brien et al. 
(2001) that in response to well capacity declining, a farmer will change irrigated acreage to 
provide adequate supply of water for crop growth. 
 The minimum optimal irrigation intensity and instantaneous rate, 10 inches and 6 
mm/day, addresses the optimal adjustment between intensive and extensive margins with no 
water policy constraint. English (1990) and Wang and Nair (2013) support this claim by stating 
that maximal water resource rent is attainable when marginal returns are equal at the extensive 
and intensive margins. In this scenario, a farmer with a particular well capacity may not decrease 
instantaneous rate below 6 mm/day to keep irrigated acreage constant. It is when instantaneous 
rate drops below 6 mm/day and irrigated acreage is constant that net return would reduce 
significantly. However, an instantaneous rate at or above 6 mm/day  would create reduced 
irrigated acreage due to limited well capacity but with smaller degree in net return reduction. In 
such a case, the farmer would adjust the extensive margin to keep the instantaneous rate of 6 
mm/day when the well capacity decreases below 600 GPM.  
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Figure 4.4 shows corn yield increases as the well capacity increases. I measure corn yield 
as average simulated corn production per irrigated acre over the 30 years of historical weather. 
The yield ranges between a minimum of 189 bushels per acre to a maximum of 197 bushels per 
acre, and as long as the well capacity is below 700 GPM, corn yield is constant. However, corn 
yield rises when well capacity is higher than 700 GPM. This implies a minimum average corn 
yield of 189 bushels per acre for irrigated acreage, which the farmer wants to attain. The 
Richfield soil requires approximately 10 inches of irrigation per irrigated acre per year as optimal 
average irrigation intensity (see Fig 4.3). The above threshold (10 inches) of water is needed to 
optimize water-corn productivity and avoid severe corn water stress so that the farmer can obtain 
the minimum optimal productivity of 189 bushels per acre. In addition, an increase in 
instantaneous rate results in corn yields increasing. This implies the ability of higher well 
capacity to maintain the given MAD with a higher instantaneous rate resulting in higher corn 
yield.  
I also find that average total corn production (i.e., corn yield per irrigated acre times 
irrigated acreage) increases as well capacity increases. Measuring average corn production from 
overall simulated corn production of the irrigated acreage using data for 30 years of historical 
weather. Figure 4.5 shows that the decrease in well capacity causes a sharp decrease in average 
total corn production when the well capacity is below 600 GPM.  However, the corn yield is 
unchanged when well capacity is lower than 700 GPM (see Figure 4.4). Hence, this implies a 
sharp decrease in average total corn production due to the decline in well capacity is associated 
with reduced irrigated acreage.  Specifically, the decrease in irrigated acreage for average total 
production can decline by 20% when the well capacity falls from 500 GPM to 400 GPM.  
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Figure 4.4 Corn yield for Richfield soil Figure 4.5 Average total production for 
Richfield soil 
  
 
Figure 4.6 shows the expected net return from optimal irrigation strategy for each given 
well capacity level. Expected net return decreases when well capacity decreases (see Figure 4.6). 
Moreover, the rate of decline in expected net return increases with smaller well capacities.  
Clearly, the decline in well capacity affects irrigation, thus affecting corn yield and total 
production, which in turn reduces expected net return. Figure 4.6 indicates that when the well 
capacity falls below 600 GPM, expected net return falls faster. On the other hand, the rate falls 
relatively more slowly when the well capacity level is higher than 600 GPM. Likewise the 
expected net returns decrease by 24% when the well capacity decreases from 500 GPM to 400 
GPM. Meanwhile, the expected net return decreases only by 5% when the well capacity 
decreases from 800 GPM to 700 GPM.  The reason is that at high initial well capacities, 
subsequent reductions result in small changes in water use, but then those changes become much 
more substantial as the well capacity gets even smaller. In addition, the different rate of change 
in expected net return can be linked to any limitation in irrigation strategy choice that each well 
capacity level can generate. Thus, a low well capacity may have more limitation both for an 
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irrigated acreage and for instantaneous rate, which would result in significantly less water use 
and lower net return.  
Figure 4.6 Expected net return Richfield soil 
 
 
The sharp decrease in expected net return in the graph is caused by decrease in irrigated 
acreage; when well capacity is lower than 600 GPM; a farmer is compelled to reduce irrigated 
acreage to attain sufficient instantaneous rate and irrigation intensity (see Figures 4.2 and 4.3). 
Foster et al. (2014) find that a farmer with low well capacity focuses more on adjustment to the 
extensive margin. Based on my estimate, when well capacity falls below 600 GPM, the best 
irrigation strategy for maximizing net return is adjustment in the extensive margin instead of in 
the intensive margin. 
The rate of change in expected net return is relatively small when well capacity decreases 
from 1500 GPM to 600 GPM. The expected net return decreases at a slower rate because the 
farmer only changes the irrigation intensity  and not the irrigated acreage, which will result in 
only a slight decrease in corn productivity and total corn production (see figure 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5). 
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When well capacity is decreasing, a farmer with high well capacity can maximize expected net 
return by adjusting along the intensive margin instead of the extensive margin. This finding is 
similar to that of Foster et al. (2014).  
The sharp decrease in expected net return as the well capacity decreases may induce a 
farmer to switch to dry land farming for all acreage. Amosson et al. (2005) mentioned that the 
conversion from irrigated land to dry land farming could be a viable economic decision in 
response to rapid depletion of the Ogallala Aquifer, especially in the Southern High Plains. With 
the assumption of non-irrigated cash rent of $24.90 per acre, a farmer with well capacity lower 
than 300 GPM may convert to full dry land farming since installing center pivot irrigation may 
not be economically profitable. However, this result may occur because my study assumes 
investment cost of center pivot irrigation is not proportional to any change in irrigated acreage. 
Figure 4.2, 4.5, and Figure 4.6 show that irrigated acreage, total corn production, and 
expected net return decrease linearly with well capacity when capacity decreases below 600 
GPM. This result shows the adjustment in the extensive margin that occurs when expected net 
return decreases proportionally with the decrease in irrigated acreage; a 1% decrease in net return 
would cause a 1% decrease in expected net return (i.e. constant return to scale). In the case of no 
acreage constraint and water policy constraint, a farmer will make adjustment to the extensive 
margin with the change in well capacity and adjust corn production at a constant return to scale.  
Figures 4.3 and 4.4 show that the irrigation intensity is higher but the corn yield is lower 
for well capacity at or below 600 GPM compared to well capacity at or above 700 GPM. This 
result suggests that the marginal return of water is higher for larger well capacity. Also, the 
higher instantaneous rate for higher well capacity could result in more efficient irrigation 
application in response to weather uncertainty. This could be because a farmer with a higher well 
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capacity is better able to maintain appropriate MAD for each growth stage, which results in 
higher corn yield.  
Next, 600 GPM wells have higher total irrigation than do 700 GPM wells or higher. Both 
600 and 700 GPM wells irrigate full acreage, but 600 GPM wells use 6 mm/day at an 
instantaneous rate, and 700 GPM wells use 7 mm/day at an instantaneous rate, which results in 
the 600 GPM well using higher irrigation intensity than the 700 GPM well. A lower 
instantaneous rate may be less able to maintain MAD for each growth stage, which may result in 
more frequent irrigation application and higher irrigation intensity. In the case of the same 
irrigated acreage, a lower instantaneous rate may induce higher irrigation intensity resulting in 
higher total water use. The higher total irrigation of 600 GPM wells compared to 700 GPM wells 
or higher also shows that the decline in well capacity due to groundwater depletion may increase 
water demand over time. Figure 4.1 shows that the water demand for irrigation is greatest when 
the well capacity is at 600 GPM and starts to decrease if the well capacity is at or below 500 
GPM.  This trend generates the “hump shape” in total irrigation water use as shown in Figure 
4.1.  
Declines in well capacity can reflect the effect of groundwater depletion over time and 
thus Figure 4.1 shows how water use is likely to change over time due to groundwater depletion. 
With the assumption of stationary demand for water, Brill and Burness (1994) found an ‘S’ 
shape regarding groundwater extraction when they simulated the groundwater extraction model 
from Gisser and Sanchez (1980) and Nieswiadomy (1985). The ‘hump shape’ of average total 
irrigation in Figure 4.1 is similar to Brill's and Burness' (1994) simulation of groundwater 
extraction on the assumption of non-stationary water demand and the possibility of water 
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demand growing over time. However, the causes of increasing in water demand in my study 
versus Brill's and Burness' (1994) are different. 
 4.1.2 Comparison between results Richfield soil and Valent-Vona soil 
I observe an almost identical positive relationship between well capacity and total 
irrigation for both Valent-Vona and Richfield soils for well capacity up to 600 GPM (see figure 
4.7). I also observe that irrigation acreage shows a positive relationship to well capacity for both 
Valent-Vona and Richfield soils (for well capacity at or below 700 GPM for Valent-Vona, and 
600 GPM for Richfield soil) (see Figure 4.8). Clearly, Valent-Vona soil irrigates less acreage 
than Richfield soil when the well capacity is at or below 600 GPM. In the case of full irrigated 
acreage, the total irrigation of Valent-Vona soil is higher than for Richfield soil (see Figures 4.7 
and 4.8).  The difference in total irrigation may be due to differences in soil water holding 
capacity with Richfield soil retaining more water than Valent-Vona soil.  
Figure 4.7 Average total irrigation 
comparison between Richfield soil and 
Valent-Vona soil 
Figure 4.8 Average irrigation acreage 
comparison between Richfield soil and 
Valent-Vona soil 
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The ‘hump shape’ for total irrigation water also found for Valent-Vona soil. Figure 4.7 
shows the water use is actually higher for 600-1100 GPM wells than for 1200-1500 GPM wells 
for Valent-Vona soil. My simulation result shows 1200-1500 GPM wells apply water at a higher 
instantaneous rate than do 600-1100 GPM wells (see Table 4.1). The high instantaneous rate 
allows 1200-1500 GPM wells to set higher MAD for an irrigation schedule especially at the 
second growth stage (crop/canopy development stage) and third growth stage (mid-season stage) 
when corn uses the most water (see Table 4.1). The high well capacity may more easily keep the 
soil moisture at a desired level using a high instantaneous rate. On the other hand, 600-1100 
GPM wells are limited by smaller ranges of instantaneous rates that they can utilize. 
Consequently, 600-1100 GPM wells need to maintain lower MAD to cope with the risk 
associated with corn production especially during drought season (see Table 4.1). Thus, smaller 
well capacity triggers more frequent irrigation and results in higher total water use. Figure 4.9 
shows 1200-1500 GPM wells use less irrigation intensity than 600-1100 GPM wells. This 
finding is different for Foster et al. (2014) as they found higher well capacity always results in 
higher total water use. The difference between the two findings may be due to different irrigation 
schedule choices in the discrete simulation optimization as Foster et al. (2014) limit the irrigation 
choices to only uniform MAD for all growth stages.  
Table 4.1 shows the optimal MAD for each growth stage. The optimal irrigation 
scheduling is to supply more water during the second growth stage or at the most productive 
stage of corn growth. My results are consistent with those of Heeren et al. (2011)  who 
recommended irrigating with more water at vegetative stages to generate maximum yield 
especially with limited water availability. 
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Conversely, Valent-Vona soil has lower soil water holding capacity causing greater 
losses of water. Thus, water holding capacity requires a higher optimal instantaneous rate of 
application and triggers more frequent water irrigation application. In the case of 1400 and 1500 
GPM wells, Valent-Vona has higher irrigation intensity but higher MAD with the same 
instantaneous rate than Richfield soil (see Table 4.1 and Figure 4.9). Thus, as stated, even though 
Valent-Vona soil has higher MAD, it triggers more frequent irrigation application due to greater 
losses of water.  
Table 4-1 Instantaneous rate and MAD for Richfield soil and Valent-Vona soil 
Well 
capacity  
RSL VVS 
Ir D1-D2-D3-D4 Ir D1-D2-D3-D4 
100 6 60-0-40-90 7 100-10-40-100 
200 6 60-0-40-90 7 100-10-40-100 
300 6 60-0-40-90 7 100-10-40-100 
400 6 60-0-40-90 7 100-10-40-100 
500 6 60-0-40-90 7 100-10-40-100 
600 6 60-0-40-90 7 100-10-40-100 
700 7 60-10-50-90 7 100-10-40-100 
800 8 60-10-50-100 8 90-10-40-100 
900 9 60-10-50-100 9 90-10-40-100 
1000 10 60-10-50-100 10 70-20-40-100 
1100 11 60-10-50-90 11 100-20-40-90 
1200 12 70-10-50-100 13 90-20-50-100 
1300 14 60-10-50-100 13 90-20-50-100 
1400 15 60-10-50-90 15 80-20-50-100 
1500 16 60-10-50-100 16 90-20-50-100 
* RSL = Richfield soil          *VVS=Valent-Vona soil 
*Ir = instantaneous rate   *D1-D2-D3-D4 = MAD at growth stage 1, 2, 3 and 4 
 
The optimal minimum instantaneous rate for Valent-Vona soil is 7 mm/day which is 1 
mm more than for Richfield soil. On the other hand, we observe a similar pattern with the 
instantaneous rate for both soil types when well capacity is above 700 GPM.  Also, Figure 4.9 
shows Valent-Vona soil uses higher irrigation intensity than Richfield soil for all well capacity 
levels.   Irrigation intensity with Valent-Vona soil is at least 1 inch greater than for Richfield soil, 
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and it steadily decreases when the well capacity is above 900 GPM. Therefore, higher well 
capacity will offer the farmer the option to optimize expected net return by adjusting the 
intensive margin. 
Figure 4.9 Instantaneous rate and average irrigation intensity comparison 
between Richfield soil and Valent-Vona soil 
 
 
The corn yield with Valent-Vona soil is higher than for Richfield soil (see Fig 4.10), and 
it remains stable with well capacity up to 700 GPM but shows a sharp increase beyond 700 
GPM. I also observe the corn yield difference between the two soils is less when well capacity is 
between 1300 GPM and 1500 GPM. For example, the yield difference between Richfield and 
Valent-Vona is 2.9% at 500 GPM, but only 0.4% at 1300 GPM.  
I observe the average total corn production with Richfield soil is higher than for Valent-
Vona soil when the well capacity is at or below 700 GPM (see Fig.4.11). In the case of well 
capacity at or below 700 GPM, the higher total corn production from Richfield soil compared to 
that from Valent-Vona soil arises because Richfield soil has larger irrigated acreage (see Figure 
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4.8). Well capacity at or below 700 GPM is a major limiting factor in corn production for 
Valent-Vona soil.  Accordingly, Richfield soil requires lower optimal instantaneous rate and 
irrigation intensity to supply sufficient water for corn production compared to Valent-Vona soil. 
Even though a farmer with Richfield soil may observe lower corn yield compared to that from 
Valent-Vona soil, higher irrigated acreage results in higher total corn production when well 
capacity is at or below 700 GPM.     
Figure 4.10 Corn yield comparison between 
Richfield soil and Valent-Vona soil 
Figure 4.11 Average total production 
comparison between Richfield soil and 
Valent-Vona soil 
  
 
 
Richfield soil results in a higher expected net return than Valent-Vona soil (see Figure 
4.12). The expected net return of Richfield soil is higher by 1.5-4% than for Valent-Vona soil if 
the well capacity is at or above 600 GPM. The difference in expected net return becomes larger 
as the well capacity decreases, especially at or below 500 GPM.  
The expected net return has a positive relationship with well capacity. A decline in well 
capacity will reduce expected net return at a faster rate, when well capacity is at or below 700 
GPM for Valent-Vona soil.  However, the expected net return decreases at a slower rate above 
the threshold of 700 GPM. For Richfield soil, that threshold was 600 GPM. Thus, conclusively, 
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the expected net return with Valent-Vona soil is relatively more sensitive to the decrease in well 
capacity.   
Figure 4.12 Expected net return comparison between Richfield soil and 
Valent-Vona soil 
 
 
When well capacity is at or below 700 GPM, the lower expected net return for Valent-
Vona soil in comparison to that for Richfield soil rises because of higher investment cost per acre 
and lower total corn production. These two variables  for Valent-Vona soil are due to its smaller 
irrigated acreage when well capacity is at or below 700 GPM (see Figure 4.8). Furthermore, 
when well capacity rises above 700 GPM, Valent-Vona soil has higher total production but 
lower expected net return, likely due to higher irrigation cost compared to that of Richfield soil.   
In the case of well capacity above 700 GPM, farmers with Valent-Vona soil will go for 
adjustment in the intensive margin thus reducing irrigation per acre to maximize net return. 
Figure 4.12 shows farmers with higher well capacity may attain higher expected net return, 
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although the rate of change in net return becomes sluggish with rising well capacity above 700 
GPM. The subsequent smaller increase in expected net return is due to adjustment in the 
intensive margin. On the other hand, the farmer with well capacity at or below 700 GPM will go 
for adjustment in the extensive margin to maximize net return, which causes significant change 
in expected net return (see Figures 4.8 and 4.12). A similar pattern between adjustment in 
intensive and extensive margins also found for Richfield soil with a threshold at 600 GPM. This 
result implies the change in soil water holding capacity will change the well capacity threshold 
as the farmer chooses the extensive margin over the intensive margin in response to well 
capacity reduction. The lower water holding capacity will increase the well capacity threshold 
with adjustment of the extensive margin over that of the intensive margin.  
 
 4.2. The impact of risk averse behavior on water use and welfare 
This section addresses net returns and irrigation strategy affected by risk averse behavior.  
 
 4.2.1 Average and standard deviation of net return for risk neutral farmer affected 
by well capacity 
Before examining the impact of risk aversion on irrigation behavior, I first illustrate net 
returns and the variation in net returns for a risk neutral farmer. I notice that the standard 
deviation in net return for Richfield soil increases with an increase in well capacity, for well 
capacity up to 600 GPM. However, the standard deviation of net return declines with well 
capacity above the threshold (see Figure 4.13). The increase in average and standard deviation of 
net return for Richfield soil with a well capacity lower than 600 GPM is because a farmer 
increases irrigated acreage with well capacity increasing, and my model assumes for simplicity 
that non-irrigated acreage receives a fixed rental payment. On the other hand, a well capacity 
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higher than 600 GPM may decrease the risk in net return by increasing instantaneous rate at the 
intensive margin.  I observe the same pattern for Valent-Vona as well with the threshold defined 
at 700 GPM. 
Figure 4.13 shows that both average return and standard deviation of net return for a risk 
neutral farmer are higher for Richfield soil than for Valent-Vona soil. The higher standard 
deviation of net return for Richfield soil is due to lower irrigation intensity (see Figure 4.8). If 
intensity were held constant across the two soil types, the variation in returns would likely be 
larger for Valent-Vona, but at the optimal point, Valent-Vona soil uses more water per acre than 
Richfield soil, and thus has less variability in returns.  
 
Figure 4.13 Average and standard deviation of net return Richfield soil 
and Valent-Vona soil 
 
 
I summarize the above discussion as follows. An increase in well capacity allows the 
farmer to go for a wider range of instantaneous rate (e.g. up to 16 mm per day). When farmers 
are able to irrigate their full acreage, they will be able to choose an adjustment in intensive 
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margin that not only increases net return but also reduces risk. On the other hand, as the well 
capacity decreases, not only does a decrease in farm net return occur but also a decrease in the 
farm’s ability to reduce risk. 
 4.2.2. The effect of risk averse behavior on irrigation strategies and water for 
Richfield soil without water constraint policy 
I observe positive correlation between risk averse behavior and change in total water 
usage. Risk averse behavior induces the farmer to use more water (see Figure 4.14) whereas 
changes in the magnitude of water use not only depend on risk averse behavior but also on well 
capacity. Figure 4.14 shows that the magnitude of water usage increases faster with an increase 
in the parameter measuring risk averse behavior for a moderate well capacity of 600 GPM. The 
change from risk neutral to risk premium 20% increases the total irrigation as much as 30% for 
600 GPM wells. On the other hand, the increase in risk averse behavior to risk premium 20% 
will increase total irrigation only by 15% for well capacity higher than 900 GPM.  
The increasing impact of the risk averse behavior on the increase in total irrigation for 
low or medium well capacity is due to the limitation in instantaneous rate. A farmer with low or 
medium well capacity (e.g., 400-600 GPM) will apply irrigation more frequently at a low 
instantaneous rate (e.g., 6-7 mm/day), which in turn results in a higher rate of  increase in total 
irrigation (see Figure 4.14 and Figure 4.15). This finding is different from that of Foster et al. 
(2014), who found greater impact on degree of risk aversion relative to the increase in water use 
for high well capacity. The difference between the findings may due to different adjustments on 
the intensive margin. However, my study includes the non-uniform MAD in irrigation choice 
that enables the risk averse farmer to focus on increasing irrigation application in the more 
productive growth stages instead of increasing irrigation application in all growth stages. 
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Figure 4.14 Average total irrigation for Richfield soil affected by risk 
averse behavior 
 
 
 
Figure 4.15 Instantaneous rate of application for  Richfield soil 
affecting by risk averse behavior 
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Moreover, I observe a positive relationship between irrigation intensity and risk averse 
behavior (see Figure 4.16). Thus, more risk averse behavior induces the farmer to increase 
irrigation intensity. Figure 4.16 shows that the risk neutral farmer irrigates 10-11 inches per acre 
when well capacity is 600 GPM. On the other hand, a farmer with 600 GPM well capacity and a 
risk premium more than 20% will apply irrigation intensity at not less than 16 inches per acre. 
Meanwhile, smaller increases in irrigation intensity are found for higher well capacity. For 
instance, a 900 GPM well sees increased irrigation intensity only from 10 inches to 12 inches per 
acre if the risk premium increases from 0% to 20%.   
As I mentioned earlier, the rate of increase in irrigation intensity not only depends on risk 
averse behavior, but also on well capacity. Two factors can influence irrigation intensity: 
adjusting the instantaneous rate, and MAD for irrigation scheduling. Figure 4.16 shows as the 
well capacity increases, the corresponding increase in irrigation intensity is relatively smaller. 
The higher rate of irrigation intensity for low or medium well capacity is due to a limitation in 
the instantaneous rate. A farmer with low or medium well capacity could increase the 
instantaneous rate by a smaller margin (see Figure 4.15). Thus, the increase in irrigation intensity 
is attained by setting a lower MAD level for irrigation scheduling (see Table 4.2). A lower MAD 
level added to a low instantaneous rate induces more frequent irrigation resulting in a higher rate 
of increase in water usage for low or medium well capacity. On the other hand, high well 
capacity induces increased irrigation intensity by changing the MAD to a slightly lower level 
with high instantaneous rate (see Table 4.2). Next, a high instantaneous rate with marginally 
lower MAD creates a marginal increment in frequent irrigation application and marginal 
increases in irrigation intensity.  
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Table 4-2 Instantaneous rate and MAD for Richfield soil affected by risk averse behavior 
Well 
capacity 
(GPM)  
risk neutral risk premium 10% risk premium 20% risk premium 50% risk premium 80% 
Ir D1-D2-D3-D4 Ir D1-D2-D3-D4 Ir D1-D2-D3-D4 Ir D1-D2-D3-D4 Ir D1-D2-D3-D4 
100 6 60-0-40-90 6 60-0-40-90 6 60-0-40-90 7 20-0-40-90 7 10-0-40-90 
200 6 60-0-40-90 6 60-0-40-90 6 60-0-40-90 7 20-0-40-90 7 10-0-40-90 
300 6 60-0-40-90 6 60-0-40-90 6 60-0-40-90 7 20-0-40-90 7 10-0-40-90 
400 6 60-0-40-90 6 60-0-40-90 6 60-0-40-90 7 20-0-40-90 7 10-0-40-90 
500 6 60-0-40-90 6 60-0-40-90 6 60-0-40-90 7 20-0-40-90 7 10-0-40-90 
600 6 60-0-40-90 6 60-0-40-90 7 20-10-40-90 7 20-0-40-90 7 10-0-40-90 
700 7 60-10-50-90 8 40-0-50-100 8 40-0-50-100 8 30-0-50-100 8 20-0-50-100 
800 8 60-10-50-100 8 40-0-50-100 8 40-0-50-100 9 40-0-50-100 9 30-0-50-100 
900 9 60-10-50-100 9 50-10-50-100 9 40-0-50-100 9 40-0-50-100 10 30-0-50-100 
1000 10 60-10-50-100 10 60-10-50-100 10 50-10-50-100 10 40-0-50-100 10 30-0-50-100 
1100 11 60-10-50-90 11 60-10-50-90 11 40-10-50-100 12 30-10-50-100 12 30-0-50-100 
1200 12 70-10-50-100 12 60-10-50-100 12 40-10-50-100 13 30-10-50-100 12 30-0-50-100 
1300 14 60-10-50-100 14 60-10-50-100 14 40-10-50-90 14 30-10-50-100 14 30-0-50-100 
1400 15 60-10-50-90 15 40-10-50-100 15 40-10-50-100 15 30-10-50-100 15 30-0-50-100 
1500 16 60-10-50-100 16 60-10-50-90 16 40-10-50-100 16 30-10-50-100 15 30-0-50-100 
*Ir = instantaneous rate   *D1-D2-D3-D4 = MAD at growth stage 1, 2, 3 and 4 
 
 Figure 4.17 shows that risk averse behavior will induce the farmer to reduce irrigated 
acreage when well capacity is lower (e.g. at or below 600 GPM). However, a farmer with well 
capacity at or above 1200 GPM shows no change in irrigation acreage with changing risk 
premium.  Meanwhile, Figure 4.16 and Figure 4.17 show that a farmer with a well capacity of 
1200 GPM or 1500 GPM will increase the irrigation intensity but maintain the same irrigated 
acreage as risk premium increases. This farmer increases intensity by using a lower MAD for 
irrigation scheduling to trigger more frequent irrigation application and thereby reduce the 
varation in corn yield.  
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Figure 4.16 Average irrigation intensity for  
Richfield soil affected by risk averse 
behavior 
Figure 4.17 Irrigated acreage for  Richfield 
soil affected by risk averse behavior 
  
 
 Figure 4.17 demonstrates that a farmer with 900 GPM well capacity reduces irrigated 
acreage as the risk premium increases above 60%. On the other hand, a farmer with 400 GPM 
well capacity reduces irrigated acreage as the risk premium increases above 30%.  With lower 
well capacity, a farmer needs to increase irrigation intensity with a higher instantaneous rate and 
set a lower MAD level for irrigation scheduling. This in turn increases irrigation intensity, but it 
is more efficient with a smaller acreage  Additionally, the adjustment in the extensive margin due 
to risk averse behavior is greater for low and medium well capacities (e.g. at or below 600 
GPM). My finding is different from that of Foster et al. (2014), which found the adjustment in 
irrigated acreage due to risk averse behavior is higher when the well capacity is high. 
 4.2.3. The effect of risk averse behavior on irrigation strategies and water use for 
Valent-Vona soil without water constraint policy 
 The impact of changes in risk premium on water usage is less sensitive for a farmer with 
Valent-Vona soil than for a farmer with Richfield soil (see Figure 4.14  and Figure 4.18). In fact, 
there is almost no change in total water use for Valent-Vona soil when the risk premium is lower 
than 20%. The lower change in total irrigation in response to a higher risk premium is because a 
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risk neutral farmer would use large quantities of irrigation water, so net returns would be less 
variable. In Figure 4.7 and Figure 4.10, a risk neutral farmer produces a large corn yield for 
which Valent-Vona soil has higher average total irrigation water than does  Richfield soil. In 
addition, Valent-Vona soil has less variation in net return than does Richfield soil (see Figure 
4.13). The increase in total irrigation would somewhat reduce the risk in crop production but 
would moderately increase the irrigation cost.  
Figure 4.18 Average total irrigation for  Valent-Vona soil 
affected by risk averse behavior 
 
 
 Figure 4.19 shows irrigation intensity changes when a farmer’s risk premium goes above 
25%. Specifically, the irrigation intensity increases by 15% for 600 GPM wells, 7.7% for 900 
GPM wells, and 1% for 1500 GPM wells. Thus, the increase in irrigation intensity is higher for 
low and medium well capacities. Next, Figure 4.20 shows that the irrigated acreage varies when 
risk premium goes above 60%. Thus, change in irrigation intensity is more sensitive to change in 
risk premium than to changes in irrigated acreage.  
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Figure 4.19 Average irrigation intensity for  
Valent-Vona soil  affected by risk averse 
behavior 
Figure 4.20 Irrigated acreage for  Valent-
Vona soil affected by risk averse behavior 
  
 
 A farmer with risk premium higher than 60% and well capacity 400-600 GPM would 
need to decrease irrigated acreage to increase the instantaneous rate for higher irrigation 
intensity. Figure 4.20 and Figure 4.21 show that a farmer with risk premium higher than 80% 
and well capacity higher than 900 GPM would reduce the irrigation acreage but not increase the 
instantaneous rate. Thus, a farmer with risk premium higher than 80% and well capacity higher 
than 900 GPM would reduce variability in net return by increasing the proportion of income 
coming from non-irrigated acreage leasing. However, this finding may be due to a limitation in 
the research framework as I assume the non-irrigated area revenue is from constant cash rent. 
Therefore, this finding may only occur if the farmer has extremely risk averse behavior.  
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Figure 4.21 Instantaneous rate of application for  Valent-Vona soil 
affecting by risk averse behavior 
 
 
 
 For the farmer with risk premium lower than 60%, I find no change in irrigated acreage, 
but I see irrigation intensity changes. Likely, this is because the farmer would change irrigation 
intensity by changing the MAD level for irrigation scheduling without changing the 
instantaneous rate (see Figure 4.21 and Table 4.3). Specifically, a farmer increases irrigation 
intensity through more frequent irrigation by way of a lower MAD level for irrigation 
scheduling. On the other hand, the changes in irrigation intensity for a farmer with risk premium 
higher than 60% differ by well capacity level. A farmer with a well capacity of 400 GPM to 600 
GPM will increase irrigation intensity by increasing the instantaneous rate, thus decreasing the 
irrigated acreage (see Figure 4.19 and Table 4.3). Meanwhile, the farmer with high well capacity 
(e.g. higher than 900 GPM) with very risk averse behavior (e.g., risk premium higher than 80%), 
would increase irrigation intensity with a lower MAD level and lower instantaneous rate for 
irrigation scheduling (see Table 4.3). However, the resulting increase in irrigation intensity 
would reduce both average and standard deviation of net return.  
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Table 4-3 Instantaneous rate and MAD for Valent-Vona soil affected by risk averse 
behavior 
Well 
capacity 
(GPM) 
risk neutral risk premium 10% risk premium 20% risk premium 50% risk premium 80% 
Ir D1-D2-D3-D4 Ir D1-D2-D3-D4 Ir D1-D2-D3-D4 Ir D1-D2-D3-D4 Ir D1-D2-D3-D4 
100 7 100-10-40-100 7 100-10-40-100 7 100-10-40-100 7 40-0-40-100 8 40-10-40-100 
200 7 100-10-40-100 7 100-10-40-100 7 100-10-40-100 7 40-0-40-100 8 40-10-40-100 
300 7 100-10-40-100 7 100-10-40-100 7 100-10-40-100 7 40-0-40-100 8 40-10-40-100 
400 7 100-10-40-100 7 100-10-40-100 7 100-10-40-100 7 40-0-40-100 8 40-10-40-100 
500 7 100-10-40-100 7 100-10-40-100 7 100-10-40-100 7 40-0-40-100 8 40-10-40-100 
600 7 100-10-40-100 7 100-10-40-100 7 100-10-40-100 7 40-0-40-100 8 40-10-40-100 
700 7 100-10-40-100 7 100-10-40-100 8 90-10-40-100 8 40-10-40-100 8 40-10-40-100 
800 8 90-10-40-100 8 90-10-40-100 8 90-10-40-100 8 40-10-40-100 9 50-10-40-100 
900 9 90-10-40-100 9 90-10-40-100 9 90-10-40-100 9 80-10-40-100 9 50-10-40-100 
1000 10 70-20-40-100 10 70-20-40-100 10 70-20-40-100 10 80-10-40-100 9 50-10-40-100 
1100 11 100-20-40-90 11 80-20-40-100 11 80-20-40-90 11 80-20-40-90 9 50-10-40-100 
1200 13 90-20-50-100 13 90-20-50-100 13 90-20-50-100 13 80-20-40-100 9 50-10-40-100 
1300 13 90-20-50-100 14 100-20-50-100 14 100-20-50-100 14 100-20-40-100 9 50-10-40-100 
1400 15 80-20-50-100 15 80-20-50-100 15 80-20-50-100 15 80-20-50-100 9 50-10-40-100 
1500 16 90-20-50-100 16 90-20-50-100 16 90-20-50-100 16 80-20-40-100 9 50-10-40-100 
*Ir = instantaneous rate   *D1-D2-D3-D4 = MAD at growth stage 1, 2, 3 and 4 
 4.2.4. The comparison of the effect of risk averse behavior to average net return 
and distribution of net return between Richfield soil and Valent-Vona soil  
 The higher risk premium shows the increase in risk averse behavior, which would   
affect irrigation strategy and net return. Average and standard deviation of net return shows how 
a farmer makes a trade-off between risk and expected net return affected by the risk averse 
behavior.   
 The change in irrigation strategy in response to change in risk averse behavior causes a 
decrease in expected net return and a decrease in variation of net return. Figure 4.22 shows that 
as the risk averse behavior increases, the farmer will choose the irrigation strategy that reduces 
the variation in net return. However, such a strategy requires higher irrigation water use that 
results in lower net return. Nevertheless, the increase in irrigation water use will produce more 
stable corn yield.  
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 A farmer with Richfield soil is more sensitive to risk averse behavior in changing water 
use than is a farmer with Valent-Vona soil. In the case of the 600 GPM well capacity, a farmer 
with Valent-Vona soil will change irrigation strategy if the risk premium goes higher than 35% 
(see figure 4.22). On the other hand, a farmer with Richfield soil will start to change irrigation 
strategy when the risk premium moves higher than 15%. Similarly, in the case of the 1200 GPM 
well capacity, a farmer with Valent-Vona soil will change irrigation strategy if the risk premium 
goes higher than 30% but with Richfield soil start to change if risk premium is higher than 20%.  
Figure 4.22 Comparison of average and standard deviation net return for risk averse 
farmer with Richfield soil or Valent-Vona soil 
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 4.3. The effect of water constraint policy on irrigation strategy and water use 
 This section is divided into two parts. The first part discusses the effect of water 
constraint policy on the risk neutral farmer. The second section analyzes the impact of both risk 
averse behavior and water constraint policy for optimal irrigation strategy. Analysis in the 
second section mostly focuses on the impact of risk averse behavior on optimal irrigation 
strategy and water use if the government imposes a particular water constraint policy such as the 
5-year time constraint and 11 inches quantity constraint. In addition, the impact of different 
quantity constraints on optimal irrigation strategy for the risk averse farmer is discussed briefly. 
 4.3.1 The effect of water constraint policy on irrigation strategy and water use for 
risk neutral farmer with Richfield soil 
 Water constraint policy comprises quantity and time constraints where quantity is the 
maximum irrigation intensity that a farmer can apply for a particular period, and time is a range 
within which a farmer can apply a particular maximum average quantity constraint, e.g. 11 
inches quantity constraint with a five years average time constraint. This means that a farmer can 
apply irrigation intensity with a maximum average of 11 inches for five years. That  farmer can 
apply more than 11 inches for a particular year within the five years’ time range, but the average 
of irrigation intensity for five years must not exceed 11 inches.  This study will analyze the effect 
of quantity constraint on water use and welfare by setting the baseline time constraint to a 5-year 
average. 
 The water constraint policy will decrease both expected net return and total water use 
(see Figures 4.23 and 4.24).  Figure 4.23 shows see that a lower quantity constraint, with a 
baseline of the 5-year average time constraint, will result in a significant negative impact on a 
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farmer’s net returns if the quantity constraint is lower than 13 inches. However, the impact of 
quantity constraint to a decrease in expected net return depends on well capacity.  
Figure 4.23 Expected net return for Risk 
neutral farmer with Richfield soil affected 
by quantity constraint with 5 year average 
time constraint  
Figure 4.24 Average total water use for Risk 
neutral farmer with Richfield soil affected 
by quantity constraint with 5 year average 
time constraint   
  
                                               
 There is a smaller effect of quantity constraint on change in expected net return for small 
and high well capacities, and a higher impact of lower quantity constraint on the decrease in 
expected net return for medium and medium-high well capacity, 600-1100 GPM (see figure 
4.23). Additionally, the 11 inches quantity constraint decreases an expected net return by 12-14% 
for 600-1100 GPM wells but only decreases the net return 5-10% for 1200-1500 GPM wells.   
Clearly, high well capacity provides more strategy alternatives to deal with the water constraint 
and weather uncertainty. Thus, the negative impact of the lower quantity constraint to net return 
is smaller for high well capacity. In addition, water constraint policy has a negligible impact on 
irrigation strategy and net return for low well capacity because the low well capacity, rather than 
the water constraint policy, has become the major limiting factor in irrigation and corn 
production. Ultimately, the net return of medium and medium high well capacity is more 
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sensitive to adjustment in the intensive and extensive margins because of limitation in the 
instantaneous rate. 
 The impact of lower quantity constraint on decreasing water use depends on well 
capacity; for example, a quantity constraint does have a negligible effect on changing total water 
use for smaller well capacity. However, it has a significant impact on the decrease in total water 
use for well capacity higher than 600 GPM (see figure 4.24). In addition, the impact of lower 
quantity constraint to decrease total water use is the greatest for medium well capacity (900GPM 
wells). Next, the 11 inches quantity constraint decreases water use by 26% for 600 GPM wells  
but only decreases water use by 17% for 900 GPM wells and 22% for 1200 GPM wells. 
 Accordingly, quantity constraint will affect adjustment in the extensive and intensive 
margins, causing change in total water use. Figures 4.25 and 4.26 show that lower quantity 
constraint will result in lower irrigation intensity and smaller irrigated acreage, so clearly, the 
change in irrigated acreage and irrigation intensity depends on well capacity. Next, lower 
quantity constraint has no impact on the change in irrigated acreage for well capacity below 400 
GPM, but a higher rate of change in irrigated acreage and smaller change in irrigation intensity 
exists for 600 GPM wells (see Figures 4.25 and 4.26). The lower quantity constraint requires a 
farmer to reduce irrigation intensity even though higher instantaneous rate may reduce the 
irrigation intensity and lead to higher efficiency. Due to limitations in the range of instantaneous 
rate that 600 GPM wells can attain, irrigation acreage needs to be reduced at a higher rate to 
attain higher instantaneous rate (see Figure 4.27). 
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Figure 4.25 Irrigation acreage for Risk 
neutral farmer with Richfield soil affected 
by quantity constraint with 5 year average 
time constraint 
Figure 4.26 Average irrigation intensity for 
Risk neutral farmer with Richfield soil 
affected by quantity constraint with 5 year 
average time constraint   
  
                                                                                 
 Figure 4.26 shows that the impact of lower quantity constraint on the decrease in 
irrigation intensity is higher as the well capacity increases.   The graph shows a smaller reduction 
in irrigation acreage for higher well capacity, which results in higher reduction for irrigation 
intensity. The larger range of applicable instantaneous rate for higher well capacity enables a 
farmer to make more adjustment in the intensive margin rather than in the extensive margin in 
response to smaller quantity constraint. For example, a farmer with well capacity 1500 GPM 
could reduce the irrigation intensity by setting higher MAD for irrigation scheduling. On the 
other hand, a farmer with a well capacity between 600 and 1200 GPM could reduce irrigation 
intensity by increasing the instantaneous rate and setting higher MAD for irrigation scheduling. 
Next, Figure 4.27 shows a negative relationship between quantity constraint and instantaneous 
rate. Here, the lower quantity constraint would induce the farmer to use a higher instantaneous 
rate with higher MAD so that it can trigger less irrigation application and decrease the irrigation 
intensity. 
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Figure 4.27 Instantaneous rate of application for Risk neutral farmer 
with Valent-Vona soil affected by quantity constraint with 5 year average 
time constraint 
 
 
 Different patterns exist for how farmers with high well capacity, 900-1500 GPM, adjust 
their irrigation strategy when they face limited water availability from a water constraint policy 
instead of from decrease in well capacity. High well capacities mean adjustment only on the 
intensive margin when the well capacity is decreasing. On the other hand, farmers with high well 
capacities make adjustments both on intensive and extensive margins when they face a more 
restricted water constraint policy. In response to lower quantity constraint, farmers with high 
well capacities reduce the irrigation intensity to a level where it still provides an adequate supply 
of water to the crop. However, to comply with low quantity constraint and to attain minimum 
optimal irrigation intensity, those with high well capacities need to reduce irrigation acreage.  In 
addition, medium (600-900 GPM) and medium high (900-1200 GPM) well capacities may attain 
a higher instantaneous rate because of irrigated acreage reduction, resulting in a more efficient 
irrigation schedule for irrigation intensity reduction.  
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 The expected net return is negatively affected considerably when the quantity constraint 
causes adjustment in the extensive margin by decreasing the irrigated acreage. For instance, the 
11 inches quantity constraint, which does not cause decrease in irrigated acreage for a 1500 GPM 
well, will only decrease the expected net return by 4.9%. On the other hand, a 10 inches quantity 
constraint causes significantly larger reduction in expected net return, as much as 12.3%, due to 
the decrease in irrigated acreage. In the case of 600 GPM wells, both 10 and 11 inches quantity 
constraints reduce irrigated acreage and decreases net return by 12.1%. Ultimately, the degree of 
negative impact of quantity constraint on welfare is significantly dependent on well capacity. 
 4.3.2 The effect of water constraint policy on irrigation strategy and water use for 
risk neutral farmer with Valent-Vona soil 
 
 I find the effect of water constraint policy on expected net return and water use is more 
extensive for Valent-Vona soil than for Richfield soil (see Figure 4.23 and Figure 4.28). In the 
case of well capacity at or above 400 GPM, the 11 inches quantity constraint will decrease the 
expected net return by 5-12% for Richfield soil and 11-32% for Valent-Vona soil. Furthermore, 
an 11 inches quantity constraint will decrease the water use by 13-26% for Richfield soil and 11-
39% for Valent-Vona soil. The greater reduction in net return may arise because Valent-Vona 
soil has less soil water holding capacity so that the restrictions on water use have a higher 
negative impact on corn yield. In addition, greater change in water use may be due to initial 
water use without restriction being higher for Valent-Vona soil. 
 Next, I see a positive correlation between quantity constraint and water use. Figure 4.29 
shows that the lower quantity constraint will promote less water use. Thus, the lower quantity 
constraint could have a higher impact on water savings for medium and medium high well 
capacity. Specifically, the 11 inches quantity constraint would decrease water use by 30-39% for 
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600-1100 GPM wells but by 27-28% for 1200-1500 GPM wells. Moreover, the lower total water 
use is predominantly affected by more adjustment in the extensive margin. 
Lower quantity constraint will result in decreased irrigation acreage, but the impact of 
irrigation intensity is indefinite (see Figure 4.30 and Figure 4.31). In fact, the pattern for 
adjustment in the intensive margin in response to lower quantity constraint is different for 
Valent-Vona soil than for Richfield soil. In addition, greater decrease in irrigation acreage occurs 
as an impact of lower quantity constraint for Valent-Vona soil than for Richfield soil (see Figure 
4.25 and Figure 4.30). The difference between those two soils is that Valent-Vona soil requires 
higher optimal irrigation intensity than does Richfield soil.  
Figure 4.28 Expected net return for Risk 
neutral farmer with Valent-Vona soil 
affected by quantity constraint   
Figure 4.29 Average total water use for Risk 
neutral farmer with Valent-Vona soil 
affected by quantity constraint   
  
                                                                           
Figure 4.30 and Figure 4.31 show that the farmer with 900-1500 GPM well capacity can 
reduce the irrigation acreage extensively but slightly decrease the irrigation intensity. On the 
other hand, a farmer with medium well capacity, 600 GPM, sees greater change not only in the 
extensive margin but also in the intensive margin in response to the lower quantity constraint. 
The difference in the intensive margin adjustment is due to the difference in the instantaneous 
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rate. Figure 4.32 shows 600 GPM wells have a lower instantaneous rate than 900-1500 GPM 
wells. This suggests greater adjustment to the intensive margin when well capacity is smaller and 
water constraint policy binds irrigation strategy choices. , However, quantity constraint offers 
little to no effect on irrigation acreage, irrigation intensity, and instantaneous rate for a well 
capacity at or below 400 GPM (see Figure 4.30 4.31 and 4.32). This is because water constraint 
policy is not binding, but low well capacity does limit water use. 
Figure 4.30 Irrigation acreage for Risk 
neutral farmer with Valent-Vona soil 
affected by quantity constraint   
Figure 4.31 Irrigation intensity use for Risk 
neutral farmer with Valent-Vona soil 
affected by quantity constraint   
  
 
                                                                         
Finally, a negative relationship exists between the lower quantity constraint and the 
instantaneous rate of application. Here, the lower quantity constraint will induce the farmer to 
reduce irrigated acreage, and as a consequence use a higher instantaneous rate of application 
with a well capacity higher than 400 GPM or lower than 1500 GPM (see figure 4.32). Moreover, 
the higher instantaneous rate will generate a more efficient irrigation scheduling for irrigation 
intensity reduction.  
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Figure 4.32 Instantaneous rate of application for risk neutral farmer 
with Valent-Vona soil affected by quantity constraint with 5 year 
average time constraint 
 
 
 
 4.3.3. The effect of risk averse behavior on irrigation strategy and water use for 
Richfield soil with government enforced water constraint policy 
 This section analyzes how a farmer decides on water use change based on the water 
constraint policy in tandem with risk averse behavior. The analysis focuses on a farm with 
Richfield soil with well capacity defined at 400, 600, 900, and 1200 GPM. The numbers 
represent low, medium, medium-high, and high well capacities to determine farm ability to 
adjust irrigation strategy. 
 The increase in risk premium will induce the farmer to choose an irrigation strategy that 
provides less expected net return but also less variation in net return (see Figures 4.33 and 4.34). 
From figure 4.33, we can observe that for a 5-year time constraint and an 11 inches quantity 
constraint, a negative relationship between risk premium and expected net return exists. Thus, 
the more risk averse farmer will choose an irrigation strategy that generates lower variation in 
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net return but consequently also a lower expected net return. This finding is also typical when 
farmers are not exposed to any water constraint policy. 
Figure 4.33 Expected net return for risk 
averse farmer with Richfield soil affected by 
water constraint 
Figure 4.34 Standard deviation of net return 
for risk averse farmer with Richfield soil 
affected by water constraint 
  
 
 Figure 4.35 with a binding water constraint policy in place, namely an 11 inches quantity 
constraint and a 5-year average, shows a farmer faces a higher risk premium to use more water if 
the well capacity is higher than 900 GPM. The data do not show any conclusive evidence of a 
relationship between risk premium and total water usage for medium or low well capacity, 400-
600 GPM. This finding differs from earlier findings with no water constraint policy. Ultimately, 
without a water constraint policy, as risk premium increases, water usage also rises for all well 
capacity levels (see Figure 4.14).  
 The impact of risk premium on the change in total water use is lower with a binding 
water constraint policy as the policy limits the maximum total water that farmer can use. For 
example, figure 4.14 shows that total water use for a 900 GPM well begins to change if the risk 
premium reaches 5% without a water constraint policy. However, the total water use starts to 
change if the risk premium reaches 20% when there is a binding water constraint policy (see 
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Figure 4.35). Thus, a water constraint policy may encourage a farmer with a relatively high-risk 
premium not to over-irrigate.  
Figure 4.35 Average total irrigation for risk averse farmer with 
Richfield soil affected by water constraint   
 
 
Figure 4.36 and Figure 4.17 show that the impact of increase in risk premium on decline 
in irrigated acreage is higher with a binding water constraint policy. On the other hand, the 
impact of change in risk premium relative to the rate of change in irrigation intensity is lower 
with a water constraint policy than without one (see Figure 4.16 and Figure 4.37). However, the 
water constraint policy still causes the farmer to lower irrigation intensity. This is because a risk 
averse farmer wants to attain a minimum optimal irrigation intensity to manage the risk in corn 
production versus the binding water constraint policy. Thus, a farmer governed by a water 
constraint policy will reduce the irrigated acreage at a higher rate than the farmer who does not 
face any water constraint.  This result also implies a possible greater impact of a constraint 
policy on welfare loss for the farmer with more risk averse behavior. 
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Figure 4.36 Irrigation acreage for Risk 
averse farmer with Richfield soil affected by 
water constraint 
Figure 4.37 Irrigation intensity of net return 
for Risk averse farmer with Richfield soil 
affected by water 
  
     
                                                                        
Figure 4.38 shows a greater impact of lower quantity constraint on the rate of decrease in 
irrigation intensity for the risk averse farmer with a smaller well capacity. Moreover, the change 
from risk neutral to risk premium 25% will increase the irrigation intensity of 600 GPM wells by 
29% and 900 GPM wells by 17%. In addition, a farmer with a higher risk premium will reduce 
the acreage more in response to a lower quantity constraint and offsets the effect of reduced 
acreage by increasing the irrigation intensity to reduce the risk to corn yield. Furthermore, when 
well capacity is at or above 600 GPM, the effect of lower quantity constraint on the decrease in 
irrigated acreage is smaller as well capacity increases (see Figure 4.38). 
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Figure 4.38 Irrigation acreage and average irrigation intensity for risk averse farmer with 
Richfield soil affected by quantity constraint  
 
 
 
 
 
97 
 4.3.4. The effect of risk averse behavior on irrigation strategy and water use for 
Valent-Vona soil with a binding water constraint policy 
 The impact of a higher risk premium on net return and water use is smaller for Valent-
Vona soil than for Richfield soil. Figure 4.39 and Figure 4.40 show that the change in average 
and standard deviation of net return to a farmer with a 600 GPM well capacity starts when risk 
premium is 70%. On the other hand, the change for 600 GPM wells and Richfield soil starts 
when risk premium is 55%. Thus, a farmer with Valent-Vona soil is less sensitive to the change 
in risk premium than the farmer with Richfield soil as regards the binding water constraint 
policy. 
Figure 4.39 Expected net return for risk 
averse farmer with Valent-Vona soil 
affected by water constraint 
Figure 4.40 Irrigated acreage for risk averse 
farmer with Valent-Vona soil affected by 
water constraint 
  
 
 
 Clearly, a higher risk premium will encourage the farmer to choose an irrigation strategy 
that results in lower expected net return and slightly higher total water use (see Figure 4.39 and 
4.41). The change in total water use would be due to the change in irrigated acreage and 
irrigation intensity. Accordingly, Figure 4.41 shows that a farmer’s decision to change total 
water use is less sensitive to change in risk premium.  
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Figure 4.41 Average total irrigation for risk averse farmer with 
Valent-Vona soil affected by water constraint   
 
 
 
 Figure 4.42 and Figure 4.43 show that a higher risk premium encourages reduced 
irrigated acreage but increases irrigation intensity. However, the effect of risk averse behavior 
relative to the decrease in irrigated acreage and increase in irrigation intensity is relatively 
smaller for Valent-Vona soil than for Richfield soil. In the case of 1200 GPM wells, the change 
from risk neutral to risk premium 40% will increase irrigation intensity by only 9% for Valent-
Vona soil but will increase the irrigation intensity of Richfield soil by 24%. The lower change in 
irrigation intensity and irrigated acreage for Valent-Vona soil is due to its higher initial irrigation 
intensity for the risk neutral farmer. However, higher irrigation intensity results in slightly lower 
variation in net return and crop yield. Thus, the impact of risk averse behavior is relatively less 
sensitive to adjustment in extensive and intensive margins for Valent-Vona soil than for 
Richfield soil. 
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Figure 4.42 Irrigation acreage for Risk 
averse farmer with Valent-Vona soil 
affected by water constraint 
Figure 4.43 Irrigation intensity of net return 
for Risk averse farmer with Valent-Vona 
soil affected by water 
  
 
 4.4. Economic implication 
The ‘hump shape’ of total irrigation in Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.7 in the first section gives 
the economic implication that groundwater depletion may accelerate when depletion reaches a 
particular saturated thickness. For example, Figure 4.44 shows faster depletion in saturated 
thickness that could be associated with the well capacity reaching 600 GPM.  The resulting 
pattern of groundwater depletion is consistent with the pattern described by Brill and Burness 
(1994) when water demand grows over time and the cost of pumping increases nonlinearly over 
time. However, the reason for the backward ‘S’ shaped depletion in my model is different. The 
backward ‘S’ shaped depletion is also consistent with data on actual depletion rates from the 
High Plains Aquifer (Steward and Allen 2016). 
Specifically, an increase in risk averse behavior will greatly increase total irrigation, and 
more so for wells with medium capacity. This result suggests that the economic model that does 
not include well capacity and risk aversion will substantially underestimate total water use. 
Examining the dynamic of well capacity and risk averse behavior will be critical on groundwater 
depletion studies. In addition, higher rates of groundwater depletion may occur the more risk 
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averse behavior a farmer has. Another implication is that a water constraint policy could be an 
effective means to reduce total water use especially in the case of high risk averse behavior. 
Figure 4.44 Implication of groundwater depletion over time 
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Chapter 5 - The welfare loss as a result of reductions in well capacity 
and water constraint policy 
A water constraint policy will limit irrigation water use to maintain sustainable irrigation 
resources for a longer period. However, a restricted water constraint policy increases the risk in 
crop production and, moreover, decreases the net return. Thus, farmers face welfare loss due to 
enforcement of a water constraint policy. My study analyzes the impact and  extent of water 
constraint policy on welfare loss and water saving.  
 The analyses are organized into four sections. The first section focuses on the effect of 
reductions in well capacity through groundwater depletion and how that effect speaks to welfare 
loss. The second section analyzes the impact of water constraint policy on welfare loss. In the 
third section, I examine how the findings in the first section change with respect to risk premium, 
where risk premium represents any change in risk averse behavior. In the final section, I discuss 
variation in the quantity constraint, namely 9 to 15 inches by increments of 1 inch. 
The water constraint policy for the analysis in the second section has two aspects: a5-year 
time constraint and an 11 inch quantity constraint. Also the analysis is based on a range of well 
capacities, 100-1500 GPM, which will offer insight into the effect of groundwater depletion 
simultaneously with water constraint policy on welfare loss. Additionally, the analysis includes 
the effect of a water constraint policy on saving water.   
  Accordingly, three terms will be used extensively in the last three sections: welfare loss, 
water saving, and cost of saving water. We measure welfare loss as the difference between two 
conditions, with and without a water constraint policy, as it concerns the welfare of the producer. 
Next, water saving refers to the difference in total water use between a water constraint policy 
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and no such policy. Finally, the cost of saving water is defined as the price of saving per inch 
water (
𝑤𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠
𝑤𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑠𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔
).  
I use SERF analysis to rank various water use strategies and to estimate the certainty 
equivalent in this chapter. This method of ranking is different from the Mean-Variance analysis 
used in the fourth chapter. However, my estimation shows similar results for both SERF analysis 
and Mean-Variance analysis. Lastly, the estimation of certainty equivalent is on a per acre basis 
so that estimating welfare loss and cost of saving water will be on a per acre basis.  
 
 5.1. The effect of well capacity reduction on welfare loss for Richfield soil and 
Valent-Vona soil 
The certainty equivalent for the farmer decreases as the well capacity decreases (see 
Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2). In turn, the decline in well capacity affects irrigation, thus affecting 
crop productivity and total production, which in turn reduces the certainty equivalent through 
smaller average net return and greater variation in net return. Thus, the rate of decline in 
certainty equivalent increases with the decline in well capacity. Meanwhile, diminishing 
marginal productivity and marginal net return occur as the well capacity increases. Figure 5.1 
and Figure 5.2 show a significant decrease in the certainty equivalent when a farmer with low 
well capacity encounters a small decrease. On the other hand, a farmer with high well capacity 
will encounter small decrease in net return with a small decrease in well capacity.  
Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2 show a steep slope of certainty equivalent when well capacity 
is low. On the other hand, a flat slope of certainty equivalent occurs when the well capacity is 
high. The steep slope shows the high marginal productivity and marginal net return of land and 
water when the well capacity is low. Thus, an increase in well capacity will encourage an  
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increase in irrigated acreage, an adjustment in the extensive margin. The increase in irrigated 
acreage would greatly increase corn production and net return. Table 5.1 shows that the increase 
in well capacity from 400 GPM to 500 GPM will increase the certainty equivalent for a risk 
neutral farmer with Richfield soil by 32% and for Valent-Vona soil by 33%, but both 400 and 
500 GPM wells do not irrigate full acreage for either soil. The flat slope of certainty equivalent 
occurs when a farmer with high well capacity irrigates full acreage. In this case, a small marginal 
productivity and marginal net return of water occurs if the well capacity is high, and the increase 
in total irrigation will slightly increase the net return. Thus, the increment in well capacity will 
induce a farmer to increase net return by slightly changing the total irrigation through an 
adjustment in the intensive margin. Table 5.1 also shows that an increase in well capacity from 
700 GPM to 800 GPM would increase the certainty equivalent of a risk neutral farmer with 
Richfield soil by only 5.4% and for Valent-Vona soil by only 5.5%. 
Figure 5.1 Certainty equivalent per acre 
without water constraint policy for Richfield 
soil  
Figure 5.2 Certainty equivalent per acre 
without water constraint policy for Valent-
Vona soil  
  
 
  
To illustrate the implications for aquifer depletion, I examine a couple of hypothetical 
scenarios of aquifer depletion. Hecox, Macfarlane and Wilson (2002)  estimated that the 
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decrease in saturated thickness from 60 feet to 40 feet would reduce the well capacity from 800 
GPM to 400 GPM assuming 90 days of pumping a single well and hydraulic conductivity of 150 
feet/day (Hecox, P. a Macfarlane, et al. 2002). The decrease in saturated thickness from 60 feet 
to 40 feet would  cause a corresponding welfare loss of 48.11 $/acre
3
  to a risk neutral farmer 
with Richfield soil. On the other hand, the decrease in saturated thickness from 60 feet to 40 feet 
would cause a welfare loss of 55.3 $/acre
4
 to a risk neutral farmer with Valent-Vona soil. Thus, a 
decrease in well capacity has a higher negative impact on Valent-Vona soil.  
Macfarlane, Wilson and Bohling (2006) estimated the mean of practical saturated 
thickness for Four Corners (which includes Finney, Grant, Haskell, and Kearny Counties) before 
the predevelopment era likely was 188 feet. The mean of practical saturated thickness in 2003-
2005 is estimated at 105 feet. Based on Hecox et al. (2002) assumptions’ 90 days of pumping a 
single well and the 25 feet/day of hydraulic conductivity parameter value, the change in saturated 
thickness would cause a decline in well capacity  from approximately 1500 GPM to 500 GPM. 
Subsequently, this decrease in thickness would cause a welfare loss of 35.88 $/acre
5
 for risk 
neutral farmer with Richfield soil.  
From the two scenarios on saturated thickness depletion above, we can see the magnitude 
of welfare loss is not only determined by how large the depletion is but also by the nonlinear 
relationship between well capacity and welfare. In the first scenario, smaller depletion, from 800 
                                                 
3
 In the case of Richfield soil and risk neutral farmer, the CE of  800 GPM  is 117.09 $/acre  and  400 GPM is 68.98 
$/acre. 
4
 In the case of  Valent-Vona soil and risk neutral farmer, the CE of  800 GPM  is 115.36 $/acre  and  400 GPM is 
60.06 $/acre. 
5
 In the case of Richfield soil and risk neutral farmer, the CE of  1500  GPM  is 126.85 $/acre  and  500 GPM is 
90.97 $/acre. 
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GPM to 400 GPM, occurs, but it has a bigger effect on welfare loss. On the other hand, the 
second scenario shows larger depletion, from 1500 GPM to 500 GPM, but it registers smaller 
welfare loss.  
In Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2,  the farmer has a lower certainty equivalent if the risk 
premium is higher, which suggests different risk behavior may induce a farmer to have a 
different irrigation strategy. For example, a farmer with a higher risk premium would be more 
sensitive to uncertainty in net return. Thus, a more risk averse farmer would choose an irrigation 
strategy that offers lower variability in net return but consequently also results in lower net 
return. The lower certainty equivalent for a more risk averse farmer is not only because of lower 
net return but also because of the variation in net return.  
The certainty equivalent difference between risk neutral and risk premium lower than 
20% is smaller when the well capacity increases and greater for medium well capacity, 400-700 
GPM (see table 5.1).  Also, the certainty equivalent for a risk neutral farmer with Richfield soil 
and a 600 GPM well is 7% higher than for a farmer with a risk premium of 10%. On the other 
hand, the certainty equivalent of a risk neutral farmer with Richfield soil and 700 GPM well is 
only 4.2% higher than for a farmer with a risk premium of 10%. Regarding risk aversion and 
land rental bargaining, Turvey, Baker and Weersink (1992) stated that the exogenous market for 
land rental is independent of risk preference so that less the risk averse farmer can take 
advantage of  land rental bargaining due to a low opportunity cost for the more risk averse 
farmer. The implication is that a less risk averse farmer may take greater advantage of land rental 
bargaining as well capacity decreases, whereas a more risk averse farmer, more sensitive to 
variation in net return due to the decrease in well capacity, is less likely to. Additionally, 
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groundwater depletion that results in medium well capacity may offer the greatest advantage for 
a less risk averse farmer in rental bargaining. 
Regarding soils, the certainty equivalent for Richfield soil is higher than that for Valent-
Vona soil (see Table 5.1); however, with no water constraint policy, there is a small difference in 
the certainty equivalent between those two soils when well capacity is at or above 600 GPM, but 
the difference is greater when the well capacity decreases below 500 GPM. Table 5.1, which 
considers no water constraint policy’ shows that the certainty equivalent of a risk neutral farmer 
with Richfield soil is $111.16 /acre when the well capacity is at 700 GPM. On the other hand, the 
certainty equivalent of a risk neutral farmer with Valent-Vona soil is lower, at 109.39 $/acre, 
when the well capacity is at 700 GPM. In the case of the risk neutral farmer with Richfield soil 
with a 200 GPM well, a 17.8% higher certainty equivalent would pertain than with Valent-Vona 
soil. This result implies that the cash rent difference based on different soil characteristics would 
be smaller as the well capacity increases.  
Table 5-1 Certainty equivalent affected by well capacity and risk premium 
 
Well 
capacity 
Richfield Soil Valent-Vona soil 
Risk 
neutral 
Risk 
premium 
10% 
Risk 
premium 
20% 
Risk 
neutral 
Risk 
premium 
10% 
Risk 
premium 
20% 
Without 
water 
constraint 
100 3.02 1.81 0.13 0.78 0.08 -0.75 
200 25.00 22.59 19.23 20.54 19.14 17.47 
300 46.99 43.37 38.33 40.30 38.19 35.69 
400 68.98 64.16 57.43 60.06 57.25 53.91 
500 90.97 84.93 76.54 79.81 76.30 72.13 
600 103.48 96.75 93.13 99.57 95.36 90.36 
700 111.16 106.65 103.78 109.39 105.74 103.57 
800 117.09 113.39 109.70 115.36 112.28 108.68 
900 121.25 117.35 113.88 117.27 114.62 111.64 
1000 123.06 119.36 115.60 118.93 116.26 113.41 
1100 123.95 120.39 117.41 119.98 117.42 114.69 
1200 125.04 121.61 118.46 121.24 118.46 115.44 
1300 125.87 122.58 119.31 122.01 119.38 116.64 
1400 126.47 123.38 120.62 122.47 119.87 117.02 
1500 126.85 123.64 120.98 123.23 120.59 117.79 
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Well 
capacity 
Richfield Soil Valent-Vona soil 
Risk 
neutral 
Risk 
premium 
10% 
Risk 
premium 
20% 
Risk 
neutral 
Risk 
premium 
10% 
Risk 
premium 
20% 
With         
5-year and 
11 inches 
constraint 
100 3.02 1.81 0.13 0.78 0.08 -0.75 
200 25.00 22.59 19.23 20.54 19.14 17.47 
300 46.99 43.37 38.33 40.30 38.19 35.69 
400 68.98 64.16 57.43 60.06 57.25 53.56 
500 84.89 77.36 73.45 71.11 69.62 67.87 
600 90.97 88.35 85.05 77.24 75.58 73.69 
700 98.54 96.67 94.56 80.71 79.19 77.55 
800 104.49 100.56 97.99 80.82 79.42 77.92 
900 104.72 101.52 97.99 83.37 81.54 79.60 
1000 107.15 103.48 99.14 83.37 81.54 79.80 
1100 109.20 103.77 99.14 83.94 81.54 79.80 
1200 112.86 104.90 99.14 83.94 81.54 79.80 
1300 115.31 106.25 99.14 83.94 81.54 79.80 
1400 118.29 108.53 99.14 83.94 81.54 79.80 
1500 120.66 112.79 101.42 83.94 81.54 79.80 
 
I find that the certainty equivalent with a water constraint policy is smaller than the 
certainty equivalent without a water constraint policy if the well capacity is at or above 500 GPM 
for Richfield soil. I also found a similar pattern for Valent-Vona soil if the well capacity is at or 
above 400 GPM. This result implies a non-binding water constraint policy for small well 
capacity. Furthermore,  the well capacity threshold of when water constraint policy is binding  
depends on soil type.  In the case of a risk neutral farmer with a 500 GPM well, the water 
constraint policy would decrease the certainty equivalent by 6.7% for Richfield soil and by 
10.9% for Valent-Vona soil (see Table 5.1). Moreover, the difference in certainty equivalent for 
a particular well capacity is higher between Richfield soil and Valent-Vona soil when the 
government imposes a water constraint policy. The implication is the enforced water constraint 
policy may reduce the cash rental rate for irrigated crop land. In addition, the water constraint 
policy would have a greater effect on decreasing cash rental rate for soil with lower soil water 
holding capacity.  
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 5.2 Welfare loss of water constraint policy affected by the decrease in well 
capacity 
This section addresses the effect of water constraint policy to welfare loss, water saving 
and cost of saving water for risk neutral farmer. 
 5.2.1 Welfare loss of water constraint policy affected by the decrease in well 
capacity for risk neutral farmer with Richfield soil 
The groundwater extraction for irrigation activity causes groundwater depletion and 
reduces saturated thickness, which reduces the amount of water that can be extracted from the 
well. Thus, the range of irrigation strategies that farmer can utilize becomes more limited. In 
addition, government policy on water use further restricts irrigation strategy. Consequently, farm 
net return will fall and risk in crop production will increase.  
The welfare loss varies substantially by well capacity. For example, a farmer does not 
experience welfare loss abiding by the water constraint policy when the well capacity is at or 
below 400 GPM (see figure 5.3). This result implies that, when the well capacity is at or below 
400 GPM, the water constraint policy is not a limiting factor in water use but instead low well 
capacity is.  
A main research finding is that the welfare loss does not always increase with well 
capacity increase. For example, Figure 5.3 shows that the welfare loss increases with higher well 
capacity when the well capacity is between 500 GPM and 900 GPM. However, a decreasing 
trend in welfare loss appears when the well capacity goes above 1000 GPM. The varied trends of 
welfare loss of 500-900 GPM wells and above 1000 GPM wells can be attributed to limitation on 
the instantaneous rate at which well capacity can be utilized in response to the water constraint 
policy.  
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Figure 5.3 Welfare loss water constraint policy affected by well 
capacity declining to Richfield soil  
 
 
The water constraint policy also may induce a farmer to reduce irrigation intensity and 
irrigation acreage; however, the extent of the decrease will depend on well capacity. The 
reduction in the irrigated acreage may enable a farmer to attain a higher instantaneous rate, 
which could generate smaller irrigation intensity with a more efficient irrigation schedule. 
Ultimately, the welfare loss for well capacity 500 GPM to 900 GPM is because of two factors: 
the decrease in corn yield and the decrease in irrigated acreage. The decrease in corn yield is due 
to lower irrigation intensity. Secondly, with respect to decrease in irrigated acreage, even though 
the reduction would be smaller for a higher well capacity, due to higher initial net return, the 
welfare loss would be higher with the increase in well capacity for wells 500 GPM to 900 GPM. 
The change in trend in welfare loss can also be attributed to different changes in 
irrigation strategy for well capacity above 1000 GPM in comparison to 500 – 900 GPM. A 
farmer with well capacity above 1000 GPM will focus more on adjustment in the intensive 
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margin in response to a water constraint policy, thus reducing the irrigation intensity to minimize 
the welfare loss. Conversely, a higher well capacity would provide a larger range of 
instantaneous rates the farmer could use for irrigation. Thus, the reduction in acreage would be 
very small or not needed in the case of well capacity beyond 1000 GPM. Instead, the farmer 
would change the irrigation schedule to attain lower irrigation intensity by setting higher MAD. 
The higher MAD would trigger less frequent irrigation that would result in lower irrigation 
intensity. The process of reducing irrigation intensity becomes more efficient when the farmer 
can utilize a higher instantaneous rate. Thus, a higher well capacity would offer better efficiency 
in reducing the irrigation intensity resulting in smaller decrease in total corn production and 
lower impact on welfare loss.  
The relatively small change or no change in irrigated acreage for well capacity above 
1000 GPM is due to Richfield’s high soil water holding capacity that has enabled farmers with 
high well capacity to reduce irrigation intensity with small or no change in irrigated acreage. In 
conclusion, higher well capacity will offer the farmer the ability to minimize the welfare loss by 
adopting adjustment in intensive margin. Given these disparate variables, namely different 
strategies, different well capacities, and therefore different responses to water constraint policy, 
the end result is varied welfare loss. Thus, an economic model that did not include well capacity 
may misestimate the effect of water constraint policy on welfare loss.  
Finally, a negative correlation exists between water saving and well capacity declining. In 
particular, Figure 5.4 shows a smaller impact of the water constraint policy on water saving than 
the decline in well capacity. In fact, the water constraint policy will not reduce water use if the 
well capacity decreases below 400 GPM because low well capacity as a limiting factor up to 400 
GPM. I observe that the highest water saving is for well capacity at 600 GPM when the water 
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constraint policy results in three inches of water saving per acre. This saving is largely attributed 
to the biggest likely reduction in irrigated acreage. In addition, 600 GPM wells use the highest 
total irrigation amounts initially. In the case of well capacity at and above 700 GPM, the positive 
correlation between water saving and well capacity is largely attributed to the reduction in 
irrigation intensity. I find that farmers apply larger reductions in irrigation intensity when the 
increase in well capacity rises above 700 GPM. The larger reduction in irrigation intensity arises 
because a farm with higher well capacity has a larger range of instantaneous rates, and thus it 
generates a more efficient irrigation schedule with lower irrigation intensity.  I also found that 
the corn yield is higher with the increase in well capacity, when it is at or above 700 GPM. 
Figure 5.4 Water saving affected by well 
capacity declining to Richfield soil 
Figure 5.5 Cost of water saving affected by 
well capacity declining to Richfield soil 
  
 
 
 When the well capacity is at or below 900 GPM, the cost of saving water  increases as 
the well capacity increases. On the other hand, when the well capacity is at or above 1000 GPM, 
the cost of saving water decreases as the well capacity increases(see Figure 5.5). Figure 5.3 and 
Figure 5.4 show that the welfare loss is decreasing and water saving is increasing with the 
increase in well capacity, when well capacity is at or above 1000 GPM. This trend results in a 
lower cost of saving water for higher well capacity. The possible greater adjustment in the 
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intensive margin with less adjustment in the extensive margin could cause a lower cost of saving 
water for higher well capacity. Thus, I can conclude that groundwater depletion will decrease the 
effectiveness of a water constraint policy on water saving.  
 5.2.2 Welfare loss of water constraint policy affected by the decrease in well 
capacity for risk neutral farmer with Valent-Vona soil 
As the soil type changes, I observe the welfare loss is relatively higher for Valent-Vona 
soil than for Richfield soil (see Figure 5.3 and Figure 5.6). The difference in welfare loss may be 
due to differences in soil water holding capacity. Valent-Vona soil retains less water as it has 
lower soil water holding capacity than Richfield soil. Thus, Valent-Vona soil requires higher 
optimal irrigation intensity than Richfield soil, which means its lower soil water holding capacity 
causes a larger impact from the water constraint policy in reducing irrigated acreage for Valent-
Vona soil. The larger decrease in irrigated acreage causes a greater reduction in total crop 
production and net return. Thus, the welfare loss is higher for Valent-Vona soil than for 
Richfield soil when the water constraint policy becomes the limiting factor of water use.  
I observe similar patterns for Valent-Vona and Richfield soils when well capacity is 
below 400 GPM. The farmer does not suffer a welfare loss abiding by the water constraint policy 
when the well capacity is at or below 400 GPM. This result implies that, for the well capacity at 
or below 400 GPM, that well capacity is the limiting factor for water use. A different welfare 
loss scenario occurs for Valent-Vona and Richfield soils when the well capacity is at or above 
500 GPM. The welfare loss of Valent-Vona soil is higher by 43-535% than for Richfield soil. 
Next, for 900 GPM wells, the welfare loss of Valent-Vona soil is higher by 106% than for 
Richfield soil. The implication is the effect of a water constraint policy to profitability depends 
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on soil characteristic. Therefore, a water constraint policy that does not include spatial variability 
in soil may underestimate or overestimate the effect of the policy on farm profitability. 
Given the different effects of well capacity and water constraint policy on welfare loss 
depending on soil type, the water constraint policy induces a farmer to reduce the irrigation 
intensity. However, the farmer may do so only slightly due to lower soil water holding capacity 
of Valent-Vona soil, which means too large a decrease in irrigation intensity will greatly reduce 
the corn yield. Thus, as Valent-Vona soil only allows small decreases in irrigation intensity, this 
means larger decreases in irrigated acreage compared to those for Richfield soil. The different 
rate of changing in irrigation intensity and irrigated acreage due to soil characteristic result in 
different pattern of welfare loss related with well capacity between Valent-Vona soil and 
Richfield soil as shown in Figure 5.4 and 5.6.  
Figure 5.6 Welfare loss from water constraint policy affected by 
well capacity declining for Valent-Vona soil 
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 Figure 5.6 shows that the welfare loss is positively correlated with well capacity when 
the well capacity is above 500 GPM. The positive correlation can be attributed to the larger 
decrease in total crop production for higher well capacity in response to a water policy 
constraint. Due to smaller allowable decreases in irrigation intensity, a farmer would not only 
need to make adjustment in the intensive margin but also in the extensive margin to comply with 
the water constraint policy. Notably, the extensive margin permits smaller adjustment as well 
capacity increases. However, the decrease in total production is greater for higher well capacity 
because of its higher initial total production without a water constraint policy.  
The highest water saving occurs when well capacity is at 900 GPM. The highest water 
saving is attributed to the biggest reduction in irrigated acreage and irrigation intensity for the 
farmer to comply with a water constraint policy. In the case of well capacity between 500 GPM 
and 900 GPM, the positive correlation between water saving and well capacity is attributable to 
the reduction in irrigation acreage and irrigation intensity. Moreover, I find a higher reduction in 
irrigation acreage and irrigation intensity with an increase in well capacity when the well 
capacity is between 500 GPM and 900 GPM. 
The effect of a water constraint policy on the decrease in irrigation intensity with the 
increase in well capacity is smaller when well capacity is above 1000 GPM. In addition, the 
decrease in irrigated acreage is relatively similar to that of a lower well capacity when the 
capacity is above 1000 GPM. Thus, higher well capacity will result in lower water saving (see 
Figure 5.7).  
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Figure 5.7 Water saving affected by well 
capacity declining for land with Valent-
Vona soil 
 
Figure 5.8 Cost of water saving affected by 
well capacity declining for land with Valent-
Vona soil 
  
 
There is a negative correlation between well capacity declining and cost of saving water 
when well capacity is at or above 600 GPM (see Figure 5.8). Thus, the cost of saving water is 
lower when the well capacity declines and this is due to a smaller welfare loss for a lower well 
capacity. Meanwhile, the cost of saving water is higher for 500 GPM wells than for 600 GPM 
wells. This is because the water constraint policy is less binding for 500 GPM wells, which 
results in lower water saving, less welfare loss, and higher cost of saving water compared to 
those findings for wells with 600 GPM. I find that for Valent-Vona soil, the water constraint 
policy has higher effectiveness when the well capacity is between 600 GPM and 900 GPM, as it 
generates higher water saving at lower cost.  
 
 5.3 Welfare loss from water constraint policy affected by risk premium 
This section addresses the effect of water constraint policy to welfare loss, water saving 
and cost of water saving for risk averse farmer. 
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 5.3.1 Welfare loss from water constraint policy affected by risk premium regarding 
Richfield soil 
Figure 5.9 shows that a higher risk premium will induce higher welfare loss when the 
well capacity is at or above 1100 GPM. In addition, the welfare loss for a more risk averse 
farmer increases as well capacity increases. A farmer with a risk premium 20% and 1100 GPM 
well will experience 24% higher welfare loss than  will a risk neutral farmer.  Similarly, a farmer 
with a risk premium 20% and 1500 GPM well will experience 216% more welfare loss than will 
a risk neutral farmer. In fact, the positive relationship between risk premium and welfare loss for 
higher well capacity, at or above 1100 GPM, is due to adjustment in the extensive margin. Thus, 
a farmer with a high well capacity and a higher risk premium makes greater reduction in 
irrigation acreage in response to a water policy constraint, which results in higher welfare loss. 
Also, a farmer with a higher risk premium maintains relatively higher irrigation intensity, which 
in consequence means they will reduce the irrigation acreage at a higher rate in response to a 
water policy constraint. This is so because  relatively high irrigation intensity will offset the 
effect of irrigation acreage reduction with less risk in corn production. However, this pattern is 
not found for lower well capacity. Figure 5.9 shows a higher risk premium does not necessarily 
result in higher welfare loss for lower capacity, e.g. well capacity at or below 900 GPM.   
Water saving increases as risk premium increases for all well capacity levels (see Figure 
5.10), and any increase in water saving is predominantly due to higher reduction in irrigation 
acreage as a result of risk premium increases. The higher risk premium will induce a farmer to 
increase irrigation intensity and reduce irrigation acreage with or without a water policy 
constraint. However, the rate of increase in irrigation intensity is lower a with water constraint 
policy than without such a policy. On the other hand, a  higher rate of irrigation acreage 
117 
reduction occurs as risk premium increases with a water constraint policy compared to without 
water constraint policy. Figure 5.10 shows the highest water saving is when a well capacity is 
600 GPM since 600 GPM wells have the greatest reduction in irrigation acreage and irrigation 
intensity. Furthermore, 600 GPM wells have the highest initial water use without a water 
constraint policy. In addition, the effect of a water constraint policy on water saving for the risk 
averse farmer differs substantially by well capacity if capacity is above 200 GPM. 
Figure 5.9 Welfare loss of water constraint policy affected by risk 
premium for land with Richfield soil 
 
 
Figure 5.11, shows the cost of saving water is negatively correlated with risk premium, a 
condition largely attributable to the effect of water saving. Here is a higher rate of increase in 
water saving compared to the increase in welfare loss as the risk premium increases. Thus, 
higher risk premium will result in a decrease in cost of saving water. In addition, the cost of 
saving water differs substantially by well capacity. 
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Figure 5.10 Water saving affected by risk 
premium for land with Richfield soil 
Figure 5.11 Cost of water saving affected by 
risk premium for land with Richfield soil 
  
 
 
 5.3.2 Welfare loss from water constraint policy affected by risk premium of Valent-
Vona soil 
As the soil type changes,  different correlations emerge between welfare loss  and risk 
premium. For example, higher risk premium will induce lower welfare loss when well capacity is 
at or above 600 GPM for Valent-Vona soil (see Figure 5.12). This is due to the change in optimal 
strategy having less effect on  the change in risk premium for Valent-Vona soil. However, the 
increase in risk premium will slightly decrease the irrigation acreage and slightly increase the 
irrigation intensity. The small change in optimal irrigation strategy is due to Valent-Vona soil 
initially having required high irrigation intensity, which results in a small variation in corn yield. 
In addition, the change in optimal irrigation strategy with the increase in risk premium is smaller 
with a water policy constraint.  Thus, a higher risk premium will result in smaller reduction in 
welfare loss due to less sensitivity to change in optimal irrigation strategy. In addition, a 
relatively small impact of risk averse behavior on welfare loss exists when well capacity is at or 
below 400 GPM because a water constraint policy is not a limiting factor in water use when a 
farmer has low well capacity.  
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Figure 5.9 and Figure 5.12 show that the welfare loss is higher for Valent-Vona soil than 
for Richfield soil. In the case of risk premium 20%, the welfare loss for Valent-Vona soil is 
higher by 38-182% than for Richfield soil. Also, the impact of a water constraint policy on the 
decrease in welfare loss is greater for Valent-Vona soil due to its lower soil water holding 
capacity. However, a farmer with Richfield soil is more sensitive to risk premium changing an 
optimal irrigation strategy. While the higher soil water holding capacity would allow Richfield 
soil to accommodate  greater changes in irrigation strategy,  this is not the case with Valent-Vona 
soil as a risk neutral farmer would have used high amounts of water initially. 
Figure 5.12 Welfare loss of water constraint policy affected by risk averse 
behavior for land with Valent-Vona soil 
 
 
The relationship between water saving and risk premium is indefinite when well capacity 
is at or below 600 GPM (see Figure 5.13). Thus, more risky behavior does not always stimulate 
more water saving. On the other hand, there is a positive relationship between risk premium and 
water saving when well capacity is at or above 700 GPM. The higher risk premium will induce 
relatively higher reduction in irrigated acreage for high well capacity. Meanwhile, the water 
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saving in Valent-Vona soil is relatively less sensitive to the change in risk premium than is 
Richfield soil (see Figure 5.10 and Figure 5.13). This is due to Valent-Vona soil having less 
sensitivity to change in optimal irrigation strategy as the risk premium changes. In the case of 
600 GPM wells, the change in risk premium from risk neutral to 20% will increase the water 
saving by 106% for Richfield soil but for only 49% for Valent-Vona soil. Similarly for 1100 
GPM, the change in risk premium from risk neutral to 20% will increase the water saving by 
33% for Richfield soil but only by 11% for Valent-Vona soil.  
The correlation between cost of water saving and risk premium also is indefinite when 
well capacity is at or below 600 GPM (see figure 5.14). On the other hand, there is a negative 
correlation between risk premium and cost of saving water when well capacity is at or above 700 
GPM (see figure 5. 14). Typically, a higher risk premium will induce lower cost of saving water. 
The negative relationship between risk premium and cost of saving water is because the higher 
risk premium induces more water saving but lower welfare loss when well capacity is at or above 
700 GPM.  
Figure 5.13 Water saving affected by risk 
averse behavior for land with Valent-Vona 
soil 
Figure 5.14 Cost of water saving affected by 
risk averse behavior for land with Valent-
Vona soil 
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 5.4 The effect of different quantity constraints on welfare loss 
This section addresses different quantity constraint on welfare loss  for risk neutral and 
risk averse farmer. 
 5.4.1 The effect of quantity constraint on welfare loss for Richfield soil 
I analyzed the effect of quantity constraint by varying it with the 5-year average as a 
baseline for time constraint. I vary the quantity constraint from 9 to 15 inches, in increments of 1 
inch. The range in quantity constraint will give a sense of when the constraint policy starts to 
have a negative impact on welfare.  
From Figure 5.15 and Figure 5.16, I find negative correlation between welfare loss and 
quantity constraint for both a risk neutral and a risk averse farmer, the latter having a  risk 
premium of 20%. Lower quantity constraint not only reduces the irrigation acreage but also 
decreases the irrigation intensity. As a consequence, as an impact of lower quantity constraint, 
both corn yield and total corn production would decrease. In addition, lower quantity constraint 
not only decreases the net return but also increases the risk to crop production.  
Figure 5.15 Welfare loss affected by 
quantity constraint for risk neutral farmer 
with Richfield soil 
Figure 5.16 Welfare loss affected by 
quantity constraint for risk averse farmer 
with Richfield soil 
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I find negative correlation between quantity constraint and water saving for both a risk 
neutral and a risk averse farmer (see Figure 5.17 and Figure 5.18). The lower quantity constraint 
induces lower water use as the farmer decreases the irrigated acreage and irrigation intensity. 
Accordingly, the rate of decrease in irrigated acreage and irrigation intensity increases as the 
quantity constraint decreases. 
Next, I observe a relatively different threshold of quantity constraint that will impact 
water saving between a risk neutral and a risk averse farmer. Figure 5.17 shows that a water 
constraint policy starts to affect water use for the risk neutral farmer with 1100 GPM, as shown 
by the water saving being not zero when the quantity constraint is at 13 inches. On the other 
hand,  when the quantity constraint is at 15 inches, it starts to have an effect on water use for a 
risk averse farmer with 1100 GPM (see figure 5.18). A similar pattern also emerged for the 
farmer with 900 GPM where the quantity constraint at 12 inches registered an effect for the risk 
neutral farmer. However, a quantity constraint at 15 inches becomes the limiting factor for water 
use when a farmer becomes more risk averse. The different quantity constraint threshold that will 
affect water use between the risk neutral and the risk averse farmer is due to the risk averse 
farmer initially use higher amounts of irrigation water to reduce the risk in corn production. This 
result also suggests risk averse farmer is more sensitive to water constraint policy. 
The effect of a water constraint policy on water saving is different for a risk neutral 
versus a risk averse farmer such that a water constraint policy has a greater effect on water 
saving for the risk averse farmer than for the risk neutral farmer. In the case of a 600 GPM well, 
the 5-year and 9 inches policy will save 100% more water for the risk averse farmer than for the 
risk neutral farmer. Similarly, for a 900 GPM well, the 5-year and 9 inches policy will save 
approximately 43% more water for the risk averse farmer than for the risk neutral farmer. 
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Figure 5.17 Water saving affected by 
quantity constraint for risk neutral farmer 
with Richfield soil 
 
Figure 5.18 Water saving affected by 
quantity constraint for risk averse farmer 
with Richfield soil 
  
 
 
 I find a negative correlation between quantity constraint and cost of water saving for both 
a risk neutral and a risk averse farmer (see Figure 5.19 and Figure 5.20). The negative correlation 
is largely attributable to the higher rate of increase in welfare loss compared to the increase in 
water saving given the decrease in quantity constraint. Figure 5.19 and Figure 5.20 also show 
that the cost of saving water is higher for a risk neutral farmer than for a risk averse farmer. In 
the case of a 900 GPM well with a 5-year and 9 inches policy, the cost of saving water for the 
risk averse farmer is 36% lower than for the risk neutral farmer. My result suggests that the 
economic models that ignore  risk averse behavior will overstate the cost of reducing water use. 
While the overall welfare loss is relatively similar, reduction in water use is larger for the risk 
averse farmer.  
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Figure 5.19 Cost of water saving affected by 
quantity constraint for risk neutral farmer 
with Richfield soil 
 
Figure 5.20 Cost of water saving affected by 
quantity constraint for risk averse farmer 
with Richfield soil 
 
  
 
 
 
5.4.2 The effect of quantity constraint to welfare loss for Valent-Vona soil 
The welfare loss for both the risk neutral and the risk averse farmer for Valent-Vona soil 
is relatively the same (see figure 5.21 and figure 5.22).  in general, the welfare loss for Valent-
Vona soil is higher than that for Richfield soil (see Figure 5.15-16 and Figure 5.21-22). This is 
due to Valent-Vona soil having lower water holding capacity so that more restricted quota 
constraint has a greater negative impact on welfare loss. In addition, Valent-Vona used more 
water without a water constraint so that a given constraint causes larger reduction in water use.  
I find negative correlation between quantity constraint and water saving for both the risk 
neutral and the risk averse farmer (see Figure 5.23 and Figure 5.24). The lower quantity 
constraint induces lower water use as a farmer decreases the irrigated acreage and irrigation 
intensity. Additionally, the rate of decrease in irrigated acreage and irrigation intensity increases 
as the quantity constraint decreases. Moreover, the risk neutral farmer with Valent-Vona soil 
shows a greater decrease in irrigation acreage than the risk neutral farmer with Richfield soil. In 
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addition, I also find relatively little difference in water saving between the risk neutral and the 
risk averse farmer with Valent-Vona soil. Thus, I may conclude that the farmer with Valent-
Vona soil less sensitivity to change in risk premium. 
Figure 5.21 Welfare loss affected by quantity 
constraint for risk neutral farmer with 
Valent-Vona soil 
Figure 5.22 Welfare loss affected by quantity 
constraint for risk averse farmer with 
Valent-Vona soil 
  
 
 
Another effect of lower soil water holding capacity is when the quantity constraint 
becomes a limiting factor in water use. For instance, Figure 5.17 and Figure 5.23 show 14 inches 
as a limiting factor for the risk neutral farmer with Valent-Vona soil, but 13 inches as a limiting 
factor for the risk neutral farmer with Richfield soil.  Clearly the uniform quantity constraint has 
a different impact for different soils,, specifically a more negative impact on welfare loss for soil 
with lower soil water holding capacity.  
All the same, I find negative correlation between quantity constraint and cost of water 
saving for both the risk neutral and the risk averse farmer (see Figure 5.25 and Figure 5.26). In 
fact, a lower quantity constraint will induce higher cost of saving for water for both the risk 
neutral and the risk averse farmer. The negative correlation is largely attributable to the higher 
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rate of increase in welfare loss compared to the rate of increase in water saving with the decrease 
in quantity constraint. 
Figure 5.23 Water saving affected by 
quantity constraint for risk neutral farmer 
with Valent-Vona soil 
Figure 5.24 Water saving affected by 
quantity constraint for risk averse farmer 
with Valent-Vona soil 
 
 
 
The impact of a water constraint policy to water saving and cost of saving water differs 
by soil characteristics and risk averse behavior. Less impact of risk averse behavior on water 
saving and cost of saving water arises for soil with lower soil water holding capacity. It is due to 
risk-neutral farmer with lower soil water holding capacity uses higher water initially. The 
implication is the model that does not includes spatial variability in soil may misestimate the 
impact of risk-averse behavior and water constraint policy on water saving and cost of saving 
water. 
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Figure 5.25 Cost of water saving affected by 
quantity constraint for risk neutral farmer 
with Valent-Vona soil 
 
Figure 5.26 Cost of water saving affected by 
quantity constraint for risk averse farmer 
with Valent-Vona soil 
 
  
 
 
 5.5 Economic implication 
Clearly, the impact of groundwater depletion on the decrease in welfare loss differs by 
soil type. Also, a threshold in well capacity reduction dictates where the groundwater depletion 
causes a rapid decline in welfare. That threshold is when a farmer moves from adjustment in the 
intensive margin to adjustment in the extensive margin in response to a decrease in well capacity. 
The threshold is different for each soil type, and the threshold is higher for soil with lower soil 
water holding capacity. However, identifying this threshold is critical for policymakers 
monitoring the impact of groundwater depletion on welfare loss. 
Imposing a uniform policy constraint will have substantially different welfare impacts 
depending on well capacity and soil type. In addition, a less restricted water constraint policy 
may not work for small well capacity. Also, higher well capacity may not always experience 
greater welfare loss due to a water constraint policy. Ultimately, the impact of a water constraint 
policy based on a particular well capacity differs by soil type. As stated, the greatest negative 
impact of a water constraint policy on welfare loss for Richfield soil is for medium and medium 
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high well capacity, but it is different with Valent-Vona soil, which shows greater negative impact 
for higher well capacity. Thus, an economic model that does not include well capacity and 
spatial variability in soil type may misestimate the effect of a water constraint policy on welfare 
loss.  
The impact of a water constraint policy on welfare loss, water saving, and cost of saving 
water for a particular well capacity are substantially different for risk averse behavior. The 
impact of such a policy on water saving is significantly greater for the more risk averse farmer. 
Therefore, a model that does not include spatially different water availability and risk behavior 
may misestimate the effect of a water constraint policy.  Clearly, identifying risk averse behavior 
is essential to estimate the impact of water constraint policy on water saving. 
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Chapter 6 - The incentive for adoption of more efficient irrigation 
technology and the effect of adoption on water use 
A more efficient irrigation technology can be one strategy to deal with weather 
uncertainty and groundwater depletion since such technology increases irrigation water 
productivity. In this chapter, I study drip irrigation and its impact on water use. First, higher 
irrigation efficiency can increase crop production while also reducing the production risk from 
weather uncertainty. However, despite the benefits of drip irrigation for crop production, the high 
investment cost is one of the major causes of low adoption rates among farmers in the High 
Plains (Bekchanov, Lamers and Martius 2010; Frisvold and Deva 2012). Furthermore, the 
impact of the adoption on total water use is ambiguous (Caswell and Zilberman 1986; Huffaker 
and Whittlesey 2003; Peterson and Ding 2005; Pfeiffer and Lin 2014).  
In general, limited water availability as a function of decrease in well capacity can 
encourage a farmer to adopt more efficient irrigation technology. First, groundwater depletion 
causes a decrease in well capacity that may limit a farm’s ability to manage extensive and 
intensive margin adjustments. A farmer may adjust the extensive margin by changing irrigated 
acreage  and the intensive margin by changing irrigation intensity--the amount of water that can 
be applied per acreage. The adjustment in the extensive margin may affect total crop production, 
whereas the adjustment in irrigation intensity may alter corn yield. Thus, low well capacity may 
not be profitable for more efficient irrigation technology because it can irrigate only a small 
acreage, which would result in low total crop production. Thus, low well capacity may not offset 
the high investment cost of more efficient irrigation technology. Frisvold and Deva (2012) 
mention that one of the important barriers to adopting more efficient irrigation technology is that 
the installation cost is greater than the expected operational cost saving from energy use.  
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Moreover, efficient irrigation technology comes with higher water efficiency, but it does 
not always promote water saving. Instead, an ambiguous impact of more efficient irrigation 
technology on water use often occurs (Huffaker and Whittlesey 2003; Peterson and Ding 2005).  
Additionally, higher investment cost of efficient irrigation technology requires a larger irrigated 
area to make that technology more profitable. Pfeiffer and Lin (2014) state that more efficient 
irrigation technology accordingly might induce a farmer to increase total water use by increasing 
irrigated acreage or increasing irrigation amount per acre. In addition, a farmer may have less 
non-irrigated acreage after adopting more efficient irrigation technology (Pfeiffer and Lin 2014). 
Another issue in many cases is that the key variable of interest is water consumption rather than 
the amount of water pumped. Because a water conservation subsidy is unlikely to give a crop 
producer incentive to reduce water depletion, this situation can, in fact, increase water depletion 
(Ward and Pulido-Velazquez 2008). The issue is that even the inefficient system that pumps 
more water than necessary returns that water to the water system as a recharge. On the other 
hand, drip irrigation may generate higher water consumption that leads to less water recharge 
and a higher rate of depletion. In this chapter, I examine the effect of drip irrigation on 
groundwater extraction rather than consumption as I do not attempt to model aquifer recharge. I 
find an increase in water extraction due to drip irrigation and the effect on water consumption is 
likely to be even larger than center pivot irrigation, so my estimates of the effect of adoption on 
water use are likely conservative. 
A water constraint policy may promote more efficient irrigation technology, but it will 
limit the total water  that farmer can apply. However, more efficient irrigation technology will 
provide greater water productivity so that the crop yield reduction because of the water constraint 
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policy can be minimized. Less efficient irrigation technology, conversely, will use higher 
irrigation intensity so that its profitability is more sensitive to a water constraint policy.  
The irrigation technology I discuss comprises center pivot irrigation and drip irrigation, 
the latter being the more efficient technology, potentially. This study assumes for hypothetical 
simulation that the maximum irrigated acreage is 160 acres.  Specifically, the maximum irrigated 
acreage for center pivot irrigation is 125 acres while the minimum irrigated acreage is 35 acres. 
On the other hand, the maximum irrigated acreage for drip irrigation is 160 acres. The different 
maximum irrigated acreages for center pivot and drip irrigation are due to the shapes of the 
irrigation system. Drip irrigation is assumed to have a square shape that can irrigate all areas, 
while center pivot irrigation has a circle shape with non-irrigated areas in the corners of the 
perceived square.  
My analyses are organized into three separate sections. The first section analyzes the 
impact of groundwater depletion on adopting a more efficient irrigation technology. I also 
explore the impact of adopting more efficient irrigation technology on total water use. Next, I 
evaluate the change in total water by focusing on potential changes in irrigated acreage and 
irrigation intensity. The second section analyzes the impact of a water constraint policy and risk 
averse behavior on adopting more efficient irrigation technology. The risk premium accounts for 
risk averse behavior of the farmer. The final section analyzes the impact of government subsidy 
on adopting more efficient irrigation technology. The analysis of government subsidy will give a 
sense of how the fixed investment cost may affect a farmer’s decision to adopt more efficient 
irrigation technology. Another restriction, the acreage constraint, is applied to drip irrigation 
such that upon being granted the subsidy by the government, a farmer with drip irrigation cannot 
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irrigate more than 125 acres. I also explore how drip irrigation, with the acreage constraint being 
imposed, compares to the existing center pivot irrigation in terms of total water use.  
 
 6.1 The effect of the decrease in well capacity on adopting more efficient 
irrigation technology 
Clearly, drip irrigation is less profitable than center pivot irrigation, and Figure 6.1 shows 
that center pivot irrigation is the more favorable choice for a risk neutral farmer with any well 
capacity level.  Additionally, groundwater depletion, shown by lower well capacity, will not 
affect a farmer’s decision  to adopt drip irrigation. As a matter of fact, the certainty equivalent 
difference between drip irrigation and center pivot irrigation gets higher if well capacity 
decreases to below 600 GPM.  
 
 
 
 
Drip irrigation is less profitable than center pivot irrigation not because of lower revenue 
from corn production but due to higher investment cost. In fact, drip irrigation generates higher 
Figure 6.1 Certainty equivalent comparison between Drip and 
Center pivot irrigation without water constraint policy for risk 
neutral farmer with Richfield 
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revenue from higher total corn production than does center pivot irrigation. However, the higher 
revenue cannot off-set the high investment cost. Thus, drip irrigation is less likely to be adopted 
by a risk neutral farmer, unless a government subsidy program  encourages the farmer to adopt it. 
Figure 6.2 shows that drip irrigation generates not only higher total crop production but also 
higher average corn yield for all well capacity levels. The higher total corn production is not only 
because of higher average corn yield and also because of larger irrigated acreage.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I find a small difference in corn yield between drip and center pivot irrigation when well 
capacity is below 600 GPM (see figure 6.2). On the other hand, the highest difference in corn 
yield between drip irrigation and center pivot irrigation occurs when the well capacity is 600-700 
GPM. Figure 6.2 and Figure 6.3 show that the higher total crop production of drip irrigation for 
land with well capacity below 600 GPM is predominantly due to larger irrigated acreage. In 
Figure 6.2 Crop Production and corn yield comparison between 
Drip and Center pivot irrigation without water constraint policy 
for risk neutral farmer with Richfield soil 
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addition, in the case of well capacity at or above 600 GPM, the higher total crop production of 
drip irrigation is due to larger irrigation acreage and higher corn yield.  
Next, drip irrigation has higher total water use than center pivot irrigation (see Figure 
6.4), but even so, the irrigation cost per acreage is lower than for center pivot irrigation. 
Additionally, Figure 6.5 shows that drip irrigation uses lower irrigation intensity than center 
pivot irrigation; therefore, drip irrigation has higher irrigation efficiency and higher water 
productivity because it uses less water per acreage and still generates higher corn yield. Also, the 
higher total water use for drip irrigation is due to larger irrigation acreage. Nevertheless, the 
conversion from center pivot irrigation to drip irrigation will not save water; instead,  it will 
cause faster rate of groundwater depletion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
My research results show significant decrease in corn yield for drip irrigation when well 
capacity decreases from 600 GPM to at or below 500 GPM (see Figure 6.2). Similarly, total corn 
production using drip irrigation starts to show significant decrease when well capacity decreases 
from 600 GPM to 500 GPM. The significant increase in corn yield when well capacity increases 
Figure 6.4 Total irrigation comparison 
between Drip and Center pivot irrigation 
without water constraint policy for risk 
neutral farmer with Richfield soil 
Figure 6.3 Irrigated acreage comparison 
between Drip and Center pivot irrigation 
without water constraint policy for risk 
neutral farmer with Richfield soil 
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from 500 GPM to 600 GPM is because of the increase in instantaneous rate application. 
Changing the instantaneous rate of application from 5 mm/day to 6 mm/day significantly 
increases the corn yield (see Figure 6.2 and Figure 6.5). Thus, higher well capacity will not only 
give an advantage to drip irrigation by allowing larger irrigated acreage but also significantly 
increase the corn yield.  
 
 
 
Drip irrigation uses lower instantaneous rate than center pivot irrigation (see Figure 6.5). 
Thus, converting to drip irrigation enables a farmer to increase the irrigated acreage. 
Unfortunately, this result can be counter-productive for the objective of more efficient irrigation 
technology to reduce water use and decrease the rate of groundwater depletion, as the increase in 
irrigated acreage will significantly increase total water use.  
 
Figure 6.5  Irrigation intensity and instantaneous rate comparison 
between Drip and Center pivot irrigation without water 
constraint policy for risk neutral farmer with Richfield soil 
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 6.2 The effect of water constraint policy and risk averse behavior on adopting 
more efficient irrigation technology for land with Richfield soil 
 
The water constraint policy may induce adjustment in intensive and extensive margins, 
which may result in lower corn yield and higher risk in corn production. Furthermore, a water 
constraint policy may have greater negative impact on irrigation technology with lower 
efficiency, which may in turn induce the farmer to adopt a more efficient irrigation system. 
However, the trade-off between high investment cost and higher irrigation efficiency for a more 
efficient irrigation system needs further analysis. In addition, higher variation in crop yield for a 
less efficient irrigation system may affect the risk averse farmer considering  a more efficient 
irrigation system. 
This section will use the baseline time constraint of 5 years average varying the quantity 
constraint from 9 to 15 inches, in increments of 1 inch. The analysis will focus on land with well 
capacity of 600 GPM. Finally, I analyze different well capacities (400, 900, 1100, 1500 GPM) 
briefly in this section. 
Quantity constraint and risk averse behavior do not increase the adoption of drip 
irrigation for land with a 600 GPM well capacity. Figure 6.6 shows no incentive for a risk-
neutral farmer with such a capacity to adopt drip irrigation for any quantity constraint level. 
Similarly, a farmer with risk premium 20% would not adopt drip irrigation for any quantity 
constraint level (see Figure 6.7).  
Figure 6.6 and Figure 6.7 show that the difference in certainty equivalent between drip 
irrigation and center pivot irrigation increases for both the risk neutral and the risk averse farmer 
if the quantity constraint becomes smaller. The implication is a smaller quantity constraint may 
decrease the adoption of a drip system for medium well capacity.  Furthermore, the effect of 
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quantity constraint on adoption of drip irrigation is similar for different well capacity levels. 
Supporting this claim, Figure 6.8  shows no connection between quantity constraint and adoption 
drip irrigation for the risk averse farmer with either 400, 900, 1100 or 1500 GPM well capacity. 
Figure 6.6 Certainty equivalent comparison 
between Drip and Center pivot irrigation 
affected by quantity constraint for risk 
neutral farmer with Richfield soil and 600 
GPM 
Figure 6.7 Certainty equivalent comparison 
between Drip and Center pivot irrigation 
affected by quantity constraint for risk 
averse farmer with Richfield soil and 600 
GPM 
  
 
 
Figure 6.9 shows a positive correlation between quantity constraint and irrigated acreage. 
Similarly, irrigation intensity is positively correlated with quantity constraint. Thus, lower 
quantity constraint will result in lower total water use for both drip irrigation and center pivot 
irrigation (see Figure 6.9). I also find that total irrigation amount with drip irrigation is higher 
than with center pivot system when the quantity constraint is at or above 11 inches. Thus, lower 
quantity constraint will promote less water use for both irrigation systems; however, changing 
from center pivot irrigation to drip irrigation will not promote water saving. 
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Figure 6.8 Certainty equivalent comparison between Drip and Center pivot irrigation 
affected by quantity constraint for risk-averse farmer with Richfield soil and 400, 900, 1100 
GPM well capacity 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.9 shows that the risk averse farmer with drip irrigation uses lower irrigation 
intensity and instantaneous rate than does  the farmer with center pivot irrigation. In part, this is 
because drip irrigation offers higher irrigation efficiency, which results in a farmer using lower 
optimal irrigation intensity. However, it also induces a farmer to irrigate a larger area. Thus, the 
higher total irrigation in drip irrigation is due to its larger irrigated acreage.    
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 6.3. The effect of investment subsidy to adoption of drip irrigation 
 
The low adoption of drip irrigation is predominantly due to higher investment cost. 
Addressing cost in this section,  I cover government subsidy for drip irrigation investment. The 
Environmental Quality Incentive Program (EQIP) is a voluntary program that assists the farmer 
and promotes agricultural production and managing sustainable environmental quality (NRCS 
2016a). One of the EQIP requirements is to subsidize drip irrigation to conserve groundwater 
and surface water resources. In addition, EQIP promotion of drip irrigation is intended to 
enhance crop production by better maintaining MAD at a given level with high uniform 
Figure 6.9  Total irrigation, irrigation acreage, irrigation intensity and instantaneous 
rate comparison between Drip and Center pivot irrigation affected by quantity 
constraint for risk averse farmer with Richfield soil and 600 GPM 
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irrigation water application (NRCS 2016a) . LEMA and Walnut Creek IGUCA are two of the 
main priority areas for EQIP implementation due to declining groundwater level and current 
water constraint policy enactment.  
Adopting drip irrigation will not necessarily reduce total water use. Therefore, the 
Environment Quality Incentive Program (EQIP) has set an additional requirement of 10% total 
water use reduction for the drip irrigation subsidy program (NRCS 2016a). Consequently, the 
benchmark of total water use will be from 5-year average irrigated acres divided by water right 
authorized acres. 
I vary the drip irrigation subsidy from 40% to 100%in increments of 20% keeping in 
mind the maximum EQIP subsidy program is $1,698.33 per acre (NRCS 2016a), which is higher 
than 100% of the subsidy for my study. Overall, EQIP tries to provide about 60% cost share 
subsidy according to “Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA)” (NRCS 2014). I also impose two 
constraints: acreage constraint and water constraint. The acreage constraint is the maximum 125 
acres of irrigated acreage for both drip irrigation and center pivot irrigation, and the water 
constraint is the 5-year time average with 11 inches’ constraint. I include two scenarios in the 
subsidy analysis; the first includes only the acreage constraint, but  the second scenario includes 
both acreage constraint and water constraint. The comparison between the two scenarios will 
show how the effect of a less restrictive constraint policy affects the adoption of drip irrigation 
and total water use. 
In the case of the first scenario Figure 6.10 shows that the risk neutral farmer, for all well 
capacity levels, will adopt drip irrigation if the subsidy for drip investment is not less than 80%. 
Thus, the government subsidy would significantly increase the certainty equivalent of drip 
irrigation. For a 60% subsidy, only land with well capacity 300-500 GPM would adopt drip 
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irrigation  due to the difference in irrigated acreage between drip irrigation and center pivot 
irrigation. For well capacity 300-500 GPM, the farmer with drip irrigation can irrigate a larger 
area; thus, the result is higher total crop production compared to that with center pivot irrigation. 
In addition, the farmer with drip irrigation also uses smaller irrigation intensity generating lower 
irrigation cost per acre. This result implies that the decrease in well capacity to a certain level 
may encourage the adoption of drip irrigation. This result also shows non-monotonic adoption of 
drip irrigation according to well capacity.  
For the 60% subsidy in the first scenario, a farmer with land with well capacity at or 
above 600 GPM would not adopt drip irrigation. However, the research shows no irrigated 
acreage different between center pivot and drip irrigation when the well capacity is at or above 
600 PM. Thus, relatively similar total production is likely, but higher investment and 
maintenance cost for drip irrigation would result in lower certainty equivalent for drip irrigation.   
 
   
   
 
 
Figure 6.10 Certainty equivalent comparison between Center 
pivot irrigation and Drip irrigation with investment subsidy 
and acreage constraint for risk neutral farmer with Richfield 
soil 
 
 
vary 
142 
 
Unfortunately, the subsidy for drip investment may have a backfiring effect on water 
saving. In the case of no water policy constraint, Figure 6.11 shows that drip irrigation would use 
higher total irrigation than would center pivot irrigation when the well capacity is at or below 
500 GPM.  The higher total irrigation of drip irrigation would be due to larger irrigated acreage 
(see Figure 6.12). On the other hand, the irrigation intensity of drip irrigation is lower than for 
center pivot irrigation (see Figure 6.12). Thus, drip irrigation may have an effect on water saving 
when the well capacity is at or above 600 GPM  because  it uses lower irrigation intensity for the 
same irrigated acreage compared to center pivot irrigation. This finding is corroborated by 
Caswell and Zilberman (1986), who state that more efficient irrigation technology would result 
in more water use for low marginal productivity of water, but would result in less water use for 
high marginal productivity of water. Ding and Peterson (2012) also found that the cost-share 
program for converting to more efficient irrigation technology is less effective in reducing water 
use in areas with lower saturated thickness, meaning low well capacity. Conversely, converting 
to a more efficient irrigation technology would have more effect on water saving in areas with 
higher saturated thickness. Ultimately, then, higher total water use for well capacity at or below 
500 GPM is due to lower marginal productivity of water. On the other hand, drip irrigation 
adoption with well capacity at or above 600 GPM would result in water saving due to high 
marginal productivity of water.  
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 In the case of no water constraint policy, a drip system would generate some water saving 
for medium and high well capacity, but not a significant amount. However, adopting a drip 
system for either a medium or a high well capacity requires a large subsidy. On the other hand, a 
drip system requires less subsidy at lower well capacities but has a counter effect on water 
saving. The greatest incentive for adopting drip irrigation is for a well at 300-500 GPM, which 
would also result in greater water use. However, if the intent is to achieve water saving, the drip 
system must be backed up with decreases in the quantity of water that farmer can extract because 
the drip system by itself is less effective at generating water saving. In addition, a low well 
capacity, 100-200 GPM, may bear too high a subsidy cost and be less effective in generating 
water saving. While the EQIP policy has required farmers to reduce their historical total water, 
the relevant comparison runs counter to what the farmer would have pumped under the same 
Figure 6.11 Total irrigation water use comparison between Center 
pivot irrigation and Drip irrigation with investment subsidy and 
acreage constraint but without water constraint for risk neutral 
farmer with Richfield soil 
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water restriction with center pivot irrigation system. The farmer who adopts a drip irrigation 
system could decrease irrigation water from historical use but increase water use relative to what 
they would have with a water restriction and a center pivot irrigation system.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Next,, enforcing a water constraint policy would increase the adoption rate of drip 
irrigation. In the case of a 60% subsidy in the second scenario, Figure 6.13 shows that the drip 
irrigation would be adopted by a farmer who has a well capacity 300-1000 GPM. Thus, the 
enforcement of a water constraint policy would have increased the range of the well capacity to 
accommodate the drip irrigation. The wider range in well capacity would be due to drip irrigation 
having more advantage on larger irrigation acreage than would a center pivot irrigation under a 
government enforced water constraint policy because that farmer would have reduced irrigated 
acreage. On the other hand, a farmer with drip irrigation does not reduce irrigated acreage. The 
higher irrigation efficiency of drip irrigation enables that farmer to irrigate more acreage by 
applying smaller irrigation intensity than would center pivot irrigation. 
 
Figure 6.12 Irrigated acreage and irrigation intensity comparison between Center pivot 
irrigation and Drip irrigation with investment subsidy and acreage constraint but without 
water constraint for risk neutral farmer with Richfield soil 
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This research shows  no impact of drip irrigation adoption on water saving if the 
government enforces a water constraint policy. Figure 6.14 shows that drip irrigation uses 
relatively more total water than does center pivot irrigation for all well capacity levels. The 
higher total irrigation is due to larger irrigated acreage when the well capacity is at or below 
1000 GPM (see Figure 6.15). Furthermore, the higher total irrigation for drip irrigation when 
well capacity is at or above 1100 GPM is due to drip irrigation having higher irrigation intensity 
but the same irrigated acreage as center pivot irrigation.  
Overall, the water constraint policy causes lower marginal productivity of water and land 
relative to the crop. Also, the increase in water use would greatly increase the total corn 
production especially for smaller well capacities. My simulation results show that drip irrigation 
can increase the total corn production by up to 50% compared to center pivot irrigation. In 
Figure 6.13 Certainty equivalent comparison between Center 
pivot irrigation and Drip irrigation with investment subsidy, 
acreage constraint and water constraint for risk neutral farmer 
with Richfield soil 
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addition, drip irrigation might increase the water use by up to 31%. Thus, adopting a more 
efficient irrigation technology would result in higher total irrigation water use.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 6.14 total irrigation water use comparison between 
Center pivot irrigation and Drip irrigation with investment 
subsidy, acreage constraint, quantity constraint, and no quantity 
constraint for risk neutral farmer with Richfield soil 
 
Figure 6.15 Irrigated acreage and irrigation intensity comparison between Center pivot 
irrigation and Drip irrigation with investment subsidy, acreage constraint and quantity 
constraint for risk neutral farmer with Richfield soil 
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Chapter 7 - Summary and conclusion 
The risk in crop production due to weather uncertainty and limited water availability are 
two major challenges of managing irrigation water. Understanding how a farmer decides an 
irrigation strategy requires understanding how risk averse behavior impacts the decision. For 
instance, the effort to reduce risk caused by weather uncertainty will be limited by water 
availability; e.g. limited well capacity and water constraint policy.  
Consequently, I investigated the impact that decrease in well capacity has on optimal 
irrigation strategy. I found a particular minimum optimal instantaneous rate per irrigated acreage 
depending on soil water holding capacity since lower soil water holding capacity requires a 
higher optimal instantaneous rate and higher irrigation intensity to provide sufficient water for 
the corn. Moreover, a minimum optimal instantaneous rate will provide sufficient water for a 
crop in response to weather uncertainty. I found that farmers with initially large well capacities 
adjust along the intensive margin in response to reductions in the well capacity because such 
adjustments offer decreasing returns to intensity, which in turn results in small reductions in 
returns.   Conversely, I found that farmers with initially low well capacity adjust along the 
extensive margin in response to reductions in well capacity. This adjustment is optimal because 
the extensive margin exhibits constant returns to scale whereas further adjustments along the 
intensive margin offer increasing returns to intensity resulting in large decreases in returns—corn 
yield becomes highly sensitive to further reductions in water intensity.  
Importantly, I was able to identify the well capacity threshold when a farmer moves from 
adjustment in the intensive margin to adjustment in the extensive margin in response to reduced 
well capacity. This threshold indicates when the well capacity decline begins to cause rapid 
reduction in welfare. Furthermore, I find that the threshold is different by soil type. The net 
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return for land with lower soil water holding capacity soil is more sensitive to decline in well 
capacity than land with higher capacity. Thus, land with lower soil water holding capacity will 
have a higher well capacity threshold at which the farmer will move from adjustment in the 
intensive margin to the extensive margin. Identifying this threshold accounting for spatial 
variability is critical for policymakers monitoring the welfare impact of groundwater depletion.  
 I also analyzed how risk averse behavior will affect the change in optimal irrigation 
strategy. Apparently, the increase in risk averse behavior induces the farmer to increase total 
irrigation water use significantly. This result implies models that do not account for risk averse 
behavior will underestimate total water use. Thus, a higher rate of groundwater depletion may 
occur if a farmer has more risk averse behavior. Also, such behavior will induce higher irrigation 
intensity but lower irrigated acreage for farmers with low and medium well capacity. 
Accordingly, a farmer likely will increase irrigation intensity by using higher instantaneous rate 
but as a consequence will have to reduce the irrigated acreage. The lower net return due to lower 
irrigated acreage would be offset by less risk in corn yield due to higher irrigation intensity and 
higher instantaneous rate. Meanwhile, the farmer with high well capacity likely will increase the 
irrigation intensity but keep the irrigated acreage constant since they are already constrained by a 
maximum acreage. Overall, the increase in irrigation intensity is higher for low and medium well 
capacity than for high well capacity. The former is due to a lower range of instantaneous rate, 
which may result in a less efficient irrigation schedule to increase irrigation intensity. 
 Next, the impact of changes in risk premium to changes in water use is smaller for 
Valent-Vona soil than for Richfield soil. This is because Valent-Vona has initial higher irrigation 
intensity for a risk neutral farmer and offers less variation in corn yield than does Richfield soil. 
149 
Meanwhile, higher variation in corn yield causes Richfield soil to be more sensitive to risk 
averse behavior changing. 
Then, I analyzed the impact of a more restricted water constraint policy on optimal 
irrigation strategy and found ower quantity constraint will result in lower average net return and 
lower total water use. Moreover, the effect of the quantity constraint on average net return and 
water use depends on well capacity. A quantity constraint as small as 9 inches has no impact on a 
well capacity below 400 GPM, which means the water constraint policy is not a limiting factor in 
water use for low well capacity. On the other hand, lower quantity constraint has a direct impact 
on a decrease in total water use for medium and high well capacities. Lower quantity constraint 
will induce the farmer to reduce irrigation intensity and irrigation acreage. The decrease in 
irrigated acreage may enable the farmer to increase the instantaneous rate, which may generate 
more efficient irrigation scheduling to acquire lower irrigation intensity. Also, the higher 
instantaneous rate may enable the farmer to have relatively larger reduction in irrigation intensity 
but without significantly decreasing the corn yield. Moreover, I found a larger effect of lower 
quantity constraint on net return and water use for Valent-Vona soil than for Richfield soil. The 
difference in the degree of impact of quantity constraint of water use for each soil type is due to 
the difference in soil water holding capacity.  
The impact of risk averse behavior on total water use is different for a farmer who is 
exposed to water constraint policy versus the farmer who faces no restriction. In the former case, 
the higher risk premium will always result in higher total water use, and specifically, a higher 
risk premium will induce the farmer with the high well capacity to increase total water use. 
However, the effect of higher risk premium on total water use for a farmer with lower well 
capacity is uncertain when the government enforces a water constraint policy. Furthermore, a 
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water constraint policy reduces the impact of a higher risk premium on increased total water use, 
and the higher risk premium will induce the farmer to irrigate less acreage and increase irrigation 
intensity with or without a water policy constraint. Next, the rate of decrease in irrigated acreage 
is higher for  a farmer facing a water constraint policy than for a farmer without a binding water 
constraint. In addition, the impact of a higher risk premium on change in total water use is 
relatively smaller for Valent-Vona soil than for Richfield soil. It is due to Valent-Vona soil 
requiring relatively higher irrigation intensity than Richfield soil, thus having lower variation in 
corn yield. 
Next, I examined the impact of the decrease in well capacity on welfare loss. The 
magnitude of welfare loss due to well capacity declining is not only determined by how large the 
depletion is but also by what extent that well capacity decreases. Thus, a smaller depletion but 
with a lower level of saturated thickness may have a bigger effect on welfare loss. On the other 
hand, a larger depletion but with moderate level of saturated thickness may cause a smaller 
welfare loss. Likewise, the decrease in well capacity from 1500 GPM to 600 GPM may generate 
a smaller welfare loss than a decrease from 800 GPM to 400 GPM. 
More closely, I investigated the impact of water constraint policy on welfare loss. The 
prominent result is that welfare loss due to water constraint policy does not always increase with 
increases in well capacity, depending on soil type. This result can be attributed to a limitation on 
the instantaneous rate for each well capacity that can be utilized in response to water constraint 
policy and soil water holding capacity characteristic. A farmer with very high well capacity will 
focus more on adjustment in the intensive margin in response to water constraint policy, thus 
reducing irrigation intensity to minimize the welfare loss. Higher well capacity provides a larger 
range of instantaneous rates that a farmer can utilize for irrigation. Thus, any reduction in 
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acreage is very small or not needed in the case of very high well capacity.  Indeed, the 
adjustment on the intensive margin only without changing irrigated acreage may only occur if 
the soil has high soil water holding capacity. This is because such capacity allows a farmer to 
have a large reduction in irrigation intensity without severely reducing the corn yield. However, 
this is not the case for soil with lower soil water holding capacity. The water constraint policy 
has a greater welfare loss effect for such soil combined with higher well capacity. Thus, model 
that does not include spatial variability in well capacity and soil type may overestimate or 
underestimate the impact of policy constraint on welfare loss. 
 Then, I examined the difference in welfare loss for both the risk neutral and risk averse 
farmer. The welfare loss per unit of reduced water use is higher for the risk neutral farmer than 
for the risk-averse farmer. The overall welfare losses are relatively similar, but reduction in water 
use is greater for the risk averse farmer. The reduction in water use being higher for the risk 
averse farmer is due to that farmer using higher irrigation intensity initially without water 
constraint policy. Thus, limiting water use may greatly reduce water use of the risk averse 
farmer, and a water constraint policy may be an effective means to reduce total water use 
especially for the farmer with very risk averse behavior. My result suggests that the economic 
models that ignore risk averse behavior will overstate the cost of reducing water use.  
Finally, I examined the incentive to adopt drip irrigation technology. Groundwater 
depletion, shown by the decrease in well capacity, will not induce the adoption of drip irrigation; 
similarly, lower quantity constraint does not generate a sufficient incentive for the risk neutral or 
risk averse farmer to change the irrigation system from center pivot irrigation to drip irrigation. 
The benefit from increasing irrigation efficiency, namely a strategy to deal with the decrease in 
well capacity, is not sufficient to offset the effect of high investment cost.  Therefore, the lower 
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profitability of drip irrigation is predominantly driven by its significantly higher investment cost 
compared to that of center pivot irrigation.  
Drip irrigation requires lower optimal instantaneous rate of application and lower 
irrigation intensity than does center pivot irrigation. Thus, adopting drip irrigation will enable a 
farmer to increase the irrigated acreage but also result in an overall increase in water use. 
Additionally, adopting drip irrigation is most likely to occur with landowners with small and 
medium well capacity, both of which have a low marginal productivity of water. In such cases, 
drip irrigation may greatly increase the total crop production and income. However, it may cause 
a backfire effect on water saving as drip irrigation may generate higher total irrigation water use 
than center pivot irrigation when the land has a low marginal productivity of water. My study 
also simulates water use with drip and center pivot irrigation assuming government applied water 
policy constraint and acreage constraint. The counterfactual finding is that a farmer who adopts 
drip irrigation system may use less water than historical use would show, but use more water 
than with center pivot irrigation. Clearly, a water constraint policy causes drip irrigation to use 
more water than center pivot irrigation since drip irrigation irrigates more acreage. Those results 
imply that a government subsidy for drip irrigation might actually increase groundwater 
extraction in areas with a policy constraint.  
Future research could evaluate the sensitivity of water price and corn price in the analysis 
as both would greatly affect the total water use and optimal irrigation strategy. Another research 
direction is the impact of non-irrigated cash rental rates to optimal irrigation strategy. The higher 
non-irrigated cash rental rate may induce a farmer to reduce irrigated acreage to lessen the risk of 
weather uncertainty with regard to crop production. Thus, such rental rate may significantly 
affect total water use. 
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Analysis of a larger range of soil parameters is also a possible avenue for future research. 
Added to research of risk averse behavior, such variables may give more implications for spatial 
policy. The effect of different distributions of weather uncertainty could also be explored, 
particularly in relation to risk averse behavior. Different distributions may generate patterns of 
how limitation in well capacity may affect total water use.  
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